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**Politics, Media and Journalism
in Greece**

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I hereby certify that this material, which I know submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of PhD is entirely my own work and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to analyze the relationship between politics and media in Greece. The relations of the two fields are defined mainly by the underdevelopment of Greek capitalism.

This fact had a decisive contribution in the delay of democratization of the political institutions but also in the delay of development of a massive press.

During its emergence, the Greek press was an instrument for the propagatory of national ideas and supporting the movement for national liberation.

Later it played an important role in the creation of a constitutional state. The press during that phase was not simply political, but a political institution of power.

Even during the period of political divisions of the Greek political system, press functioned inside these divisions, not only by supporting but also by expressing either conservative or liberal political forces.

The appearance of radio and later of television was connected with state interference and state control. Both these media, until recently, comprised an integral ideological mechanism of the state and the political powers.

The de-regulation of the broadcasting field and the upgraded role of media, and especially of television, did not decrease the degree of composition of these relationships.

The entry and the domination of businessmen with main interests in other economic fields expanded the relationship between political power and media on economic level.

From the establishment of the Modern Greek State until today, politics and media not only continue to have a close relationship but one depends on the other. The media supported politically and ideologically the political power and in turn the political power supported and provided the media with vast subsidies and public contracts.

This thesis supports that in Greece historically, there was developed a relationship of interdependence between the political power and the media, which reflected different characteristics at different historical periods. Even nowadays this interdependence continues to exist, taking the form of Media Clientelism.

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to describe and analyze the relationship between the media and politics in Greece. The strong tendencies of commercialization in the field of the media, which developed in the 1990s, combined with earlier the significant changes in politics, led to a re-examination and re-definition of the relationship between the two fields. It is well known that the development of a media system is influenced by population and cultural traits, physical and geographical characteristics, and political, social and economic conditions (Lowenstein and Merrill: 1990, Hiebert, Ungurait and Bohn: 1982). However, the press and broadcasting systems have a close relationship to the politico-economic system in which they exist. Governments regulate broadcasting systems and the press in ways that reflect attitudes towards economic organization, the rights of individuals, political traditions, and so on (Papathanassopoulos: 2004) and governments may treat the different media in significantly different ways (Seymour-Ure: 1987). However, this relationship is rather interactive than has one-directional: the media is not only influenced by politics and political institutions, but also the latter are influenced by the media.

Greece is an interesting case for studying these relationships. The country's dominant characteristic is the delay in the development of capitalism that influenced not only the two fields whose relationship I will try to analyze, but also the whole spectrum of economic, social and cultural life. This fact attributed certain basic characteristics to the Greek society: a late development of industry, weak political institutions, continuous state interference and, mainly, an atrophied civil society and a dominant system of clientelistic relations (Charalambis: 1989). This is certainly related to the particularities of the modern Greek history. After

the national revolution of 1821 and the foundation of the modern Greek state, the country experienced a storm of important political events: foreign intervention, military coups, wars, revolutions, civil wars and dictatorships. Greek society was continuously on the move and experiencing change, and that had a definitive influence on the constant transformation of the political institutions. The political history, and its particularities, are therefore significant for the study of a media system, since as Hallin and Papathanasopoulos have pointed out: 'The transformation of many political institutions-including the mass media- are often slow and uneven and for that reason a knowledge of political history is crucial to understanding current institutions' (Hallin and Papathanasopoulos: 2002:182).

This is because the approach of this dissertation focuses the political history of this country, since it aims to describe and analyse the development of the complicated relationship between politics and media. Through the historical exploration of these two fields, it will be managed to define their exact relationship and, mainly, the degree of influence that one has on the other.

In other countries, like the Great Britain and USA, there has been also a kind of relationship between politics and the media. This relationship, however, differs from historical period to period and from country to country. In the USA, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the content of the newspapers 'was dominated by politics and advocacy, reflecting their close ties to political parties and interest groups' (Baldasty: 1992: 3). A similar situation existed in Great Britain as well, from the middle of the 19th century (Curran-Seaton: 1991: 45). But in these countries, the relationship between politics and media has changed towards the end of the nineteenth century. Newspapers attained autonomy from the political parties and the political power, whereas the entry of businesspeople reinforced the tendency for their transformation to a clearly commercial product.

Did the same thing happen in Greece too? Or did the relationships between politics and the media follow a different path because of the delay in the development of industry, the general political instability and the political crisis? Based on that assumption, I will try to answer the follow questions: a) Did a relationship develop between politics and the media in Greece during the 20th century? b) what was its exact form during each historical period? And, d) does it continue to exist nowadays?

Nevertheless, this thesis can not be limited only to the exploration of the relationship between the two fields. Parallel to that, it will try to analyze and explore whether these relationships affect the media's structure, the development of the journalistic profession and the education of the professionals.

This thesis maintains that the relationship between politics and media in Greece was and continues to be a relationship of interdependence. Of course, from period to period this interdependence had a different form, under the existence of different historical conditions. With the entry of businesspeople in the field of the press during the 1980s and the deregulation of the broadcasting system in the beginning of the 1990s, this interdependence took a new form. It was the form of 'media clientelism', if not "interplay", which will be approached and defined within the main body of this thesis. Towards the end of the twentieth century, the role of the media in Greece is further reinforced against politics, because of their upgraded role on the one hand, and of the limitation of the influence of politics into big groups of citizens, on the other.

The Greek experience may thus be regarded as a case study in which to test some generalizations that have been offered to describe the process of the media interplay and clientelism in Latin America and Southern Europe analysed by Daniel Hallin and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos. The thesis id focused on

Greece since the Greek case, I believe, it offers another example how the changing structure of the media system is related to and at the same time affects, the political system of a society. Moreover, the case of Greece provides another example of the argument that in the age of globalization, a media system may be no longer remain unique and isolated, but on the other hand carries out its significant differences, which continue because the political history of every country is strongly implanted within its media system.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

The main attempt of this thesis is to describe and analyse the above mentioned relationship through significant periods of the history of the modern Greek state. Therefore, the thesis is organised around these axes, and at the same time it tries to interrelate the developments in the Greek political history to the developments of the media system of the country and the journalist profession: In each chapter it first provides an overarching overview with the issues in the political world and then it relates them to the media system and the journalistic profession at the same political period.

In the first chapter, the thesis provides with a historic review of the political situation and the role of the press from the creation of the Greek State until the Second World War. Particular emphasis is put on the involvement of the press in the efforts for the creation of a constitutional, liberal state and its role during the emergence of the political divisions, as they appeared after the first decade of the twentieth century. At the same time emphasis is given on the appearance of 'literary journalism', on the efforts for the creation of professional unions and of a journalistic school, and on the press subsidies.

The second chapter gives a detailed account of the political situation, since the after the war developments led to the creation of an autarchic state that limited human rights and the freedom of press. These political divisions continued to define the profile of the press and to give it a strong ideological and political orientation. There is a special reference on the expansion of the press subsidies, which are used as state intervention.

The third chapter offer a thorough report of the political situation during the 'colonel's dictatorship' and the mechanisms of censorship that it developed. It is also examined the newspapers' stance towards the *junta* as well as the role of the journalistic professional unions.

In the forth chapter emphasis is given to the process of the country's democratization, the massiveness of the parties and the appearance of new political divisions. There is a special report on the gradual entry of businesspeople in the press and on the new forms of interdependence that emerged in the relations between politics and media.

In the fifth chapter we put emphasis on the political developments and on the process of deregulation of the radio-television field and the formation of new media market. Finally, in this introductory chapter, it is discussed the methodology used in this thesis and the relevant literature regarding the relationship between politics and media.

METHODOLOGY

This research has a multi-methodological character employing a historical approach. It is known that classifying a research method does not necessarily mean that only one approach has been selected and the researcher may not use

other methods. There are, for example, occasions when the researcher draws on empirical techniques and interviews.

The historical method of research adopted here usually applies to all fields of study because it encompasses their origins, growth, theories, personalities, crisis etc. Both quantitative and qualitative variables can be used in the collection of historical information. Once the decision was made to conduct historical research, there were particular steps that the author followed. Busha and Harter (1980) detail six steps for conducting historical research: a) the recognition of a problem or the identification of a need for certain historical knowledge b) the gathering of as much relevant information about the problem or the topic as possible; c) appropriate the forming of hypothesis that tentatively explain relationships between historical factors d) collection and organisation of evidence and the verification of the authenticity and veracity of information and its sources; e) selection, organisation and analysis of the most pertinent collected evidence and the drawing of conclusions; and f) the recording of conclusions in a meaningful narrative.

The mentioned steps were followed during the preparation of the present dissertation. There were a variety of places to obtain historical information. Primary sources are the most sought after in historical research. Primary resources are first hand accounts of information like for example personal diaries, eyewitness accounts of events and oral histories. Primary sources, for instance, are the small in number published biographies and stories written by journalists during inter-war period which since then are out of printing. Secondary sources of information are records or accounts prepared by someone other than the person who participated in or observed an event. Secondary resources can be very useful

in giving a researcher a grasp on a subject and may provide extensive bibliographic information for delving further into a research topic.

The classification of the material was done based on the historical periods that are mainly defined by the political situation and the important events that rationally separate one period from another. For example, the Second World War and the establishment of the dictatorship in 1967 are events that change the facts in politics and also the media. Finally, we selected the year 1990 to separate the period after the fall of the dictatorship. This year is extremely important not so much because of the political developments, although they are important, but mainly because of the radical change that took place in the field of the media with de-regulation.

Each historical period is divided into three subchapters: a) political context b) media developments and c) ancillary developments. This thesis is organized with the following scheme.

1. The period from the emergence of the Greek press and the establishment of the Greek State until the beginning of the Second World War. We considered this unit necessary because it constitutes the basis of modern Greek political history but, also, the shaping of the press. It represents a unit of general reference and, in a way, a historical introduction. The emphasis was given to developments after the Second World War.
2. From the Second World War until the establishment of the Colonels dictatorship in April 1967. This period has very specific characteristics that lend it autonomy. Civil war and the semi-parliamentary system characterize this period and differentiate it from the others. Because of the particular circumstances the political context is reinforced, compared to other periods.

3. From 1967 until the fall of the dictatorship in 1974. This period is unique from every aspect, because of the political status and the influence it had on the media. This period helps us to make a more rational division of the units, as we have mentioned above.
4. From 1974 until 1990, the year when the deregulation of the broadcasting system took place.
5. From 1990 until today. This is a period during which the field of the media has changed radically because of the prevalence of private media.

While writing this thesis many problems were faced mainly because of few available sources concerning the history of the press in Greece. This fact relates to the absence of research on this particular field, because of the non-existence of University Departments of Communication and Media Studies in 1990. In reality, literature on the development of the press is very limited, especially for the period until 1974. The very few studies and dissertations were written mainly by journalists of the period, and almost all are out of print. Some of these were found, after many efforts, in certain bookshops that sell old editions. Similar difficulties occurred while searching for appropriate material in the *Ephemeris tis Kivernisis* (Government Gazette) records. All the laws of the Greek State are published in this newspaper, including the laws that regulate the press. The research on these particular archives was necessary in order to record the various laws that limited the freedom of the press and others that regulated the general function of the newspapers, the journalistic associations and the press subsidies. This particular record was not computerized until 1979. Despite the difficulties, the archival research we undertook managed to locate resources that were useful for our dissertation and which could be valuable for any future research. The interviews were also important for the collection of facts and the recording of views,

wherever we decided this was necessary. For example, the exact magnitude of the press subsidies by the General Secretary of Communication is being published here for the first time. On some occasions we searched for information through e-mail, and the Internet was also utilised.

POLITICS AND MEDIA: A LITERATURE REVIEW

Few would argue with the notion that the institutions of the mass media are important to contemporary politics. Yet the media are not just neutral observers but also political actors. There are various theoretical approaches, which aim to tackle this relationship. To analyse all different theories and schools is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Classical Marxism proposes an opposition between superstructure and economic base. A Marxist tradition sees the media as integrated into the existing economic and political elites and therefore reflecting their interests. The different schools of thought within Marxist media theory are categorised and listed in three paradigms: structuralist, culturalist and political economy (Gurevitch et al: 1982: 8).

Media political economy considers ideology as subordinate to the economic infrastructure (Curran et al: 1982: 26). Graham Murdock and Peter Golding (1977) deem that a 'critical' political economy approach' that locates the power of media in the economic processes and structures of media production is the most important way to analyse the current and past developments, such as ownership concentration, conglomeration and content of the media systems. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1988) see media as close to an instrument of class domination, because of the interests of conglomerates are reflected in the commercial press and the broadcasting outlets they control.

The relationship between politics and media has begun to develop as a rather semi-autonomous research field, within social sciences, in the last three decades. Historically the issue of mass media's relationship to politics has been framed by the idea of propaganda and fear of its effect on mass society (Street: 2005: 19). For instance, Lasswell wrote his doctoral dissertation on propaganda and that became his first book (Schramm: 1997:32). The so-called 'Frankfurt School' turned its attention to the role of the media after the fascist success in Germany in 1933 (Curran and Seaton: 1991: 249). The Frankfurt theorists tried to explain the role of the press and radio, which were extensively used by Nazis, as means of propaganda. These approaches although they were different in ideological and epistemological departures, they had to do more with the effects of the media to the public rather than a specific research approach concerning media's relationship to politics itself on the basis of political and economic structures. The latter was accompanied by the historical orientation of communication research with media effects. According to Hallin and Mancini 'For many years empirical research in communication was almost synonymous with the media effects paradigm which was concerned not with larger media structures but with the effects of particular messages on individual attitudes and beliefs' (Hallin and Mancini: 2002: 15).

John Street (2005: 19-20) proposes four additional categories of research focusing mass media's relationship to politics.

a) The 'political effects' research which is concerned and organized around the elections;

b) Research that has been focused on political communication, party organisation and government communication;

c) Research that has been devoted to the relationship between public policy and the media which has to do also with regulation of media and broadcasting policy and

d) Research that has been focused on the relationship between media and democracy.

Street's (2005:18) proposes three theoretical schisms regarding the relationship between the politics and the mass media. These are those represented by pluralism, constructivism and structuralism.

Pluralism, as a theoretical approach supports that media effects are limited or improvable, the effects of watching television news and reading newspaper are largely positive, that the mass media contribute positively to political knowledge (Norris: 2000: 212) and that the media act only as instrumental inter-mediaries between agents and the options offered by the political system.

Constructivism sees the political world that it is re-constituted according to the conventions of the medium in which it comes to exist; it is constructed as 'reality' by the media that present and report it, a reality in which politics is a superficial game of appearances (Street: 2005: 23). Bob Franklin, for instance, regards that the spin doctors and advertising executives were recruited by governments and parties to disempower citizens and to diminish politics (Franklin: 1994). According to Street, Franklin approach could be located within constructivism.

The third theoretical approach is that of *structuralism*. The development of the media has to be understood as part of a larger process of state formation and capitalist development. Garnham, for example, writes that all theories of the media rest upon historical theories as to the process of the historical development of media institutions and practices and their relationship to the development of

modernity and its characteristic social structures and practices' (Garnham: 2000: 38). According to Street, Garnham represents an account of the politics-mass media relationship that locates it within the structures of the political economy that organise both (2005:29).

This theoretical schism and the research categories are opposed by Corner and Robinson who propose other research categories including the play-off between media-centric and politics-centric accounts. Media-centric accounts have tended to privilege the role and functions of media and place politics within an outer framework, whilst politics-centric accounts still have a tendency to regard media as an external, one among others, impacting upon political processes (Corner and Robinson: 2006: 49). Corner and Robinson criticism on Street theoretical approaches, noticed, the absence of any reference to critical theory and especially the work of Habermas (1989). They also support the idea that the work of Garnham it can be compared with other political economy accounts (Corner and Robinson: 2006:51) like for example the works of Murdock and Golding (1974) and Herman and Chomsky (1988). They also questioned 'how politics is located within the developing frameworks of international media research and how political science responds to the changes that media have introduced to its core agenda of inquiry' (Corner and Robinson: 2006: 52). The works, for instance, of Hallin and Papathanasopoulos (2002), Hallin and Mancini (2004), Esser and Pfetsch (2004) and Papathanassopoulos (2004) are comparative studies which can contribute in the developing of the international media and politics research. Their approach is mainly adopted by this thesis. However, each country as it was noted above presents its own particularities, and in the following pages I will try to analyse them within the Greek context.

Between media and politics: the case of Greece

In 1974 Greece liberated from the colonel's dictatorship and entered to a successful permanent transition to liberal democracy. That transition encouraged an increased interest on the part of historians and social scientists in Greece as a country with a particular historical experience (Tsoukalas: 1981, Mouzelis: 1978). In this thesis, I will argue that the late and contested transition to democracy in Greece, as in other Southern European countries, such as Spain and Portugal, has produced distinct patterns of relationship between the media and the political world. The mass media in Greece have been intimately involved in the political conflicts that spot the history of the country, and there is a strong tradition of regarding them as means of ideological expression and political mobilization. At the same time, the development of commercial media market was relatively weak, leaving the media often dependent on the state, political parties or wealthy private patrons, and inhibiting the development of the media as autonomous institutions (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos: 2002). These patterns are changing due to the country's entry to the European Union, and the Europeanisation of the economy and the institutions (Harcourt: 2002, Venturelli: 1991:197). Regardless the strong EU influences, the Greek media have remained distinctive in important ways.

Greek Politics and media

The media developed in Greece as an institution of the political world more than of the market. In Northern Europe and North America, the commercial bourgeoisie, whose success in a market economy depended on a steady flow of reliable information about trade, navigation, technology and politics, played a key role in the development of the first newspapers. A mass circulation press then began to develop as masses of literate ordinary people--workers, shopkeepers and

farmers entered the market and, through the development of mass political parties, the political process (Hallin and Mancini: 2004).

In Greece, the development of the bourgeoisie was weaker, and early newspapers were tied more to the other purposes, such as the independence of the country or the influence of the nascent state rather than in the market, which was miniscule. Besides, the number of the educated was extremely small - over seventy percent of the population was illiterate in the 1880s-, and the whole discussion about the fate of the country was done with the small circles of the elite, which was also expressing its views in their newspapers (Mayer: 1957, 1959, 1960, Papalexandrou: 1971, Koumarianou: 1971). By and large, the purpose of early Greek newspapers was not commercial, nor rooted in the functions of information and entertainment were central to the development of commercial newspaper, as in the Central Europe and the USA. Their purpose was the expression of ideas, both literary and political.

Commercial newspapers emerged much later, and newspaper circulation began to rise in Greece after the 1950s. But a true mass circulation press, as in other Northern and Central European countries, never fully emerged in Greece. Since their circulations were not large, Greek newspapers were never as profitable as their counterparts in other European countries, and this resulted, as I will show in the following chapters of this thesis, to a 'permanent' relation with the state, as with the case of public subsidies. In fact, as we shall see in this thesis the state has played a decisive role in the media sector. This could be easily seen in the press laws. First, by enforcing the laws, and second, by providing sizeable financial aid to the press, on which individual enterprises become dependent because they cannot cover their production costs (Papathanassopoulos: 2001). Later on, this situation was mixed with the advertising market and the advertisers.

Since the sales could not support the press revenues, the major portion of the newspapers' revenues in the last decades arrived from the advertising market.

In this thesis, I will try to show that the Greek experience could be seen as case study of the pattern of media development in Southern Europe (Hallin and Mancini: 2004). In Greece a vigorous opinion press emerged in the nineteenth century, and the press played a key role in the institution of the modern state during. The first Greek newspapers were exile papers published under Turkish occupation, which lasted until the 1830s (Enepekides: 1965). Greek history is marked by sharp political conflict and frequent alternation between dictatorship--or occupation--and democracy. Greek newspapers have for the most part developed as political papers with limited readership (Zaharapoulos and Paraschos: 1993).

In Greece a strong party press developed in the early twentieth century, which for both countries was part of a long period of political democracy. The 'constant' political upheavals, the dictatorships and political instability interrupted any chance for the development of a pluralist party press; but it re-emerged strongly in the immediate periods. As in most cases, the political history of a country reflects the media system, in Greece the long periods of dictatorial rule and political instability obstructed the development of mass parties, and certainly of the mass press. For example, since its inception the Greek press coincided with the struggle for independence from the Turks in 1821 and its development has paralleled the growth of political life in the nascent Greek state. The establishment of political parties in the late nineteenth century paralleled the start and the growth of the modern Greek press. In effect, in Greece mass parties did not really develop until the 1970s, so the party press has never been strong--though privately-owned papers, as we shall see, are typically *kommatikos* (partisan).

Newspapers in Greece have been directed for the most part to an educated elite interested in the political world. Starting in the 1970s Greece saw a shift toward a more market-oriented print press. The major newspaper have tried to expand circulations with a form of journalism that combines the old focus on politics with more human interest, more feature news, a more graphic presentation, and so on. But, in one way or another, newspaper circulation in Greece remains the lowest in Europe. Two additional characteristics of the press market in Greece are worth noting. Gender differences in newspaper readership are quite large, presumably reflecting the closeness of the press to the world of politics and the traditional exclusion of women from the latter. In Greece, in 2000, 65 % of men and 35% of women buy a daily newspaper. The newspaper industry is also highly dependent on newsstand sales, kiosks, the so called *periptera*, rather than subscription.

One must also note that sensationalist popular newspapers are virtually absent in Greece. Even since the 1980, gradually most of the papers have adopted the tabloid format; the physical size is not related to sensationalist content of the relevant tabloids in Europe and in the US. Moreover, the local press is relatively undeveloped, and this to a certain extent is related to the centrality of the political system in the country.

By and large, mass circulation newspapers never developed in Greece in part because the economic and political conditions for the development of the domestic media market did not develop until the mid-twentieth century--when radio had already become an important medium and television was beginning to develop. It seems likely that no country which did not develop mass circulation newspapers in the late nineteenth century ever will have them. The only true mass media of Greece are electronic media, and their importance for the formation

of mass public opinion is therefore particularly great (Papathanassopoulos: 2004, Hallin and Mancini: 2004, Komninou: 1990, Heretakis: 1996). As the history suggests, the media in Southern European countries are relatively strongly politicized, and political parallelism is relatively high. The style of journalism tends to give substantial emphasis to advocacy and interpretation. Newspapers tend to represent distinct political tendencies, and this is reflected in the differing political attitudes of their readerships; at times they play an activist role, mobilizing those readers to support political causes. Public broadcasting tends to be party-politicized. Both journalists and media owners often have political ties or alliances (Papathanassopoulos: 2004, Hallin and Mancini: 2004, Hallin and Papathanassopoulos: 2002, Zaharopoulos and Paraschos: 1995).

Greece is a strong case of this pattern. From the time of the exile press, Greek newspapers have always been above all political instruments, rooted culturally in passionate ideological divisions and often tied institutionally to the state and/or parties, which provided financial subsidies, help with distribution and other forms of assistance. The many Athenian newspapers, especially, still reflect a wide range of ideologies, and their writing is often highly polemical. In effect, the Greek newspapers have also often taken an activist role, mobilizing their readers to support political causes and participate in political events. Of course, this role was central to the party press; but it was never exclusive to them.

By and large, the press watched all the developments of political life and played an important role in the political scene, becoming a player with some power, stronger compared to most other countries. This was because the newspapers were not only highly *politikopoihmenos* (partisan), but also were used by their owners as a mean of pressure on the government of the day in order to serve their own particular interests. In effect, in the early days of the modern

Greek state there was a well known phrase regarding the relationship between press owners and political power: 'Either you give me a ministry or a publish a newspaper' (Papathanassopoulos: 1999). As above noted, the size of the Greek market was always so small to support so many newspapers. So, the press owners also used their newspapers in order to support their business such as contracts for public works, which, on the other hand, were (in some cases still do) subsidizing the operating costs of their publications. Moreover, the newspapers had power since even in the days of state broadcasting monopoly, as we will see later, were the key mass medium for the dissemination of political information of Panhellenic interest.

The close relationship between the state and the media has largely arisen from the tensions in Greek society since the Second World War. These tensions, combined with the absence of a strong civil society, have made the state an autonomous and dominant factor in Greek society. Mouzelis points out that this situation is associated with an atrophied civil society, as a result of which the state has to take on additional politico-ideological functions (Mouzelis: 1980: 261-4). The over-extended character of the state has coincided with the underdevelopment of capitalism in Greece. This makes the Greek system less self-regulatory than developed capitalist systems such as in Britain or in the US. The lack of self-regulation is also noticeable at the level of politico-ideological superstructure, because with a weak civil society, even the economically dominant classes do not manage to form well-organized and cohesive pressure groups. Mouzelis notes that because of the persistence of patronage politics, even bourgeois parties and interest groups are articulated within the state machinery in a clientelist/personalistic manner (Mouzelis: 1980: 263). This has led the state to promote the interests of particular types of capital rather than the interests of

capital as a whole. The lack of self-regulation leads to the state intervention in the politico-ideological sphere and thus the diffusion of its repressive mechanisms throughout society. The fact that the state plays a decisive role in the formation of the Greek economy and policy illustrates the state's "relative autonomy" from society (Mouzelis: 1987, Tsoukalas: 1981).

It is not accidental, therefore, that there has been such strict control over the broadcasting media in Greece. The general pattern of the broadcasting media in the state monopoly era was that a transfer of political power was followed by an equivalent changeover in the state media institutions' executives. In other words, all key radio and television appointees were politically sympathetic or affiliated to the government of the day, reflecting the tradition of political clientelism in Greece. Responsible posts in state broadcasting have traditionally had rapid personnel turnover. News and editorial judgments of particular importance, meanwhile, would be in close agreement with the government position on a whole range of policies and decisions. This attitude of the Greek state has remained one of the most important features of the state electronic media. It is not surprising that various recommendations by foreign experts concerning the structure of state broadcasting were half-adopted or neglected by most governments (Papathanassopoulos: 1990: 338-339, Papathanassopoulos: 1997a).

However, the Greek media during the last twenty years have been under a process of modernization. The press has been undergoing modernization since the fall of the Dictatorship in 1974. The development of advertising as one of its main source of revenue in the 1970s worked as a catalyst transforming the newspapers political orientations: advertising tended to neutralize political polarization, reducing the "black" and "white" (or "us" and "them") approach of the

newspapers. The tradition of the small circulation partisan publication has gradually given way to a "commercial" mentality, which has indirectly exerted considerable influence on content, leading to increased emphasis on financial and social news as well as human interest stories. Moreover, the arrival of new printing technologies in the '80s (Leandros: 1992), the entry of entrepreneurs and businessmen into the media sector as well as the hard competition from television have contributed to the process of change since the 1980s (Psychogios 1992: 11-35, Zaoussis and Stratos: 1992: 171-187).

As a result, the content of the press has become less partisan, and the traditional close association with particular parties or individuals has been superseded by a tendency to identify more with a political camp, right, left or centre. Partly this has arisen out of a need to attract a broader spectrum of readers to increase circulation in a time of economic difficulties, and partly it has reflected a drift within the political community itself towards the two larger or so called power parties, since in the 1980s, the Socialist party (PASOK) and the Conservative party (New Democracy) used to attract approximately 80 per cent of the votes. However, the political stance of the newspapers is always manifested in periods of intense political contention, including election periods (Komninou: 1990, 1996).

Greek television has undergone complete commercialization, since the 1990s adopting to a market-oriented structure with more channels, more advertising, more program imports (mainly from the USA), more sensationalism and more domestic productions, which are mostly imitations of US programs adjusted for the Greek market. The deregulation of radio frequencies, as we shall see later, resulted in 1987 while the deregulation of the television sector in late 1989. As in most European countries, the imminent deregulation of Greek

broadcasting has been associated with partisan ends and eventually led by a haphazard reaction of the politics of the time, rather than a coherent plan resulting in an overcrowded broadcasting universe (Papathanassopoulos: 1997a). As in other countries publishers and other business-oriented interests have impressively entered the broadcasting landscape. Although some government control over the state broadcasting channels is still evident, there is no overt control of the plethora of private television channels, which have dominated the broadcasting scene in terms of viewers' ratings and advertising revenue.

In Greece, like Gaullist France, this control is direct, with Administrative Council of the state broadcasting company, ERT, under the authority of the Minister of the Premiership. A more broadly representative National Broadcasting Council has advisory authority (Zeri: 1996).

In short, political logic tends to play a large role in broadcasting, particularly--though not exclusively--in publicly-owned media, and of course particularly in news and public affairs programming. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the fact that the news agenda is not considered to be governed purely by journalistic judgements of "newsworthiness," but is a question of political policy.

Politics and Journalism

In many ways the history of journalism in Greece is closely parallel to political history of the media. Limited development of media markets meant that newspapers were smaller, and less likely to be self-sustaining. And state intervention, particularly in periods of dictatorship, interrupted the development of journalism as a profession. The level of professionalization in journalism thus has remained lower in Greece (Zioutos: 1954), although it increased in important

ways in the last couple of decades of the twentieth century (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos: 2002).

The notion of journalistic professionalism, which forms the basis for journalists' claims of autonomy, is connected with the idea that journalists serve a public interest that transcends the interests of particular parties, owners of social groups. To what extent this model can be applied to other countries, especially to those, which have experienced a different political culture and development? How can this model be applied to everyday practices of other countries, especially in those societies where a sense of public interest transcending particular interests has been increasingly difficult to achieve? Paolo Mancini (2000: 266) referring to Italy notes that: 'In reality [in other countries] journalists act in a different way: they follow a different model of journalism'. As Papathanassopoulos argues (2001), this is the case of Greek journalism as well. One can say that due to the political particularities of Greek society, it is difficult to develop a culture of journalistic professionalism faithful to the Anglo-American model. This is because journalism always reflects and embodies the historical processes within which it has developed and the contemporary social conditions within which it is made (McNair: 1998: 64). One has to note that western democratic practices and functions in Greece, especially since the restoration of the Parliament in 1974 have influenced the performance of the mass media. At the same time, there are some persistent particularities of the Greek society and, consequently, of the Greek media, which, as in the case of Italy, indicate that the Anglo-American professional model cannot be applicable in all countries. This is because: 'Journalism does not grow in a vacuum: it is the fruit of the interaction between different actors and systems and such differences in social structure and context

have to be taken in to account even when theorizing models of journalism' (Mancini: 2000: 267).

Although Greek journalists in theory state that they adopt the neutral and objective model of journalism, which performs a watchdog function, in practice facts and comments are freely intermixed in Greek news reporting (Papathanassopoulos: 2004, 2001). Moreover, interpretative reporting, although is nearly old as Greek journalism itself, remains the dominant model of Greek news coverage and sets the journalist at the centre of the story, regardless the commercialisation of Greek media and market-driven orientation of the news media. At the same time, the interests of their news organizations influence Greek journalists heavily. This was (and still is) the basic framework of today's Greek journalism.

It is worth mentioning to make clear what I mean when we say the level of professionalization is lower. This does not, for example, mean that journalists in Greece are less educated than their European colleagues. Journalists in Greece are more likely to have university degrees today than those in major European countries (Weaver: 1998). The close connection of journalism with the political world and the orientation of newspapers to educated elites has meant that journalism has in some sense been a more elite occupation in Greece than in other European countries (Hallin and Mancini: 2004). One has also to note that Greek journalists had (and may still have) a strong sense of commitment to the social role of their own paper, but it was not a commitment they shared with journalists at other news organizations--in this sense they were part of an institution but not exactly of a profession. Certain things have changed in the last decade. The new competition caused by the electronic media, the new entrants in the press market,

the increasing importance of the regional papers have made the elite newspapers less unique, and the prestige of the media as a social actor has surely increased.

Professional organizations and journalists' unions are weak, at least in comparison with the strong organizations of the other European countries. Moreover, formal accountability systems are essentially absent. There is no, for example, Press Council at the national level. The absence of such institutions reflects the general lack of consensus on ethical standards in the Greek media. Attempts to establish codes of ethics have certainly taken place, but it is questionable whether they are applied in practice, and this is probably a reflection the weaker development of the profession and its limited recognition by the wider society. The weak consensus on journalistic standards and of professional self-regulation reflects the fact that journalism in Greece has to a significant extent not been an autonomous institution, but has been ruled by external forces, principally from the worlds of politics and of business. Probably the most significant form of this has been the use of media by commercial owners--sometimes private and sometimes state-linked, as in the case of state-owned enterprises--to wield influence in the political world. In effect, it seems that Greek journalists have realised (since they know it at first hand) that Greece has entered in a new era of 'interplay' between media owners and political power. The reason is rather obvious. Commercial interests cannot be the only motivation for entrepreneurs and other business interests to enter such a small media market. It seems that they have entered for other purposes as well. The entry of businesspeople, shipping company owners, and other business interests into the media scene is an important way in which these interests try to influence public opinion and to exert pressure in the political arena for their business interests. It is obvious that Greek media owners want to have the means to put pressure on politicians because of the huge

financial interests they hold, such as telecommunications, shipping, refining etc. This pressure is useful when fighting for government contracts. This is due to the structure of Greek economy, in which the state plays a much larger role than in developed capitalist countries and so many important decisions affecting entrepreneurs rest in the hands of politicians. Being able to influence public opinion has become an important business tool for the media owners (Papathanassopoulos: 2001).

The State and the media

The state has always played a large role in the social and economic life of Greece, and its role in the media system is no exception. The role of the state is also complex. As Hallin and Mancini argue (2004) it reflects a combination of authoritarian traditions of intervention and democratic traditions of the welfare state similar to those that prevail in the Liberal Democratic countries; it is also made complex by the fact that the state's grasp often exceeds its reach: the capacity of the state to intervene effectively is often limited by lack of resources, lack of political consensus, and clientelist relationships which diminish the capacity of the state for unified action.

Through much of the modern Greek history the state has played the role of censor (Alevizatos: 1983). The direct authoritarian control of the years of dictatorship is presumably a thing of the past, but some remnants have carried over into the democratic period. Even in the 1980s, journalists were jailed for defamation against public officials. Moreover, the law gives the state the right to seize and shut down publications, among other things for offences against religion or against the President of the Republic. The state has also played an important role as an owner of media enterprises. As in the rest of Europe, broadcasting has

been mainly state-owned through most of its history. But the state has also had significant ownership in commercial media: for example, state subsidies to the press are not governed by a clear legal framework, consistent with the clientelist nature of Greek politics which will be discussed throughout the chapters of this thesis; they take the form of "soft" loans, subsidies both overt and covert, and state jobs offered to many journalists. Moreover, the central role of the state in the Greek media system has limited the tendency of the media to play the "watchdog" role so widely valued in the prevailing liberal media theory. The financial dependence of media on the state and the persistence of restrictive rules on privacy and the publication of official information have combined with the intertwining of media and political elites. Due to this interdependence there has been developed a journalistic culture which has historically been cautious about reporting information which would be embarrassing to state officials. This does not mean, of course, that political criticism and debate have been absent from the media--that would make no sense in polarized pluralist systems, where parties with a wide range of political ideologies contend, and their debates are central to the content of the news. Moreover, the fact that in Greece hundreds of broadcast stations have operated without licenses while the government has been unable to establish licensing procedures, and the public broadcaster has dropped to the lowest audience share in Europe, indicates the 'power game' that goes on in the interdependence between the state, politics and the media in this country (Papathanassopoulos: 1997). In Greece it could be said that public service broadcasting in the full sense of the word never really existed (Papathanassopoulos: 2004, Hallin and Papathanassopoulos: 2002). This is the reason, that the Greeks still call the public broadcaster, ERT, as a state broadcaster. This is also the reason that the Greek public turned its back to the

state broadcaster with the arrival of the commercial, privately-owned, radio and television stations.

History and Media: an appraisal

The social forces that would form either the civil society or the industrial and commercial upper class was relatively weak in Greece (Mouzelis: 1978). This is associated to the history of the country, since the entry of liberal institutions began in 1821, when Greece liberated from the Ottoman rule, and liberal ideas introduced by exiled nationalist leaders clashed with a pre-existing institutional setting characterized by a pre-capitalist, underdeveloped economy, a patrimonial structure of political controls, and the anti-enlightenment, anti-western ideology of the Christian Orthodox Church (Mouzelis: 1978, Meynaud: 1966, Clogg and Yannopoulos: 1972, Tsoukalas: 1981).

The weakness of liberal social and economic institutions, first of all, limited the development of the mass circulation press (Hallin and Mancini: 2004). Limited development of the market economy restricted both the resources available to commercial newspapers and the need for the kind of information-oriented content that was crucial to their social function elsewhere: in a market economy publicly-circulated information on prices, technology, legal regulations and political and business developments on a national and international scale are crucial; in traditional economies information flows are more private and more local. Political instability and repression also made the development of commercial media more risky. And limited development of political democracy meant a limited constituency for political news.

Moreover, the development of the Greek media has been deeply affected by influenced by the political patterns of polarisation. Newspapers were principal

participants in struggles among diverse ideological camps, especially as champions of liberalism, but eventually on all sides. This strengthened the ties between the media and the world of politics. The sharpness of ideological divisions and the high stakes of political conflict made it difficult for the media system to become differentiated from politics, difficult for a professional culture and organization of journalism to develop across party lines, for example, and difficult for public broadcasting to be separated from party politics. At the same time, a strong positive value was often placed on political engagement of the media and on ideological diversity (Demertzis: 2002, Pleios: 2001).

Another effect is that the media in such a system--especially newspapers--have historically served and participated in this process of political bargaining. They are an important means by which elites follow and comment on the progress of negotiations, establish an agenda, signal positions and commitments, pressure one another, and come to consensus on the shape of the bargain. Many key characteristics of the Greek media are connected with this pattern: the closeness of the relationship between political actors and the media, the heavy focus of the media on political life and the relatively elitist nature of journalism, addressed to political insiders rather than to a broad mass public. This pattern is also apparent in the case of Italy, Spain and Portugal (Hallin and Mancini: 2001).

Furthermore, the late development of capitalism in Greece is also connected with the strong role played by the state. With the market poorly developed, the state played a particularly central role in the accumulation of capital; in the absence of a strong bourgeoisie and civil society, it also played a central role in organizing modern social life (Mouzelis: 1978, 1980, Tsoukalas: 1981). Thus, welfare state is weaker, reflecting both more limited resources and a later transition, coming at a time when neoliberalism was on the rise globally

(Papathanassopoulos: 2004) The strong state, combined with the history of political conflict has also contributed in much to a broad politicization of society. As Mouzelis 'notes, in the same way that nothing can be done in Greece without stumbling over the all-pervasive state bureaucracy, so nothing is said, thought or otherwise expressed without being coloured by strong political connotations and considerations. From dinner parties of fashionable middle and upper-class Athenian society to everyday coffee-shop gatherings in villages, the main mode of social interaction and cultural exchange is the impassioned discussion of political happenings and personalities. This predilection for the logic of the political... permeates all institutional spheres, from sport to religion and from education to popular theatre' (Mouzelis:1995: 22). No doubt this situation has contributed to the high level of politicization of even commercial media in Greece (Panagiotopoulou: 2004, Papathanassopoulos: 2004).

In short, the media of Greece deviate in many ways from the dominant liberal norm of neutral professionalism and a 'watchdog' media in other, mainly Central and Northern, European countries. The present thesis does not attempt to reply the answer whether the Greek system is ultimately better or worst than the systems of the rest of Western Europe. It simply tries to provide for the first time a concise historical account of the relationship between the media and politics and to show how this relationship has remained strong, and still influences the development of the media in this country. On this point we must note again that while in the field of political history and analysis literature is abundant, in the field of the media, literature is extremely limited and was developed mainly after 1990.

CHAPTER 1: THE HISTORY OF THE GREEK PRESS AND POLITICS

That the Greek press was formed even before the Modern Greek state was created is an interesting development. It verifies that an organised Greek community, which was active at an economic, social, cultural and political level, was already in existence. The fact that the Greek press appeared outside the framework of a nation-state (as this was not yet formed) and within the centres of the Greek Diaspora proves that the nation-building process had already started long before the formation of the modern Greek state. The first Greek newspapers played a significant role during this process, since they were political tools that supported this aim. This element together with the later developments played a determining role in the historical development of the press in Greece. Thus the origins of the Greek press put it in a clear position that favours propaganda for the national ideals and the formation of a modern Greek state and in that way the press had a direct involvement in politics.

A second important issue is that the Greek press at its birth had also clear literary characteristics, which indicates the direction that Greek letters aimed towards at the time, influenced by the French Enlightenment and the liberal ideas of the Revolution in 1789. According to Koumarianou, 'during the decade 1811-1821, the press as a whole was literary oriented. The Greek press expressed the interests of the Greek intelligentsia and especially its cultural and social aspirations towards the preparation and groundwork of the Greek Revolution' (Koumarianou: 1971:10).

The growth of the press in Greece during the first years after the war of National Liberation in 1821 was rapid, and was based on political developments.

As politics interfered with the freedom of the press and the press was involved with politics, the two were interdependent. This will be analysed below.

Some initial attempts were made to form laws and a constitution that would safeguard the freedom of the press, although some limitations to that were also integrated in the legislation. The Epidaurus Decree Law of 1823, passed two years after the beginning of the Greek Revolution was about the freedom of ideas and of the press, yet it specifically stated three limitations: these concerned possible attacks on the Christian faith, infringements upon one's personal freedom, and finally attacks against the 'social values' of the era. This law concerned Greek citizens, and was against any pre-censorship but it accepted repressive measures.

The Trizina Constitution of 1827, sanctioned by the Third National Assembly also declared that the press freedom of expression ought to be safeguarded, while it forbade censorship. The 1827 Constitution also echoed the same framework posed by the Epidaurus Decree Law and ratified the three previous limitations and the repressive measures. Generally speaking, the first attempts to legislate issues concerning the press were particularly liberal even in spite of the limited restrictions (Antonopoulos:1965:33).

The situation changed dramatically after Ioannis Kapodistrias resumed government during the Third Trizina National Assembly. Kapodistrias was a liberal politician, the former minister of foreign affairs for the Russian Empire, and aspired to limit the authority of landowners and merchants/ship owners. He also meant to stop the Great Powers of that time from imposing an absolutist political system in Greece. The landowners and the merchants/ship owners were two dynamic social groups that formed the Greek ruling class. The different interests and the conflicts between these two elite groups did not stand in the way

of reaching a political consensus that lasted a long time, agreeing mainly on how the constitutional state should be organized. Count Kapodistrias was offered the governorship of Greece in April 1827 and, until his arrival in January the following year, a small governmental committee was in charge. Many people were against this decision, including Pharmakidis, the publisher of the newspaper *Geniki Ephemeris tis Ellados*. Kapodistrias was born in Corfu on 31 January 1776 and after the completion of his studies in Italy, he returned to Greece. In 1809 he went to St. Petersburg and in 1821, when the Greek Revolution began, was already counselor at the Russian Ministry of External Affairs. He disagreed with the policy that was followed by Czar Alexander I on matters concerning the Greek cause and resigned in 1822. He then moved to Geneva, but when the czar died he was appointed by the imperial family as governor of Berlin. On 6 July 1827 the three Great Powers, (England, France, and Russia) signed a treaty in London that demanded an armistice between the Greeks and the Turkish forces. Their intention was to negotiate an arrangement with the Turks on the basis that the Greeks would be allowed to establish a small independent state under Turkish patronage. All Greek factions accepted the treaty and the majority of them decided to offer Kapodistrias the title of the first leader of the new state.

In spite of his liberal principles Kapodistrias moved to suspend the Constitution in order to deal with the civil conflicts and the war with the Ottomans. He was greatly criticised for this by a large part of the press, which led him to take a series of measures which considerably limited press freedom. As Karikopoulos suggests 'Kapodistrias's environment tried to stop the publication of the newspaper *Apollo*. When the editor went on to type-set the newspaper, a military force took over the printing room and knocked down the pages that were already printed' (Karikopoulos: 1984:58). It should be mentioned that Ioannis

Kapodistrias's political decision to restrict the freedom of the press was part of a general centralisation policy which he tried to institutionalise in order to deal with the objective problems of the newly formed Greek state.

The resolution voted in May 1831, along with other legislation that followed in 1832, limited the freedom of the press in drastic ways (Antonopoulos: 1965:35). The new measures were about issues that specifically dealt with how order and the political regime were to be maintained as they were. The preventive measures that were implemented were also significant in that they concerned nationality, property and education. In other words, Kapodistrias implemented an almost totalitarian legislation, according to which only Greek citizens who had a specific educational background and property had the right to publish newspapers, under the condition that religion, the regime, the moral values and order were not undermined. Thus in spite of his generally liberal views, the result of Kapodistrias's politics was to restrict the movement of ideas and the freedom of the press.

The role of the Press during the Oligarchic Democracy

After the assassination of Kapodistrias by his political rivals, the civil war and the coming of the Bavarian Otto, who at the age of 17 took charge of what was now the Greek Kingdom, the political conditions in the country started to change so that a system of an oligarchic democracy was implemented in 1833. The young Otto became a King, imposed by the great powers. Together with a series of Bavarian dignitaries, who were acting as regents, and escorted by Bavarian troops, he took hold of the country's reign. Greece was thus transformed into a country under foreign rule, the constitution was disabled, and the regime was transformed to a totalitarian monarchy. Under these circumstances, the press freedom was even

more restricted. As Mayer suggests, 'some newspapers, as they could not respond to such conditions, terminated their publication, whereas others were led to judicial trials' (Mayer: 1957:47). The three Laws that the Bavarian monarchy imposed, meant that the freedom of the press was under restriction. A totalitarian and bonapartistic monarchy replaced a political system that at first, when the state was founded, aspired to be based on the tradition of ancient Greek democracy and the ideas of the French Revolution. The demand for constitution and for democratic freedoms was soon formed within Greek society, and especially within the two elite groups that represented the ruling class. The press played a significant part in the process of expressing that demand. According to Kanner 'that this demand was expressed by the publishers of a different political agenda is especially interesting, since, in spite of their political starting-point, some common ideological axes were being seen' (Kanner: 2000:25).

As Koumarianou suggests 'the attacks on the government by the press, became undisguised, especially those launched by the Athenian newspapers. That was the case of newspaper *Athina*. Even the newspaper *Aeon*, published by Ioannis Filimon, a newspaper that was basically conservative and expressed the views of the 'Russian Party', turned against the King and asked for a Constitution to be conceded. As for the newspaper *Elpis*, it too criticized Otto's politics from its first issues. Thus the three largest newspapers of the time, irrespective of their political orientation, agree on the issue of the Constitution and personal freedoms. The press that expresses the views of all three parties strengthens the constitutional freedoms politics' (Koumarianou: 2000: 17). The above mentioned newspapers were the most important of that period (Karikopoulos:1984:81-82).

On 3 September 1843 a military coup forced Otto to allow a Constitution and personal freedoms. It is commonly accepted that this military intervention

would not have been made without the leading part that the press played. According to Antonopoulos 'the revolution in 1843 was to a great extent prepared by the press' (Antonopoulos: 1965: 38). The 1843 revolt is the second great involvement of the Greek press in the formation of politics in modern Greece. It comes after its involvement in the distribution of the ideas of the national liberation and the formation of the modern Greek state. Of course the revolt of the 3 September was not a revolution that commanded a greater social participation, but was primarily a military uprising that also involved the political parties of the opposition. It was a modern civic uprising that it could be categorized in the typology of the modernising coup d' etat (Maligkoudis:2000:4), which aimed not to bring down the political economic and social system but to manage to impose political reform and create a constitutional state.

That the military took the initiative is linked with the political and party-oriented system, as well as with the relative autonomy that the military kept in relation with the political forces of the era. After the national revolution, the political system gradually started to be characterized by the domination of the ruling elite and of the many small groups of patrons that represented vested interests. In spite of the existence of a parliamentary system, active politics was reserved for a small number of privileged groups. The relations of these political groups with the upper social strata were relations of patronage and clientelism. The Greek political parties were mostly clubs of the ruling elite and the privileged groups which implemented ways of political manipulation of the voters (Mouzelis: 1987:27). The parties of that period did not have a large social basis that would be organized according to collective interests, and, most importantly, they were not supported by the existence of mass movements like it mainly was the case with the parties of Western Europe. They also did not have a clear

ideological orientation, and their reference axis was more concentrated on the great powers of the era than on anything else. It was not a contingent fact that the basic parties of that period were named Russian, French and English.

It is obvious that the system of clientelistic relations is linked with the delay in the development of capitalist means of production, especially in relation with the development of the industries, and following from that, of mass organizations. Greece, like other countries of southern Europe, was based on agricultural economy. Hallin and Papathanasopoulos pointed out that, 'clientelistic relationships have been central to the social and political organization in South Europe' (Hallin-Papathanasopoulos: 2002:185).

The new Constitution of 1844 brought back the press freedom and democratic rights. It forbade the pre-censorship measures in the press, whereas one did not need to have any special licence from the state in order to publish a newspaper.

In Germany, for instance, the state licensing for publication was abolished in 1874 (Humphreys: 1994:14). In reality, the monarchy continued to limit the freedom of the press, this time going even against the Constitution. Confiscations of issued newspapers, prosecutions and incarceration of journalists continued. Only in the beginning of 1862 Otto was forced, under pressure, to free the journalists and allow general amnesty.

On 11 October 1862, a new revolt, once more with the participation of the whole opposition and the military, dissolved Otto's monarchy and called for a National Constitutional Assembly. Otto and the Bavarians departed from Greece. The Press again played a significant part in this revolt too, and proved to be a dominant guardian of civic liberalism and democratic freedoms. In 1863, George I, of Danish origin, replaced Otto as a King. A foreign dynasty was established in

Greece, which, in spite of some small intervals, will remain in power for 111 years until it is conclusively removed in 1974.

As a result of the changes, the political level was affected, the New Constitution of 1864 extended democratic rights and the freedom of the press. Specifically, article 14 characteristically suggests that 'each person is entitled to publish his thoughts in an oral or written manner via the press, while observing the state laws. The press is free'.

The 1864 Constitution forbade every pre-censorship measure, but also the confiscation of newspapers. However, cases where the publication was alleged to insult the Christian faith and/or the king did not fall under that rule. Yet even in this case, the Judicial Council was the one entitled to make the relevant decision, not the political authorities.

Thus the period that followed strengthened the press. New newspapers appeared, while a series of them started being transformed to dailies. 'In Athens alone, whose population did not exceed 35,000 inhabitants, 26 newspapers were published, together with many periodicals, whereas, from 1835 to 1862, 156 were published in the whole country' (Tsoukalas:1986:144). Of course it must be said that most of them did not survive for long. On a journalistic level, newspapers started organising their staff, channelling it to different specialisations, while the flat presses started being removed, and cylinder ones were installed in their place. At the same time, the press involvement in the formation of politics and especially in the defence of democratic freedoms continues. In many cases, newspapers took a clear party line, and in fact were mere party organs. Yet their position in favour of a constitutional monarchy was common, and thus a common ideological basis was formed.

The publication of the newspaper *Efimeris* of Demetrios Koromilas in 1873 is significant. *Efimeris* was the first daily newspaper which had systematic circulation, and which tried to keep a distance from the political parties. In spite of this, as Karikopoulos states, 'six future prime ministers and 11 future ministers started out their career working in this newspaper, which declared its independence' (Karikopoulos: 1984: 94).

At the same time, a series of periodical publications appeared which were mainly oriented literature and poetry (Margaris: 1954:8). Another important development of that period was the publication of a great number of satirical newspapers, which did not only manage to survive financially for many years, but also occupied a significant position regarding readership. The newspapers of this kind had a sarcastic style and made fun of the political and social current affairs with an intense literary and poetical style.

During the June 1874 elections, Demetrios Voulgaris did not attain the parliamentary majority votes he strove for, and went on to govern the country without the operation of the parliament, whereas in November the budget was voted without the necessary majority being present in the parliament. In March 1875, Voulgaris appointed nine members of parliament whose election was not confirmed. In reality he was moving to a parliamentary coup, in order to attain parliamentary majority in his favour. This constitutional overthrow and crisis led the publishers of newspapers to convene on an emergency basis the next day; and they published an announcement with which they denounced the overthrow of the Constitution. At the same time they daily published the names of the members of parliament who co-operated with Voulgaris and assisted the parliamentary coup. Those MPs are known in the Greek political history as "Stilites" (Mayer: 1950:72). Under such strong pressure, Voulgaris was forced to resign on 23 April

1875. 82 members of parliament that belonged to his party also resigned, as they had facilitated the parliamentary coup. Once more, political developments were determined by the press, which was steadily proving to be the guardian of the constitutional state.

In June 1874, Charilaos Trikoupis, a politician, had published an article under the title 'Whose Fault It Is', in the newspaper *Kairi* (Times). With this article, Trikoupis attacked King George for his continuous interventions, which led to a political and constitutional crisis, and for this reason Trikoupis was imprisoned for a few days. This article still is of historical importance for Greek politics and journalism. King George decided to follow a form of political consensus in order to avoid a new insurrection and for this reason he appointed Trikoupis, his former critic, as a caretaker prime minister in order to hold elections that would lead to the formation of government. Following these elections, which took place in 1876, Alexandros Koumoundouros was voted by the majority, and he formed a government.

Later, Trikoupis became prime minister twice more: in 1878 and in 1880. As a governor, he brought his constitutional intervention to completion by introducing the principle of the declared majority, according to which the command to form a government is given to the party with the majority within the parliament. The "Declared Majority Principle" became a main parameter of the operation of the Greek parliamentary system.

When Trikoupis became prime minister for the fourth time, in 1882, this time having a clear parliamentary majority, he made a significant effort to modernise the social and economic life of the country, which was still largely agricultural. Trikoupis's important contribution refers mainly to the state's organisation, as well as that of the economy and the social structure. As a result of

these changes, a middle class started to develop, and that led to the social forces of liberalism also being strengthened. As Tsoukalas suggests, 'civic population rose to 28% of the whole population in 1879, - while it was only 8% in 1853' (Tsoukalas: 1981:12). 1883 was perhaps the most significant year for the Greek press. *Acropolis* was published on the 1 November by Vlassis Gavriilidis. Its publication will be combined with efforts to organise it commercially, along the lines of newspapers of Western Europe (Karikopoulos:1984:98). Yet the broad involvement of the Greek press in politics did not allow the newspaper in question to distance itself from the existent framework.

The need for modernization and growth made Trikoupis borrow too much, mainly from Great Britain. Public income could not cover the cost of these loans, and in 1893 the country was led to bankruptcy. In 1895, Trikoupis lost the elections; with him, the liberal political forces also suffered defeat. Theodoros Diligiannis was to succeed him in government, and would declare war on Turkey in 1897, a war that was catastrophic for the Greeks. This defeat was attributed, by the historians, to the King in person as well as to the monarchists (Tsoukalas:1981:16), who had cultivated the Megali Idea (Great Idea) this means the aspirations that the Greek state would expand to reach its historical borders.

The attack against the press continued. On 17 November 1904 Vlassis Gavriilidis, publisher of the newspaper *Acropolis*, was arrested and imprisoned with charges of having insulted the King and his heir. 'A great wave of solidarity with the publisher led to him being found not guilty and being released' (Stamelos: 1982:35). As the Cretan revolutionary movement was to prevail (a movement that was marked by a high degree of liberalism), the founding of an autonomous state and the clash of the Cretans with Prince George, the second son of the King of Greece, who had resumed command of autonomous Crete,

encouraged liberal forces in Greece. Under the leadership of a part of the army, mainly lower level officers, a new revolt took place in 1909. This development marked the prevalence of the liberal political forces in Greece, the final formation of a constitutional democratic state, and the transformation of an oligarchic democracy to a bourgeois one.

The great majority of the press dealt with this in a positive and encouraging manner, supporting the 1909 revolution and especially the initiatives of the military organisation named Military Association (Stratiotikos Syndesmos). Just days before the revolution, the newspapers *Hronos*, *Script*, *Acropolis* and others, wrote about how the officers of the army and the navy were organising, and how they meant to submit a memo presenting their demands to the Rallis government. Indeed the officers' conspiracy groups agreed with the publisher of the Athenian newspaper *Chronos* that they would use it as a medium to present their politics to the public (Kiouisis: 2005:37). Even after the movement was under way, the great majority of the newspapers continued to support the officers' uprising. The larger newspapers greeted the coup and expressed their support the next day (Igglezou: 2001:44).

Political Division and the Press during Liberal Democracy

In December 1909 the Military Association called on Eleftherios Venizelos, a Cretan politician and former leader of the Cretan revolutionary movement. He was assigned to handle all the political issues and the organizing of elections. Indeed, in 1910 Venizelos formed his first government and started paving the way for the Constitution of 1911. That the Liberal Party that Venizelos had founded prevailed, was to lead to important reforms, for example the expropriation of large plots of land for which the owners were compensated, the recognition of the trade

unions, the encouraging of agricultural co-operatives, the compulsory insurance of the workers, and the establishment of Sunday as an official holiday. Along with that, the army was strengthened, and the diplomatic abilities of Venizelos resulted in the doubling of Greek territories, as Epirus, Crete, many islands of the Aegean Sea and the greater part of Macedonia were annexed to the then, small Greece. Venizelos aspired to the Liberal Party being organised based on the masses' acceptance, on modern political structures, and, most importantly, on using candidates from all social groups. Venizelos repeated these efforts in many cases, but he had to abandon them since he was faced with strenuous resistance from the strong clientistic elements of the society (Mouzelis: 1987:38). It is obvious that the clientistic relations and the patronage system affected modernization and the reform efforts in a negative manner, and created conditions of political instability, even after bourgeoisie democracy was established.

The 1911 Constitution was based on that of 1864 and the issues of the freedom of the press were dealt with in more detail. It was however, to add yet another case in which the newspaper could be confiscated: that of indecent publications which posed an insult to public sentiments of propriety. It also added that publications that revealed military moves were forbidden, as well as issues that had to do with the country's defense politics. The political conditions that followed after the 1911 Constitution, and especially the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, the political crisis of 1916 and the outbreak of the First World War did not aid the implementation of the freedom of the press, in spite of the fact that the movement prevailed. A series of laws that were voted from 1914 to 1918, limited even further the freedom of ideas, and these conditions culminated in the suspension of the Constitution at the time of the First World War.

During the same period, the so-called non taxation of newsprint is implemented by law, as a form of state press subsidy (Antonopoulos:1965:131). However, this will also be used, as will be explained later, as a form of censorship and state intervention. Yet the crowning development regarding the press during this period was its political division, a fact that reflects the greater political and social developments which got under way after 1909 and especially after the end of the Balkan Wars. The press as a whole, as stated before, held an almost unified position in all the developments which followed the national liberation war and the creation of the modern Greek state. It even played a leading role. That a constitutional political system was finally achieved by 1909 seems to change the situation. At a political level, antagonism was not noticeable between the absolutist forces and the forces representing the constitutional and parliamentary system, since the latter prevailed in a definite manner by 1909; the division appeared, instead within the political forces which represented the implementation of a constitutional state and a parliamentary democracy.

This led to the fragmentation of the Greek ruling class at a political level, a fragmentation that was linked with the deepening of the economic reforms, the role of the monarchy and the position that Greece held during the war. On the one hand there were the ruling class, with the merchants and the ship owners, and on the other hand there were the land owners. This antagonism took the shape of a political division between the Venizelists and the Antivenizelists, and was consolidated with the movement of National Defense (Ethniki Amyna), the events of 1916 and the beginning of the so-called national schism. Greek society was divided into two fundamentally opposite poles which were led on the one hand by Eleftherios Venizelos and on the other by King Constantine, who had succeeded his father George after the latter's assassination in 1913. King Constantine, who

was in favour of neutrality during the war, wanted to resume absolutist powers and limit the role of the elected government, and for this reason, he allied with the land owners against Venizelos. This political division between the liberals and the monarchists was expressed in the area of the press too. The newspapers would from now on be characterized either Venizelist or anti-Venizelist. In other words, the common ideological and political starting-points of the previous period were no longer in place, and the press was divided between conservative and liberal ideologies.

The first Journalists' Union was founded in 1914, and Ioannis Kondilakis, one of the most significant figures of Greek literature, became its first president. The fact that a literary author was positioned in the presidency of the Journalists' Union was not by chance. Most journalists of the time were literary authors, and for that reason the union did not easily recruit members (Mayer: 1960:337). The literary authors' involvement in journalism is not something that only happened in the case of Greece as it will be analysed below. In June 1917 King Constantine was overthrown by the French troops that landed in Athens in order to take part in the war operations of Asia Minor. His second born son Alexander took his place. Eleftherios Venizelos became prime minister of the country again. After the First World War, Venizelos lost the elections of 1920, and Constantine resumed the throne after a referendum. The events that followed were a disaster for Greece. It was the greatest catastrophe since the modern Greek state was created. The new pro-monarchy government, continued the war against the Ottomans in Asia Minor, and this resulted in the defeat of the Greek army and the uprooting of more than a million Greeks from the area of the east Aegean coast in 1922. The defeat also had another painful result: the territories of Asia Minor and of Eastern Thrace, where ancient Greek civilisation was prominent were lost for ever.

After the defeat, a military movement was formed on 14 September 1922 under the leadership of the radical General Nicolaos Plastiras. King Constantinos was expelled. In December 1923 elections were held, were won by the Liberal Party, in spite of its fragmentation and its split into two new parties, the Democratic Union and the Liberal Democrats. Venizelos returned to Greece and became prime minister for a month. His efforts to reunite the party and assume control of the army failed, and so once more he left Greece. The Liberal Party was once more divided, this time in three. The left-wing liberals, who had founded the Democratic Union under the leadership of Papanastasiou, as well as the radical part of the army under Kondilis asserted considerable pressure, and this led the National Assembly to vote for the monarchy to be abolished, and the establishment of presidential parliamentary democracy on 25 March 1924.

From 1924 to 1928, Greek political life went through a period of instability and crisis. Brief governments and army interventions tested the country. As Tsoukalas suggests, 'during this period ten prime ministers, three general elections and eleven short military coups took place' (Tsoukalas: 1981:31). The continuous interventions of the army were different from those of the period of the oligarchic democracy, because they no longer positioned themselves in favour of one political pole. During the period of the oligarchic democracy, the army was firmly in favour of the creation of a constitutional state and was in alliance with the whole of the political parties and the ruling classes. The relative autonomy of the army that we saw during the period of oligarchic democracy no longer existed during this period. If the parliament was divided along the lines of Venizelists and Antivenizelists, the military was no exception. Politicians, due to the threats each bloc posed to another, allied with different fractions of the military.

The 1926 elections were especially interesting, since for the first time they were processed with the system of proportional representation. In spite of the general instability of the period, a series of laws that aimed to regulate press issues were voted after the election, while in 1927 the Constitution was reviewed. There is a need to mention the voting of the Law 23/1924 on the establishment of the democratic political system. This was a law which aimed to restrict the Greek Communist Party's activities, which during that period started addressing the masses and developed intense activity, especially within the trade unions and the Greeks who had come from Asia Minor. This was a law that was clearly reactionary and conservative, which at a political level tried to restrict the spread and growing influence of the views of one political party. At the same time, other Decree Laws, like for instance 6/9-11-1922 and 11/15-7-1925, regulate the issues of newspaper sales and format (Antonopoulos:1965:137).

The 1927 Constitution, in spite of its conservative character, had some progressive characteristics. The two basic elements were firstly, the addition with which the arrest of someone for offences that take place via the press was no longer considered an arrest in the act, and secondly, the abolition of the confiscation of publications that insulted the King. Eleftherios Venizelos came back to the country's political life in 1927. He tried to reunite the Liberal Party and finally formed a government after the elections of 1928, with a spectacular victory. The rise of the Communist Party, and the continuous strikes of the trade unions, combined with the world economic crisis of 1929, led the Liberal Party to a conservative politics which was crowned by the passage of the Law 4229/29 for 'the protection of the social regime', which is known in the country's modern political history as "Idionimo". That law came to strengthen even more the repressive character of the previous 1924 Law. This is the law which contended

that whoever expressed propagandistic views in favour of overthrowing the regime would be prosecuted. With this Law, besides the social and political repercussions that restricted the free political and trade union activities, there was also the effect that 'newspapers could be closed down and journalists could be fired and not allowed to work' (Antonopoulos: 1965:45).

From 1932 to 1936, there were 4 general elections and different parties came to power, along with temporary alliances. The Republic was abolished and the royal dynasty resumed power on 25 November 1935. A part of the military forces had tried to seize power from the antivenizelist People's Party in March 1935. This move of the army was supported by Venizelos. The failure of the military movement brought on a wave of violence against the Venizelists and communists, and also against the newspapers of the opposition. As Linardatos suggests, 'those in favour of the government turned against the Left with particular fury. From, the very beginning the Venizelist and other left newspapers were closed' (Linardatos: 1978:2). The clearing out that took place within the army was also significant, as it led to the prosecution and incarceration of the most democratic officers. This last fact had important consequences which, combined with later developments, created conditions of complete autonomy for the army, to the detriment of the country. Political instability continued until the 4 August, when the dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas was established.

During the same period, a series of Decree and Laws were passed with regard to the press. Some of these modify earlier ones, and others regulate different issues. The most important of these was the Law 31/1935, which regulated the issues that had to do with the journalists' organisations. For the first time the state now intervened by law in order to regulate the professional organisation of the journalists, an intervention which would continue. As state

intervention increases, so does interdependence between the press and political power. Yet it was important for the inter-war era that literary journalism was developed. Literary journalism is a form of journalism writing that was developed mainly in Southern Europe, including Greece, during the 19th century. Journalism writing was more oriented towards literature and letters than other modern forms of writing, like for example, reports and interviews. Literary journalism can be defined as a form of referential writing that uses literary techniques rather than professional. Literary journalism represents an earlier form of journalistic writing. An example of literary journalism is the chronicle, a form of writing that today has almost disappeared. The involvement of literature figures in journalism was the rule in countries with a tradition in literary journalism. For example in France the most important figures in literature, as Balzac, Hugo, Dumas and Zola, were in the same time journalists (Skamnakis: 1998: 264). In Greece besides Kondilakis, Tellos Agras, I.M. Panagiotopoulos, Petros Charis and others wrote in newspapers and magazines. Literary authors were also journalists in Italy like, for example, Gaspare Gozzi and Giuseppe Baretti. They were known as *Erudit* (Zioutos: 1954:62) In this country, even during the '70s important literature figures, like Pasolini, Calvino and Giorgio Manganelli (Burns: 2000:4), continued to occupy themselves with journalism. That journalistic form of writing appeared in those countries because of the delay in the development of the press as an industrial product on one hand, and because of their specific cultural traditions, and especially romanticism, on the other. This form had to rely on the literature authors, because it did not have a massive character, but, on the contrary, an elitist one. In other occasions literary authors themselves pursued their involvement in journalism in order to attain a wide public audience but also as a means of living. The parallel development of literary and political journalism is not contradictory.

A distinguish feature of romanticism on which literary journalism relied was its political involvement in the struggle for independence.

The conditions in the country created a significant base for research and speculation. That period's literature was developed thematically and was expressed with different ideological orientations. The mass of events during the previous period led to a qualitative transformation, mainly in regard to the production of a huge literary output, which targeted a large audience. The literary authors expanded their participation in journalism. 'The fact that literary authors worked as professional journalists led to a more substantial growth for literature, and to a more scholarly form that the press ever had' (Polikandriotis:2003:241). This involvement of literary authors in journalism and the literary characteristics of the Greek press were not something new. These characteristics formed a high proportion of newspaper content during the period of the pre-revolutionary and the post-revolutionary press, as well as later. Anyhow, Literary journalism is related with the delayed development of journalism's profesionalization and of press's commercialization.

The establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship suspended all personal freedoms including the freedom of the press. That a long-term dictatorship was established in the country for the first time was a result of many factors. The weakness of the two bourgeois political parties and their multi-fragmentation, the deaths of their leaders, the removal of progressive officers after the failure of the 1935 movement and, most significantly, the rise of the working class and of the left-wing organizations, created the conditions for a new military coup. This time the coup had an entirely different character. Its imposition marked, not one elite's fear of another elite, but the fears about the rise of lower social classes, especially the working class.

In 1936, the Metaxas dictatorship bought a radio transmitter of 15KW to organise a radio station in the area of Ilion near Athens. At the same time it created three studios in Zapeion for the needs of the radio programmes. With the enforced Law 95/1936, a Legal Entity subjected to Public Law was created, namely the Radio Transmitting Service (Demertzis-Skamnakis: 1998:209). It should be noted that this was not exactly the first experiment in radio: radio programmes at an experimental level had been made in 1923 in the Ministry of the Navy. In 1928 a private radio station was founded in Thessaloniki by C. Tsiggiridis (Tirovouzis: 2005:28) and in 1930 permission to operate was granted to a second smaller one which was also private. The creation of a public radio station by the dictatorship soon transformed it into a propaganda tool of the regime. Its foundation and operation from the very beginning was identified with that of the state. It is self-evident that neither relative autonomy nor independence could exist for this medium. Later conditions, the beginning of the Second World War, the Civil War and a series of the undemocratic governments were to strengthen even further the state control and intervention in the areas of radio broadcasting.

The laws of that time regarding the press lead to a complete control of the newspapers, and also of the journalism profession. The Law 1092/1938 provided even more reasons for confiscation of newspapers and for shutting them down altogether, and also forbade their circulation if they did not have a specific license from the regime. In the same year, the Law 1093 regulated issues regarding the organization of journalists. For the first time a *Press Register* was created, in which journalists were obliged to register, on the one hand to practise their profession, and on the other, to register in the Journalists' Union. The *Press Register* was compulsory for those who wanted to become journalists and the

candidates needed to have completed their High School studies or at least an Institute of Higher Education.

The whole period since the revolt of 1909 and the voting of the Constitution in 1911, in spite of the fact of the political division in politics and the press, is characterized by the continuous prosecution of newspapers and journalists, irrespective of whether they belonged to the liberal or the conservative political space. Two elements contribute to this. The first is linked with the restrictions posed by the different Constitutions and Laws of the country. The second is due to the political and social conditions. The continuous shifts in government, the world war and the Asia Minor catastrophe, the continuous military movements and the dictatorships created a climate of polarization within which it was almost impossible to develop conditions of a complete freedom of the press. It was exactly these conditions that allowed the greater politicization of the press in Greece and its involvement in the formation of politics. At the same time, via not only the state interventions, which aimed to restrict the freedom of the press, but also via the subsidies, which were of course selective, a relationship of inter-dependence was created, which strengthened even more during the next decades.

At the same time, Greek journalism acquired intense literary characteristics, especially with the massive participation of the more prominent literary authors in the newspapers and the periodicals of the time. The fact that the press was involved in politics and in the development of literary journalism is not at all contradictory. These two elements co-existed within these conditions and formed basic characteristics without the one negating the other. Greece was not the only country where the combination of political press and literary journalism appeared as has already been explained. In France, newspapers 'measured their

success by criteria more reflective of French journalistic tradition and thus were basically partisan journals of opinion that existed for political rather than commercial reasons' (Smith:1976:96) whereas 'the French press developed a peculiar intellectual press-or a literary style in journalism that also could be found elsewhere on the Continent' (Hoyer:1993:283). But in Italy too, 'journalists are advocates linked to political parties and very close to being active politicians themselves' (Mancini: 2003).

In Southern Europe the print media's involvement in politics and in literary journalism have travelled side by side. Both formed a very important part of the content of the newspapers of these countries. In reality, only later 'French journalists like journalists in many other countries progressively imported and adapted the methods of Anglo-American journalism' (Chalaby: 1996:303).

The development of the Greek Press up to 1940

A brief reference to the first attempts at publication, as well as to the political events of that time would be especially important, for the sake of historical accuracy and making the analysis more complete. There were three phases in which the Greek press was developed, from the time when the first Greek newspaper appeared until the end of the century. The first phase spans from 1790 to 1820. This is the period of the so-called pre-revolutionary press. The newspapers of that period were published in the big cities such as Vienna, Bucharest and Paris, where the Greek Diaspora was active. The newspapers' character was mainly political but also literary. The second phase lasts from 1821 to 1823. It was the period of the revolutionary press. The newspapers had a clear propagandistic character, aiming to support the effort to win the war of national liberation. The third period lasted from 1823 to 1900 and could be named the

period of the post-revolutionary press. At this point it should be stressed that the reference to the Greek press concerns mainly the newspapers that were published within the territory of the future Greek state, which was gradually formed to reach today's final shape. In spite of the fact that the Greek press had a significant presence outside these territories, there will be no reference to these areas. For instance, in Izmir alone, a city which today belongs to Turkey, 'from 1832 to 1922, almost 135 Greek newspapers and periodicals were published' (Yiannakopoulos: 2002:38).

Pre-revolutionary Press

The first Greek newspaper was published in Vienna, by George Vendotis, in 1784. However, neither the title nor the contents of that newspaper are known. George Laios published a number of official letters during his research at the Austrian Public Record's Office and has suggested that this Greek newspaper was a weekly one and only eight issues came out before it was banned by the Austrian Government (Koumarianou:1971). Enepekides, also, pointed out that George Vendotis was the first Greek owner of a typographic office in Vienna (Enepekides: 1965:87).

From the last two decades of the seventeenth century till 1820s a number of Greek newspapers and periodicals were published by the Greek Diaspora mainly in Vienna where almost the entire trade with the East was in the hands of the Greeks. Along with Venice, Rome, Florence, Milan, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow and Paris, Vienna became a cradle for the education and revolutionary activities of the Greek nation at that time. In chronological order and up to 1821, the year of the Greek Revolution, the following titles were published in Vienna:

Ephemeris (1790)¹, *Ermis o Logios* (1811)², *Ellenikos Telegraphos* (1812), *Philologikos Telegraphos* (1817)³, and *Kalliopi* (1819)⁴. In addition *Mellissa* and

¹. The first issue of this bi-weekly newspaper can be dated Vienna, 31 December 1790. It was published by the Markides brothers who were born in Siatista, Macedonia. The word “ephemeris”, is still in use in Greece and means newspaper. The paper was printed at the office of Joseph von Baumeister, a doctor of law. Many members of the Greek community placed their printing orders with Baumeister. The Markidis brothers were already working with Baumeister when the latter was appointed a teacher. After that, the brothers undertook the direction of his printing house (Papalexandrou: 1971: 18). Both managed to get Austrian citizenship, something which proved to be very helpful later. For the next five years, in addition to conducting other matters, they carried on printing the *Ephemeris*, the first Greek newspaper of which actual samples survive.

In December 1797 Regas, a Greek revolutionary, was arrested by the Austrian police, together with seventeen of his comrades, and taken to Vienna. The Markides brothers were accused of helping Regas by printing and distributing his manifestos, thus spreading his revolutionary message against the Ottoman occupation of the Balkans (Mastorides:1999:35). In February 1798 the Austrian authorities ordered the closure of the newspaper and expelled the Markidis brothers from the country (Karikopoulos:1984:24). The fact that they were Austrian citizens saved their lives.

². *Ermis o Logios* was the third Greek newspaper. It was first published in 1811 by Anthimos Gazis in Vienna and was printed by J.B.Zweck, who in 1810 undertook the direction of a printing house that had been established almost ten years earlier by the Greek George Vendotis as mentioned above (Karikopoulos:1984:28). In his announcement the editor called it “philological ephemeris” and declared that its aim was to print “philological news about Science and Education”, especially news concerning the Greeks (Enepekides:1965:54). In the first issue, which appeared in January 1811, Gazis invited his learned compatriots to contribute to the journal with articles on geography, astronomy, natural science, archaeology, and old inscriptions.

The editor also promised to print remarks and articles about the Greek language. Following in the paths of the Greek Enlightenment Movement, led by Adamantios Koraes, *Ermis* survived the next ten years until the beginning of the Greek Revolution. In the course of its publication it changed editors three times and produced 211 issues. Kokkinakis, the last in the rank of *Ermis*'s editors, chose to discontinue its printing after he was forced by the Austrian authorities to publish the patriarchal aphorism against the revolutionary attempts in Greece. The last issue of the journal came out on 1 May 1821 (Mayer: 1957:12).

Athena were published in Paris both in 1819 and in London the *Mousion* and *Iris* (Karikopoulos: 1984:11-31). Furthermore, an announcement in *Ermis o Logios* informed readers about the forthcoming publication of a periodical that was to be printed in England which however never came into existence.

Consequently, the printing of the first Greek newspapers and periodicals could not take place anywhere else than in a large center, where a free Greek community worked and educated itself. From 1781, the restrictive laws concerning the distribution of printed matter in the Austro-Hungarian Empire had already been lifted and, as a result of this democratization process, licenses were given to Greek publishers. The Austrian authorities had no interest whatsoever in alienating the large Greek community, which numbered many thousands of Greeks. Moreover, the biggest proportion of Austrian commerce with the Ottoman Empire was controlled by merchants belonging to that community. Out of some 120 banks and commercial houses in Vienna at the end of the eighteenth century about ninety were Greek (Mastorides:1999).

The revolutionary press

The details of the historical events concerning the start, but also the progress of the Greek Revolution, still constitute an area of dispute among historians.

³ . In the beginning, *Ellinikos Tilegrafos* was published as *Eidisis apo ta Anatolika Meri* (News from Eastern Parts). Its first editor, Efronios Popovic, was born in the Northern part of Greece in Macedonia. The first issue came out on 2nd July, 1811 (Karilopoulos: 1984: 26). On 3 January 1812, the editor and the title changed. Popovic was also replaced by a Greek medical doctor Demitris Alexandrides and the title from *Eidisis apo ta Anatolika Meri* changed to *Ellinikos Tilegrafos* (Mastorides:1999:64).

⁴ . *Kalliopi* was the last pre-revolutionary newspaper that was published in Vienna in 1819. Its editor, Athanasios Stagirites was also a Greek from Macedonia and professor at

Although the 25 of March 1821 has been established as the official date of the beginning of the revolution in Kalavrita, we now accept that a series of revolts took place all over the Greece before that date (Sfiroera:2002:10). The uprising rapidly spread to the three islands, Hydra, Spetses and Psara, as well as to the Greek mainland. An unsuccessful attempt led by Alexander Ypsilantis, was preceded by his decision to declare the beginning of the Greek revolution in the principalities of Russia in February 1821 (Clogg: 2002: 57). The fact remains that the process to establish the first Greek state, which concluded ten years later, had been started. The ups and downs of this process and the analysis of the war events are beyond the scope of the present study.

Before the appearance of the printed newspaper during the Greek Revolution, handwritten ones existed (Koumarianou: 1971:11). A handful of such papers appeared in the early period of the Greek armed struggle.⁵ A few days after

the Kings Academy. *Kalliopi* was also forced to close during the Greek revolution (Mastorides:1999:60).

⁵. The most important papers of this period were: a) *Salpinx Elleniki*; the first recorded attempt at printing a Greek newspaper within Greece was *Salpinx Elleniki*, or the Greek Trumpet as its title could be translated, which began publication on 1st August 1821 in Kalamata, a few months after the War of Independence had started (Mastorides, 1999: 79). It was the first newspaper to be printed in a free Greek territory after the War of Independence began. The Peloponesian city of Kalamata lies south west on the edge of the Messinian Gulf. It was first captured by the Turks in 1459 but the Venetians held control of it from 1685 until 1714, when it was recaptured by the Turks. In March 1821 Kalamata passed into the hands of the Greek revolutionaries, and tradition says that it was there the official ceremony initiating the War of Independence took place. In Kalamata, where the first temporary revolutionary headquarters was set up, the first issue of *Salpinx* came out; its second issue was dated 5 August and the third one, which was the last to be printed, 20 August 1821(Mayer, 1957:19). The year 1824 has to be seen as a landmark in the development of the Greek press. During that year three newspapers were printed on free Greek soil.

b) *Ellenika Chronika*; this paper, the second to be printed on free Greek soil, was the fruits of the work done by an English colonel called Leicester Stanhope. After many adventures, which make enjoyable reading, he arrived in Greece in November 1823 as a representative of the British Philhellenic Committee (BPC) (Mastorides, 1999: 90). Early the next month, Stanhope landed in Messolonghi, determined to move into action on three fronts. He intended to set up a kind of a regular post office mechanism, to organize a hospital unit, and to establish a press. Stanhope found an editor, John Jacob Meyer, a Swiss who had been in Greece since 1821. According to Papalexandrou 'In order for the *Greek Chronicles* to be published, Lord Byron, who had recently arrived in Messologi, offered 250 talira. The West Greek Administration Authorities bought also 100 newspapers distributing them to the people of the region' (Papalexandrou, 1971:101). The first issue of the paper can be regarded as the outcome of a multinational operation carried out by an Englishman born in Dublin, a Swiss, a Greek translator and copy editor, and a Greek printer. It was already obvious from the very first issue, but also from Stanhope's personal correspondence, that the newspaper was not meant to be a mere tool of revolutionary propaganda. It also had to play a wider educational role, which was a necessary ingredient for the readership it was aiming at. The two main information units however, are to be found under the headings "International" and "National News".

c) *Philos tou Nomou* (friend of law): made an important contribution to the small group of printed newspapers which came out in the 1821 in Greece. Chronologically it was the third paper, after *Salpinx* and the *Chronicle*, to be printed in a free Greek territory. The *Friend of Law* constitutes the longest-living paper among the ones first published in 1824 in Greece; its last issue, numbered 296, was dated "May 27 1827" (Mastorides: 1999:102). A complete series of this paper is kept at the library of the Benakis Museum in Athens. The idea of publishing this newspaper belonged to an Italian philhellene called Joseph N. Chiappe, who also undertook its editing (Karikopoulos, 1984: 47).

d) *Ephemeris Athenon*: The group of the 1824 Greek newspapers closed with the production of the *Ephemeris Athenon* (The Athenian Newspaper), first published on Wednesday 20 August. Its existence, like that of the Greek Chronicle, owes much to the BPC (Papalexandrou: 1971:116). When the first issue of the *Athenian Newspaper* came out on 20 August 1824, Stanhope was already back in England. He left Greece in May 1824, aboard the same ship that carried Byron's bier to his homeland. In less than six months, Stanhope had managed to put his stamp on the early history of the free Greek Press (Mastorides:1999:114).

e) *Geniki Ephemeris tis Ellados*: The first issue of the *Geniki Ephemeris tis Ellados* (General Newspaper of Greece) had to wait five months after the start of the printing operations of the Administration's office. The *Friend of Law* played that role from April

the revolution began the first newspaper of this kind appeared. It is also known as “pseudoephemerida” because of false or inaccurate information it contained about the course and the results of the battles (Papalexandrou: 1971:80). This attitude was adopted on purpose in order to encourage the fighting Greeks, and to incite the rest of them to participate in the struggle. The next handwritten paper, *Aetoliki*, came out in Messolonghi and *Acheloos* was “produced” in Agrinio (Karikopoulos, 1984: 350).

The Post-revolutionary Press (1831-1900)

Greece remained an agricultural small state for the next forty years after the establishment of its independence, cereals being its main product. Any attempts towards industrialization in the years 1830-70 failed dramatically. Among them, a proposal in 1835 for the establishment of paper manufacture was turned down by the government, and a similar plan in 1839-40 was abandoned before it even started. In the field of education, the steps taken by the new country followed much the same slow developmental process. As was the case at all levels of Greek society, there was too great a gap between an elite mainly educated abroad and the large percentage of the population which was illiterate.

Briefly these were the political, social and economic conditions under which the Greek newspaper were to grow. The *Sotir* (Saviour) and *Athena* were the first newspapers to be published in Athens, early in 1835. Apart from these

1824 until October 1825, when the *General* was born, with Theoklitos Pharmakidis as editor in chief (Mastorides: 1999:125). In the course of this publication, the *General Newspaper of Greece* had to follow the movements of the seat of the Administration. On 18 April of that year, its title was changed to *Ethniki Efimeris* (National Newspaper) and the last issue bearing this title came out on 1 February 1833. It was then replaced by the

two, and a few provincial newspapers several other papers, such as *Elpis* (Hope), *Aeon* (Century), *Mellon* (Future) and *Avgi* (Dawn) left their mark on the history of the Greek newspaper in the years 1831-1900.

From 1831 to the end of the nineteenth century, numerous newspapers were published both in Athens and in the provinces, in spite of repressive measures, the various political crises and general political instability. From the catalogue that Mayer provides, in the period 1835-1862, about 116 newspapers were published in the areas of Athens and Piraeus, and 35 in the rest of the Greek cities in the limited territories that the country occupies at the time. The Ionian Islands, which were under British rule, are home to 23 newspapers during the same period. Among these, the daily newspapers were a small percentage and were represented by titles like *Phos* (The Light), *Geniki* (The General) and *Ephimeris tis Elladas* (Greece's Newspaper) the rest were either weeklies or they were published twice a month. Most of these were small size newspapers, and encompassed mere four or six pages. The articles they give space to were mainly written by people who were employed for just these, rather than being written by professional journalists. These article writers, who were usually literary authors and people who were involved in politics, gradually became the active journalistic content of these newspapers. To cut a long story short, the need of the first organised newspapers to develop their subject matter and shape their content, makes them turn to a search- not of professional journalists, since these did not exist as such- but to the intellectuals and political persons of the era. As Lychnos suggests, 'the first newspapers did not have a lot of information available to publish, and as they could not comment on the political developments,

Newspaper of the Government whose first issue was printed in Nafplion on 16 February, 1833 (Mayer: 1957:32).

concentrated more on literary and much less on real journalistic work. Then and later, the literary authors or those who had literary ambitions were the first to contribute to the daily and periodical press' (Lychnos: 1972:40). Thus in Greece of that period, journalists were mainly literary authors, which means that the young people who wanted to be journalists needed to have some literary talent too. As Zioutos pointed out, 'during the time of literary journalism, it is widely thought that talent is everything' (Zioutos: 1954:85).

The fact that literary and political journalism would appear and develop in Greece had also to do with a number of other reasons. For instance, during that period there were no organised press agencies. International news could only become known through the Greeks of Diaspora, and the newspapers were dependent on them. Most of these Greeks who co-operated with the newspapers were intellectuals, or at least they wanted to preserve some kind of contact with the political life of Greece. The result was that the Greek newspapers of that period, those which could afford to deal with international issues, did so by presenting them in the shape of analyses and comment, rather than in the shape of the classic form of journalistic correspondence, as it appeared later. Some Greek newspapers in that period were also published in foreign languages and especially in French is of special interest. At the same time, it is worth noting that in 1838 a weekly newspaper was published in Athens which had women as its target group; its title was *Socrates of Women and the People*.

From 1863 to 1900, around 420 newspapers were published in Athens and Piraeus, and reach 390 in the rest of Greece. Politis contended that 'from 1840 to 1900, eighty newspapers are published only in Patras, whereas this number does not include the satirical, religious and others' (Politis: 1984:11). During this period, the press is being modernised. Manually operated printing presses give

their place to level ones and then to cylinders. The introduction of the use of printing blocks enriches the newspapers with images. The number of pages of these newspapers is growing, and many of them transform themselves to dailies. It was during that period that the daily press really makes its way to becoming the norm in Greece. In 1875, the newspaper agency "Spyros Tsaggaris" was founded, as a result of the merging of many small newspaper selling businesses, while in 1877, the same agency expands and is re-named Central Newspaper Agency (Basantis:1995:9). New conditions were created, which allow for better organisation of newspaper distribution and sales. Yet this did not benefit their finances, since circulation remained at very low levels.

But besides the newspapers which closed down and never reappeared, there was another category of newspapers which either interrupt their publication for a little while, or were forced to change their title because of the political instability of the period, or for reasons of censorship. The huge number of newspapers that circulated since the foundation of the Greek state to the end of the nineteenth century suggests that there started to develop an entire search for ways to satisfy the needs of expression that the society had, and it had started to shape and produce culture. This high number also indicates the underlying differences in politics and in society, which were between different ideological movements; these differences will appear in a more marked manner a little later. The fact that politics and literature were the basic axes for the newspapers seems to point to two significant characteristics which will determine the future development of the press in Greece.

Firstly, the publishing enterprise as such is being strengthened, and an exceptionally large number of newspapers appeared, in spite of how long they continue to be published or how secure they are when they are published. The fact

that politics and literature are at the centre of journalistic developments also means that there were no newspapers dealing with celebrity scandals or the personal life of well-known people. As Tsoukalas pointed out, 'Greece is probably the only European country where no "tabloid press" appeared' (Tsoukalas: 1986:149). A tabloid is a newspaper format particularly popular in the United Kingdom. The phrase "tabloid press" is used to refer to newspaper focusing on less serious content, especially celebrities, sports, crime stories, scandals etc. It is noteworthy that the first "tabloid newspaper" was not published in Greece until 2000, entitled *Espresso*.

Secondly, the fact that politics and literature determine the content of the first newspapers had a negative effect on every effort to expand their readership and develop specific methods of profit making through organising sales and advertising. Under these circumstances the environment was one of low circulation which in turn led to dependencies. On the contrary in the United States 'editors and publishers saw their readers not only as voters but also as consumers so they produced content that went beyond the world of politics and voting' (Baldasty:1992:5).

The most significant publications of this period are the newspaper *Efimeris* (Newspaper), which was first published in 1873. The *Acropolis*, of which a special mention appeared above, was first published in 1883. Its circulation daily reached the 13,500 during the first period. The satirical newspaper *The Script* appeared for the first time in 1893, with a circulation of 15,000. *Estia*, which was founded in 1896, reached a circulation of 20,000.

Only four of the newspapers which were published during the nineteenth century are still in existence. They are: *Peloponnisos* of the Frangopoulos family, which was published in Patras in 1886, *Estia*, which was published in 1894 in

Athens, *Thessaly* which was published in 1898 in the city of Volos and the *Tharros* (Courage) of Apostolakis family, which was published in 1899 in Kalamata. These are the only daily newspapers which were published almost during the whole twentieth century. Three of them, all regional, continue to develop and have gained an important position in terms of circulation at the local level, while the Athenian *Estia* is original in that it uses the katharevousa, the Greek purist language with clear ancient Greek linguistic elements.

Newspapers from 1900 to 1940

In 1901, Ioannis Stefanopolis, managing editor of a French language newspaper in Athens was commissioned by the government to negotiate with the French News Agency Havas which represented a number of large wire agencies- the establishment of a Telegraphic News Service. In 1906, an agreement was signed in Paris defining the organisation and operation of the Athens News Agency. At the beginning, however, the Athens News Agency did not have the means to fulfil its mission and it experienced hundreds of difficulties of every kind during the completion of its work. There was no wireless. Neither was there a duplicator. They used the primitive form of copying for the printing of the newsletters that they distributed to the newspapers. And this news was short and written in an archaic and laconic style (Mayer: 1957). However the establishment of the Athens News Agency was an important development for the organisation of the newspapers.

In the beginning of the twentieth century publishing initiatives were still taking place. A great number of newspapers were published in Greek territory, some of which are still active nowadays. According to the National Research Institute of Modern Greek Studies more than 2.500 titles were found throughout the country

(Droulia: 2005:31). Due to the limited space available, it is almost impossible to refer extensively to all the titles that historically appeared in Athens and regional Greece during this period.⁶ This brief historical retrospect makes it clear that in

⁶. Thus a short reference can only be made to the daily Athenian and regional ones that are still in circulation today. In 1901 *Kirix* (The Herald) a newspaper that was founded by Eleftherios Venizelos was published in the city of Chania, Crete. As Mayer pointed out, 'the Cretan politician fought in the journalistic arena against the court of Prince George and against the political decisions of the latter in regard to the Cretan Issue. Due to these articles, *Kirix* was closed down on three occasions before the revolutionary movement of Therisos in 1905, and Venizelos was sentenced to incarceration, in the Itzedin jail' (Mayer:1957:152). During this period, Crete was not yet united with the rest of Greece, and it remained an autonomous state after its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1898. The newspaper *Patris* (Homeland) was published in 1902 in Pyrgos of Peloponnisos, by Leonidas Varouxis. This newspaper, which is active continuously for more than 100 years now, continues to be published by the same family. The *Kritiki Epitheoris* (Cretan Review) was published in 1912 by the Kalaitzakis brothers in Rethymno of Crete. It was the continuation of the newspaper *Radamanthis*, which was published in 1841 by Emmanouil Vivilakis, an uncle of the Kalaitzakis brothers.

In 1913 the *Ethnos* (Nation) was published in Thessaloniki a newspaper which later moves to Athens. It was a newspaper that supported the politics of Eleftherios Venizelos, and for that reason its publication was stopped twice, when the Antivenizelist parties resumed government. The first occasion was from November 1916 to April 1917, and the second from 1 March 1936 to 18 April of the same year. It is in that year that *Ipirus* newspaper was published too, in the city of Ioannena. The *Rhodiaki* was published in 1915 in Rhodos Island, while the *Simaia* (Flag) of Kalamata was published in 1916. In 1917 the *Rizospastis* (Radical) was published. In reality *Rizospastis* was already published in the beginning of 1908, as a weekly, but stopped its publication in 1911. In 1920 it becomes associated with the Socialist Party of Greece, which will later be renamed the Greek Communist Party. In 1919 the *Tachidromos* (Postman) was, also, published in the city of Volos. In Athens George Vlachos published in 1919 the newspaper *Kathimerini*, which was friendly to the political position that was against Venizelos. The newspapers *Eleftero Vima* (Free Tribune) in Athens and *Eleftheria* (Freedom) in Larissa were published in 1922 (Skamnakis: 2005). *Eleftero Vima* was the main newspaper that supported the political views of the Liberal Party and its leader Eleftherios Venizelos. Its owner, Dimitris Lambrakis, was born in Chania of Crete, as

the inter-war period, there was a parallel publishing endeavour not only in Athens but in regional Greece too. This means that the centralized press model which appeared in Greece especially after World War II, did not exist before that. As Demertzis and Skamnakis pointed out, 'It is toward the end of the inter-war period, when gradually the Athenian press became dominant at the national level' (Demertzis-Skamnakis: 1998). Athenian newspapers retained very low rates also at the level of circulation, and only towards the middle of the 1930s did they raise that, making it more than double. As Balta pointed out 'the average daily circulation of Athenian dailies was 150,000 in 1915. In 1930-36, average circulation reached 350,000-360,000' (Balta: 1993:81).

Venizelos was, and he was one of the main collaborators of the leader of the Liberal Party. As Mayer pointed out, 'many political programmes were drawn up in the offices of the *Elefthero Vima*, many governments were formed and many revolutions planned, which were to have a great influence on the future of Greece' (Mayer:1959:197).

The newspaper *Vradini* (Evening), was published in Athens in 1923. After the military coup of 1923, the new government of Prime Minister Gonatas shut down all the newspapers that were opposed to Venizelos. The journalists that were left unemployed decided to found a coalition and publish a morning newspaper under the title *The Efimerida Syntakton* (Editors' Newspaper), and an afternoon one under the title *Vradini* (Evening). A year later *Vradini* was privatised. The newspaper was against Venizelos. In 1927, *Ipirotikos Agon* (Struggle of Epirus) was appeared in Ioannena, published by the teacher Efthimios Tzallas. It was rightly characterised as the greater school of thought concerning journalism within the region. *Proodeftiki* (Progress) appeared the same year in the island of Chios. In 1928 the *Demokratias* (Democrat) in the island of Lesbos and the *Kirix* (Herald) of Larisa, which will become today's *Imerisios Kirix*. *Proodeftiki* (Progress) in the city of Serres in Macedonia appeared in 1929, while the *Tachydromos* (Postman) was published in Kavala, Macedonia in 1931. The *Athinaiika Nea* (Athenian News), belonging also to Dimitris Lambrakis was published in Athens in the same year. In 1932 the newspaper *Anatoli* (East) was published in the city of Agios Nicolaos in the eastern part of Crete. Finally, the *Lamiakos Typos* (Press of Lamia) was published in 1936 in the city of Lamia and the *Neos Agon* (New Struggle) in Karditsa. Both of them have a large circulation today (Skamnakis: 2005).

The rise in the circulation of the Athenian newspapers during this period reflected two important elements that were related with a) The definitive dominance of a national and political decision making center (Athens) and b) the prevalence of Athenian press as the most important, if not the dominant, category of media for the shaping of politics in the country.

Professional Organisations

During the whole nineteenth century, there was no clear separation of roles between the publisher and the journalist. The publishers are journalists at the same time, to the degree that they deal with the material of the newspaper and write the articles. As it was mentioned above, the newspapers of this period were not organised enterprises, and did not employ a large number of people. This fact delays significantly the process of organisation of the professional journalists as well as the creation of a collective professional identity. Publishers, journalists, literary authors and politicians, form an exceedingly differentiated group that deals with the publishing of newspapers, and they do not share clear professional characteristics. In the course of time, and especially during the two first decades of the twentieth century, this heterogenous group was strengthened even more. One of the oldest known journalists described those who were acting as journalists in Greece at that period as follows: 'There are graduates of German universities and others that did not have the chance to know how the chairs were organised in high-school. There are officers, literary critics, actors, university students, merchants, members of parliament, economists, public servants and bank officials... Perhaps this is one of the prerogatives related to the profession' (Paleologos: 1930:20).

Considerable efforts for the organisation of journalists begun in 1889, with an initiative of the publisher of the French speaking newspaper *Messenger d' Athenes*, called Antonios Stephanopolis. The union formed thus was named the Greek Journalists' Union. As Karikopoulos pointed out, 'the then prime minister Charilaos Trikoupis met with the council of the union, and the council suggested that tax should be reduced concerning the paper used for newspapers, the post office costs and the telegram costs' (Karikopoulos:1984:112). These suggestions are the first to be registered in order to make possible a press subsidy system, which would form gradually and will find the support of almost all cabinets. The first attempt to organise the effort failed, and the union was dissolved. The same happened with the Journalists' Association of Athens, which was founded in 1902. In 1904, the Press Syndicate was founded, whose members were publishers. The Press Syndicate was created with a view to rendering the newsprint tax free. According to Mayer, 'The Theotokas government initiated a Law that would invalidate the taxes on paper, but met with strong reactions and there was the danger that it would not be brought to parliament for voting' (Mayer: 1957:251). The first legislation regarding the issue, which was not however formed in a systematic way, took place in 1909 (Antonopoulos: 1965:131). Ten years later, the Press Syndicate was dissolved.

Today's Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers was created in 1914. As Mayer pointed out, 'the tactics of the administrations not to allow new members, led to the creation of more journalistic unions' (Mayer:1960:22). Indeed, by 1925 the Journalists' Association was created, followed by the Journalists' Union, the Editors' Association, the Editors' Union and the Association of Professional Journalists. In 1922, the Journalists' Union of Volos was established. The city of Volos was an important regional centre for the

publication of various newspapers during that period. This first effort failed some years later. In 1927, a second effort for the establishment of a Journalists' Union in the same city took place but it also failed like the previous one. Finally, in 1932 a third Journalists' Union was established which will be renamed in 1938 the Journalists' Union of Thessaly, Sterea Ellada and Evia (ESIETHSEE:2002).

This multiple fragmentation of the journalistic organisations during the inter-war period reflects the possible conflicts that came up in the ways that professionals were organised. But it mainly reflects the fact that this is considered a closed profession, which is linked with the literary characteristics of Greek journalism. The Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers (ESIEA) was not exactly a professional union, but a club of intellectuals. It is characteristic that even today, the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers is deemed an intellectual and professional union (Skamnakis: 2000). This is the reason why the introduction of new members met with systematic refusal, or why applicants for acceptance found it very difficult to reach the standards demanded. It is characteristic that in spite of the huge number of newspapers and periodicals that appeared after 1900, Journalists' Union members by 1934 were, only about 170. The Journalists' Association had around the same number of members – in spite of the fact that it took in all the other unions that we referred to above. In the course of time, the union's closed nature was also due to state financial support that the members had, especially via the Journalist's Lottery, and later through the Advertising Stamp, as it will be explained later.

The Kondilis government passed, in 1935, a new legislation regulating a new structure of the journalistic unions. (Antonopoulos:1965:48). As Mayer contends, the president of the Journalists' Union Kraniotakis proposed the legislation, as he was Minister of Public Transport at the time (Mayer: 1960:338).

With this legislation a journalists' union new structure with local branches in towns with more than 50,000 inhabitants was created, branches with at least seven journalists. The Metaxas dictatorship founded a special Ministry for the Press and for Tourism, and imposed new legislation, as well as the *Press Register*, which was mentioned above. The whole enrolment process was the following: The journalist trainee had to submit a form signed by the newspaper owner or the newspaper director to the Ministry of the Press and Tourism. This form included the date of employment, the salary and insurance details. The training period officially started from the date of the forms submission. After a successful year on the job-training, a special committee consisting of a Ministry representative, a representative of the professional organization and a professor from the University of Athens, Panteion School, interviewed the candidate. If the result of the interview was successful the candidate attained a temporary membership at the *Press Register*. After three years the journalist could become a permanent member provided that his/her service was satisfactory and he/she could become a member of the Journalists' Union. Those who failed at the interview could not continue their training period at their newspaper (Skamnakis: 2000:117). However, they could attend another interview in six months' time. That system of entry to the journalism profession was similar to the system established in Italy and later in Spain. A characteristic example, of this kind of regulation, is Italy. In Italy, the fascist regime imposed the *Press Register* by Law in 1928. 'During the fascist period, the *Press Register* was established. In this way the State enslaves the Press' (Antonopoulos: 1965:121). In Spain, the Franco fascist regime imposed a similar law in 1938. According to Alavarez, 'Franco was the number one journalist as he occupied the top position in the Registro Oficial de Periodistas

(official Register of Journalists).The totalitarian model was also applied to the training and practical application of the profession' (Alvarez: 1994:48).

Four unions of owners and four unions of editors, divided by geographical criteria were created under this Law. The Union of Editors of Periodical Press was also founded, along with the Union of Periodical Press Owners. At the same time, two associations, one of owners and one of journalists were founded by media all around Greece, and a General Union of Greek Press, as the top of the hierarchy. This state controlled form could not be put to work because of the Second World War.

An important factor for the finances of the journalistic unions was the Journalists' Lottery, which was institutionalised after an initiative by the Journalists' Union of the Athens Daily Newspapers in 1932, and it was officially entrusted to the unions by the laws 339 and 1093 of 1938. This Lottery was a source of significant income and strengthened the finances of the unions, thus also their members, as the funds for pensions and health. Of course it also accentuated the closed character of the unions for many decades, since the members had special privileges. It should be mentioned that almost 20 to 25 % of the whole revenue of the Journalists' Lottery went directly to the unions and the rest to the winners, the sales persons and some organisations of public interest like the IKY (National Scholarship Foundation) and the Olympic Committee. Later, the Journalists' Lottery will pass into the hands of the state which will form the general directorship of the State Lottery, which will be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance.

Journalism training

The history of journalism education in Greece is characterised by a series of attempts that aimed at the creation of a professional school of journalism. These attempts began, in 1925, with the formation of a school of journalism that had a seminar-like character, and lasted, until 1990, when two Departments of Communication and Media Studies were established at the Panteion University and the National and Kapodistriako University both located in Athens. The reasons for the creation of these departments related mainly with the historical absence of education and training in the field of journalism, as we shall see further down. They also related with the important changes that took place in the wider field of communications and the formation of a new media market in the beginning of 90s. This new market demanded specialized personnel with basic education, which could have been done in university departments of communications and mass media studies. So the historical demand for the creation of a school of journalism, but also the modern demand of a new developing media market led to the creation of these new departments.

In some other European countries journalism studies were introduced by the end of 19th and in the beginning of 20th centuries, for example in Switzerland in 1884 (Katzen: 1975) in France in 1894 (Bjork:1996), in Poland in 1917 (Golka:1997) in Great Britain in 1919 (Jacobson:1977) in Belgium in 1922 (Bourquin:1958), in Italy in 1928 (Zioutos:1954). In 1928, a school of journalism was also established in the Czech Republic (Desmond:1949). The request for the establishment of a School of Journalism was a demand of the journalistic world for many decades (Mayer:1960). The first attempt for the establishment of a school of journalism in 1925, about which Zioutos provides information, had a very well-known Greek journalist, K. Polychroniadis, as its Head and was run by

the Executive Board of the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers (Zioutos:1954). In 1928, the school acquired legal status but it closed down later on. In 1932-33 and 1936-37, some lectures on the history of press and public affairs were taught in Panteion School of Political and Social Sciences in Athens. In 1935, Law 1093 decreed the foundation of a professional School of Journalism for the candidate members of the Journalists' Union, which, however, never came into effect. The Metaxas dictatorship passed Act 339/1936, which concerned the Journalists' Lottery (Lachio Syntakton), ensuring that the earnings were given to the Journalists' Union, as was explained earlier. According to this law, a percentage of the lottery profits were destined for the creation of a professional school of journalism. In 1938, due to Law 1093, the money intended for the school was transferred to the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers (Skamnakis: 2000). With the same legislation, the regime transferred the responsibility for issues concerning the training of journalists to the General Union of Press an organisation that never worked.

In fact, the Metaxas dictatorship did not want a school of journalism. For this reason with the article 32 of the law 1093/1938 the dictatorship of Metaxas transferred the money that were intended for the creation of a school of journalism to the Equity Fund of the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers. That money came from a percentage of the winnings of the Journalists' Lottery (Lachio Syntakton), which had been established with the law 339/1936 (Skamnakis: 2000: 116). In reality, Metaxas wanted to take full control of the journalistic profession and enforced Law 1093/1938 concerning the *Press Register*. This system was actually aimed at controlling the profession (Alevizatos:1995:426).

Summary

Conclusively, press from the creation of the first Greek State until the beginning of the Second World War went through two different historic phases. During the first phase it played a leading role for the achievement of the goals of the Greek liberating movement and the establishment of an independent liberal state. Press, in its bigger part, supported all the movements and the political elites that opposed the centralized and autarchic models of governing, like for example Kapodistrias and King Otto, respectively. It participated actively against every effort that aimed to deviate the parliamentary function and it supported the military movement at Goudi that established definitively the bourgeois democracy in Greece. So, political elites, military and press formed a political consensus concerning the function of liberal democracy and constitutional state. Under this meaning, interdependence contains all the elements of that political consensus.

During the second phase, because the political elites that composed bourgeois class in Greece had divided into liberal and conservative-monarchic, press in Greece followed these political divisions and it divided too into liberal and conservative-monarchic. The political division between Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists that characterized the whole period from 1909 until the beginning of the Second World War reinforced the party character of press and the publishers' involvement in the formation of politics. It also reinforced the state intervention in press either through the existence of laws that limited the freedom of press or with the creation of press subsidies that were used selectively.

Under these conditions, interdependence between political powers and the press was reinforced, while the appearance and development of literary journalism reflected the delay in the development of printing industry and profesionalization.

CHAPTER 2: POLITICS AND MEDIA DURING 1940-1967

The period from the end of the Second World War until the establishment of the dictatorship is a period of censorship and the restriction of the freedom of press. The left-wing newspapers were forbidden, whereas journalists were arrested and imprisoned. The civil war in particular created circumstances where almost all the bourgeois press was rallied against the democratic and communist left.

It is a second period during which the conservative and the liberal press form a political consensus on the subject the political regime and they identify with the ruling political forces. Gradually after the end of the civil war and because of the political divisions appeared once again among the conservative and the liberal political forces, the press was, in turn, divided into conservative and liberal. The newspapers' circulation increased during the 60s, but it was still at very low levels in relation to that of other countries of Europe.

From the civil war onwards a radio network made its appearance, which was controlled by the army and operated parallel to the public radio network. This fact is indicative of the shift that part of the power was made from politics to the army. At the same time, the publishers continued to interfere in the shaping of politics and to support the two bigger parties. Political power in its turn reinforced the press with new press subsidies.

Political Context: 1944-1967

In the beginning of 1944, the National Liberation Front (EAM) and its army section ELAS were dominating almost the whole of the country. These organisations of resistance were under the control of the Greek Communist Party (KKE). Despite the fact that during the inter-war period KKE did not have any

important political influence, during the Occupation. It made substantial advances and become the only Party actually in touch with the masses of the population (Petropoulos:1984:64). This was, on one hand, due to the confrontational tactics it followed during the German Occupation with the political organization of EAM and its military section National People's Liberation Army (ELAS), and, on the other, to the important changes that occurred in the class structure of Greek society. These changes in the class configuration of the Greek society were mainly caused by the gradual increase of the working class as a result of the huge wave of Greeks that flooded Greece after the 'Disaster of 1922' in Asia Minor. As Mouzelis notes, 'the increase of the industrial proletariat during the two pre-war decades, and the wide scale of immigrant, settlement in Athens and Salonica, became the basis for the creation and development of the Greek Communist Party' (Mouzelis:1978:51). On 10 March 1944 the Political Committee for National Liberation (PEEA) was formed, the so-called "Government of the Mountain", under whose wings many non-communists participated, like the Professor of Constitutional Law, Alexandros Svolos, who became the prime-minister of that government. In April, a National Council was formed, following secret elections in which 1,800,000 Greeks voted. The National Council was established by the National Assembly which was organised by PEEA in the village of Korischades, Central Greece (Tsoukalas:1981:58). The National Council confirmed the authority of the PEEA as the representative government. Thus, apart from the Government appointed by the Germans, there were two actual centres of power. The first, the exiled royal government in the Middle East, under Prime Minister Tsouderos, had the support of the Allies and especially the British while the second, PEEA, was under communist control. However neither PEEA nor KKE aimed at the formation of a self-sufficient government after the

liberation. On the contrary they aimed at the formation of a National Government with representatives of all political parties. For this reason PEEA addressed a note to Tsouderos and the royal government, concerning the formation of a government of national unity. This letter seemed to have influenced a big majority of democratic officers and soldiers in the Middle East, which on 30 March sent an ultimatum to Prime- Minister Tsouderos asking him to form a government of national unity. The intervention of the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was immediate and decisive. He asked the exiled royal Greek government not to give in but to disarm the battalions that had already revolted. After many discussions, 20,000 officers and soldiers surrendered to the British and were exiled to various North-African countries. This incident proved to be decisive for the future developments within the Greek Army and Greece in general. Firstly, because the democratic officers and soldiers were almost entirely removed from the Royal Greek Army, allowing room for a long-term period of domination of the right wing and pro-royal elements. As Alexander notes 'after the mutiny of April 1944 in Middle-East, the fear of communism lead to the coalition of conservative republicans and royalist officers and the birth of a new type of Greek politician 'the ethnikofron'' (Alexander:1984:266). Secondly, it led the way for the open intervention of foreign agents, the British in particular, in the shaping of political developments. As a matter of fact, the British had already been involved in the Greek liberation movement, either by trying to coordinate the attacks of partisan groups against German targets, or by supporting the non-communist-controlled ones.

On 27 April, George Papandreou became Prime Minister of the exiled royal government and started a series of discussions with PEEA concerning the formation of a National Government. On 3 September the two governments

agreed on the formation of a National Government. Six representatives of the National Liberation Front (EAM) took over secondary ministries. EAM, although it had absolute military and political control in Greece, wanted the formation of a national government and legitimacy. This policy was probably part of the strategy of the "Popular Fronts" that Communist parties were following internationally, which led to the participation of some of them in national governments immediately after the War, in France and Italy, for example.

On 12 October 1944, the Germans abandoned Athens and three days later British troops disembarked in Piraeus. The liberation found EAM-ELAS dominating almost all the countryside, with the Greek Democratic National Army (EDES), a right-wing partisan organisation, as the sole exception in the North-West zone of Epirus. EAM-ELAS forces approximated 50,000 permanent armed members and an equal number of auxiliary ones. ELAS, as regards to co-relations, was the most powerful military organisation in the country, by far. But the British, who did not want such a powerful left military mechanism, called for the dismantling of ELAS and the other resistance organisations. At this point, it must be mentioned that the decision of the British and the Government of George Papandreou to disarm the organisations of resistance was followed by the preservation of a right-wing section of the Greek army. 'This military section, which was full of extreme royalists, caused fear to the leadership of EAM and ELAS that it could be possibly used for a coup, given the existing instability' (Alexander:1984:268). This led to the resignation of six EAM ministers who participated in the National Government. At the same time, on 3 December, EAM decided on the organisation of a peaceful protest, which was banned by the government. The protest, finally, took place, resulting in the death of 28 protestors after police opened fire. The following day, 4 December 1944, EAM called for a

general strike and a mass demonstration. The protest took place without any unpleasant incidents. However, in the end, armed right-wing members of paramilitary organisations attacked the protestors killing over a hundred people. The following day the armed troops of ELAS attacked and took over some police stations while all their divisions around Greece were on standby. The British General Scoby declared Athens under martial law. The civil war had commenced. The brutalities that followed were accompanied by murders, imprisonments and displacements on both sides. The country that had just been liberated relived a new tragedy. However, one has to note that the presence of 25,000 British soldiers and another 15,000 men of the governmental National Guard, did not constitute a threat to ELAS. ELAS dominated the whole country and had a force of 16,000 men in Athens and two military sections of 5,000 men seven kilometres away from the centre of the Greek capital in the region of Hasia. ELAS could easily have taken control of Athens had it mobilized its military forces from the other regions of Greece and had it allowed the two military section of Hasia to enter Athens. But EAM's policy was oriented towards the formation of national government and the political resolution of the issue.

The British decided to re-enforce their army quickly, while they gradually started to dominate Athens, something that led to ELAS's decision to abandon the capital on the night of the 4 January 1945. In the meantime, George Papandreou had been worn down and could not play any important moderating role, as the British would have liked him to. The coming to power of the democratic General Nicolas Plastiras, who was in charge of the democratic rebellion of 1922, was considered to be a move of reconciliation. On 3 January 1945, he took over as Prime Minister and on 11 January a truce was signed. But the warfare was continuing especially from the part of the right wing elements, many of whom had

already joined the ranks of the National Guard and the police force. In fact the police and the National Guard were formed from the ex-security divisions that had been organised by the Germans and a Greek puppet government during the occupation. The members of these regiments not only turned in Greek partisans but also committed extensive killings and looting (Tsoukalas:1981: 69). It is the saddest case in the country's political history of the modern times. 'National Guard, the so-called "politofylaki" was formed immediately after the liberation, by these militant right wing and fascist elements, with the assistance of the British, in order to be used in the period of the incidents of December and later' (Iatrides:1984:343).

After long negotiations, on 12 February, Plastiras's government, EAM and the British signed the Agreement of Varkiza, which called for total disarmament of all partisan troops and political amnesty. As we will see below the political assassinations of the Civil War were later on characterised as common crimes, something that resulted in a huge one-sided wave of persecutions against the members and supporters of EAM-ELAS. EAM-ELAS, under the instructions of the Greek Communist Party, surrendered its weapons, with the exception of a few troops that disobeyed. But the activity of the extreme right-wing bands had already taken huge dimensions. The killings of members of EAM were a daily phenomenon while the arrests of democratic citizens measured up to thousands. The limited political amnesty finally proved to be a "Trojan Horse" that aimed to spread the persecutions of every democratic citizen. Thus people who had collected taxes during the War for PEEA were accused of robbery and looting. Others, who had executed collaborators of the Germans, following trials in courts set up by EAM, were accused of murder. Ex-judges of these courts were also accused of murder as its moral instigators. Former commanders of ELAS's troops

were considered to be morally responsible for every sort of crime. Even the killing of a German or Bulgarian soldier, during the occupation, was considered a crime. 'Between January and April 1945 more than 40,000 people were incarcerated' (Richter:1984:292). This fact forced even the leaders of the small liberal parties of the centre to sign up a common memorandum against the actions of the extreme right-wing paramilitary forces. This period remains known, in modern political history of the country, as the period of "White Terrorism".

Between January and April 1945, no fewer than eight governments came successively to power. In reality, the power was exercised by the British Army, which became a new army of occupation. The Greek Communist Party and EAM were continuing the policy of legality in accordance with the Varkiza Agreement and despite the mass arrests and murders. On 4 June 1945, an article was published in *Rizospastis*, the Communist Party newspaper, according to which the Varkiza Agreement had to be followed by all Greeks without any hesitation. On 12 June, a denunciation of Aris Velouhiotis was published, in *Rizospastis*. Aris Velouhiotis was the most heroic person of the Greek Resistance and leader of ELAS in Central Greece who, however, after the Agreement of Varkiza, decided to continue resisting against the British and finally was killed on 16 June 1945 after battles with the National Guard. By the end of 1945, nearly 49,000 EAM supporters had been imprisoned and over 1,200 murdered by the National Guard or unofficial paramilitary units (Lycogiannis:2001:117).

But while the Communist Party supported legality and did not hesitate to denounce the EAM groups that refused to surrender to the British and the Government, it still had decided not to participate in the elections that were planned to take place around the end of March 1946. The atmosphere of white terrorism and the political assassinations did not allow space for a fertile election

campaign. Despite the unfavourable conditions, the abstention of the Communist Party in the elections was a mistake. The result was that the Communist Party and its affiliated organizations were barred from public life. Thus, from an early stage, the irredentist discourse was effectively monopolized by the forces of the incipient “ethnikophrosyne”. In January 1946, 14 members of the government resigned, with a request for the postponement of the elections. But the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bevin, rejected the request of the Prime Minister, Themistoklis Sofoulis, for the rescheduling of the elections. The influence of the British was so great that they directly determined all the political developments, even the date of the elections. In these elections 13 parties participated and a few independent candidates, as well. This does not constitute an element of pluralism and democracy, but rather an indicative element of political clientelism and the forms of political patronage as they evolved in Greece before and during the inter-war. Finally, the ‘United Party of Ethnikofrones’, a right wing alliance that was dominated by the royalist People’s Party, won the elections. The Prime Minister became the leader of the People’s Party, Constantinos Tsaldaris. As it can be reasonably deduced, these elections were neither democratic nor representative of the social and political forces of that time (Tsoukalas:1981:85). Abstention was over forty percent. These elections were aiming at the legitimisation of the establishment (kathestotika) parties (especially the right wing ones) and at the ostracism of the Communist Party and other left-wing, non-communist forces. The refusal of EAM and GCP to participate in the elections allowed space to the extreme right and the British to achieve their goals and dominate politically in the parliament that came out of these elections. ‘The vast majority of the parliament of 1946 was constituted of pre-war politicians or personae that symbolized the worst that pre-war division had left, while, at times, the rejuvenation of the

political staff took the form of constitutional/parliamentary legalization of the local chieftains that loomed via the Security Divisions' (Nikolakopoulos:2000:146).

In August 1946, the last big removal from the army of its high ranking members who had served ELAS took place. Over 100 high-rank officers were arrested and dislodged to the infamous reformation camps (Vourmas: 1986:38). Certainly the battles continued in the rest of the country between government forces and ELAS units that had not surrendered arms. In September 1946, a referendum concerning the issue of monarchy took place. As it was expected, the royalist political forces dominated and King George II returned from London. Strangely enough, the leadership of the Greek Communist Party decided to take part in the referendum, probably within the frame of legality imposed by the Varkiza Agreement. At the same time, due to the continuous persecutions, the number of people, especially the ex-partisans, members of the ELAS, who resorted to the mountain, increased, while others had to cross the northern boarder of the country to Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. In mid-September the Greek Communist Party officially decided to join the ELAS units that had not surrendered arms. In December 1946, Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) was founded by the Greek Communist Party having Markos Vafiadis as its leader. The Civil War was now at its peak.

The rise of the Labour Party in Britain, the shift of interest of British foreign politics and various other factors led to the decision on behalf of the Labour Government to withdraw the British troops from Greece. The coming of the Americans, who, according to the Truman Doctrine, got officially involved in Greek political life in March 1947, followed the retreat of the British. Simultaneously, the American Congress, through the European Recovery Program

(The Marshall Plan), decided on a huge financial aid towards Greece, which started as \$400 million dollars and finally reached, according to the Marshall Foundation, the amount of \$706.7 million. The equivalent amount was, for example, Ireland \$147.5 (The Marshall Plan: 2003:2). This huge financial aid to Greece would create relations of dependence that will be discussed later on. In the meantime, the Americans substituted the British in issues of military training of the regimental army, while Laws 509/47 and 411/47 sped up the procedures of arrest and exile of the leftist citizens to special camps and reformation island-prisons. Within a few days the displaced exceeded 7,000 (Vournas: 1986:152).

By this point the DAG had started to accept military aid from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The borders of these countries remained open and the DAG could cross to regroup its forces. The support from the Soviet Union was not what Greek Communists expected. The non-direct involvement of the Soviet Union was because of the Treaty of Yalta. But a single-party government, especially a royalist one, would possibly be a negative factor for the stabilization of the state and the final domination of bourgeois forces. The Americans wanted a broadly-based government and a more liberal Prime Minister. Such a government, having support among both the centrists and the democrats, could limit the political influence of the Democratic Army. As Charalambis mentions 'this policy aimed at the restoration under bourgeois control of the mass of EAM that originated from the party of Venizelos and therefore the narrowing of the social base of the Communist Party' (Charalambis:1989:152). Under these circumstances, the allied government of the People's Party and the Liberals, having the centrist Themistokles Sofoulis as Prime Minister and Constantinos Tsaldaris as second in rank was formed at the beginning of September 1947. Their alliance in cabinet formation after so many irreconcilable ideological and policy differences may be

considered as the beginning of closing the pre-war gap that had divided the country for decades.

On 24 December of the same year, the news agency "Eleftheri Ellada" (Free Greece) which was controlled by DAG, publicized the formation of an alternative government under Markos Vafiadis, the leader of the DAG. At the beginning of 1948, the forces of the Greek Democratic Army started getting successful, which troubled the Americans and the government of Athens. The DAG section of Roumeli, in central Greece came as close as 20 km to Athens, while three days later forces of DAG attacked Salonica. These incidents led to the Sofoulis-Tsaldaris government to make all the left-wing parties and organizations illegal. A new cycle of thousands of arrests and executions began, resulting in a reduction in supporters of the Democratic Army, either because of their physical elimination and arrests or because they had fled to other countries.

But the equilibrium of power started to change drastically when, in the middle of 1948, there was a rupture between Stalin and Tito. The Greek Communist Party decided on an alliance with Stalin, something that caused Tito to close the borders and stop the supply to the DAG on 10 July 1949. This development, in combination with the continuous reinforcement of the governmental army (surpassing at this time 200, 000 men) by the Americans caused serious problems to the Democratic Army. The fact that it was cut, off any external aid and its supporters, and restricted to the north borders, leads the Communists Party to decide the termination of the war on 16 October 1949.

The results of the Civil War were tragic for the country. According to Tsoukalas, 'unofficial estimates bring the losses to 158,000 dead. Moreover hundreds of thousands of people were left homeless and the material disasters equalled those of 1944. Finally, 80,000 to 100,000 people crossed the borders and

were gradually integrated into the population of the communist countries' (Tsoukalas: 1981:102).

Autarchic semi-parliamentary democracy

The developments in Greece after the Civil War are defined by the prevalence of those political forces that had clearly sided with the western political and ideological system. But, contrary to the developed parliamentary democracies of the west, post civil-war political power in Greece utilized political measures that limited freedom, including the press freedom, and human rights, extensively. The Greek Communist Party remained outlawed even after the end of the Civil War. In general, the winners of the Civil War imposed an oppressive and totalitarian political system not only against the defeated ones but also against everyone who was politically different. 'The division of Greece into two parts was not just a political division; it had long-term consequences to whole groups of citizens whose economic enterprise and perspective, place in the division of labour and social hierarchy, and cultural capital were significantly influenced by a regime of discrimination' (Moschonas: 2000:167). The system, although it was based on parliamentary democracy, was extremely reactionary, restrictive, and divisive (Charalampis: 1985:15, Komninou: 2002: 56, Nikolakopoulos: 2000: 158). A new political and social division was growing again, within Greek society, a division that was broadening and re-creating the political dichotomy of the inter-war, among the Venizelists and the Antivenizelists. This division was directly related to the issue of monarchy, as it has already been mentioned in a previous chapter. It must be pointed out though, that anti-communism existed even during the inter-war (Psellas: 2002:59) but it did not assume the main form of political division for two reasons. First, because of the limited social and political influence of the

Greek Communist Party and second, because of the inherent fractions within the bourgeoisie that were expressed with the national cleavage. Of course, this time, the new political and social schism was related to the division between the nationalist (ethnikophrones) and anti-nationalist (anti-ethnikofrones), a schism that in the mid of the '50s would become a division between the Right and the anti-right. The anti-right political pole will include left-wingers and democrats from the liberal centre. This division was to linger almost throughout the second part of the 20th century. That is, while the inter-war schism was between two electoral bourgeois party formations and reflected the division of Greek ruling class (Psellas:2002:69, Charalampis:1989:99), the new schism, during and after the end of the Civil War, appeared and evolved having ideological, and to a certain extent, class characteristics. In fact, 'independently of its national-liberating and patriotic character, the EAM movement assumed the form of class conflict, especially after 1944 and peaked in the period of the Civil War' (Nikolakopoulos: 2000:71). The extent of this new political schism was huge and affected even the fields of Literature and Art. As Tsoukalas characteristically mentions 'the decisive heritage of the Civil War was not so much the vast material disaster or the human losses, as the unprecedented political, ideological and cultural void' (Tsoukalas:1981:102). However it is worth noting that, in the majority, the political forces of the liberal centre participated decisively in the block of winners and comprised, at least during the first years after the end of the Civil War, an indispensable part of the oppressive, autarchic political power. According to Nikolakopoulos, 'the political differentiation even of the left side of the centre 'was indiscernible in the economic and social choices while at a political level it remained to a great extent trapped in the narrow frame of national-mindedness 'ethnikopfrosyne' (Nikolakopoulos:2000:74). In short, all

the post-war ruling parties, liberals and conservative, formed a front against the communists and other left-wing political forces.

As a result of the Civil War and the political instability that appeared during the first years of the composition of the national government, the army played a definitive part. Direct involvement of the army in the political life of modern Greece had taken place twice already in the interwar era, with the dictatorships of Pangalos and Metaxas, as has been analysed in a previous chapter. These interventions resulted in the disturbance of the delicate balance between political parties and the Army, without however affecting the constitutionally established hierarchy or seriously damaging the parliamentary democratic system. 'Despite these fluctuations, there is no doubt about the full involvement of the Greek Army in politics, after 1922, and the fact that it constituted an important force in the political arena' (Mouzelis:1987:181).

But, the prolongation of the Civil War and the difficulties the forces of the government faced at the beginning of 1948, made the government allocate increased responsibilities to General Papagos. Under Law 882/1949, he could take initiatives of a military character without needing the government's consent. This way, the intervention of the army in politics was legalised; the army acquired increased power, which, on several occasions, overpowered the weak semi-parliamentary system of the Civil and early post civil-war period. As Alevizatos mentions 'the dependence of the army from political authority, that the new legal frame instituted, was a logical consequence of the process of the one-sided over-politicisation of the body of the Army officers against the constitution. This practice, introduced in 1935 by George Kondylis, continued and reinforced by Metaxas in the years that followed was tolerated by the exiled royalist governments, and favoured by the post-December-1944 governments'

(Alevizatos: 1995:202). At the same time, within the Army, paramilitary groups began to form, like "IDEA" (Holy Affiliation of Greek Officers), that aimed at, not only, the confrontation of the Communists, but also the overt involvement of the army in political developments. The attempt of the Army to intervene in politics was to be slow and steadfast and would lead to its relative autonomy from political power. According to Diamantopoulos, 'the unfavourable, to the democrats, final upshot of the middle-eastern movements, after the liberation, had allowed for the hardcore extreme right paramilitary organisations not only to impose their domination on the army, but also to become, especially after the incident of December 1944, a significant factor in the formation of political developments, almost like a parallel government' (Diamantopoulos: 1997:159).

However, it should be noted that in relation to the inter-war, the increased involvement of the army in political life had acquired different characteristics. These new characteristics mainly relate to the influence of the foreign power on the national army, first the British and later the Americans (Charalampis:1989:148, Tsoukalas:1981:98). This influence is not unrelated to the developments within the army. As it was mentioned above, during the war, the extreme royalist elements may have dominated the army but the army itself did not have either the power or the capacity to instantly intervene, at least in the first few years after the Liberation. Actually, as we have already analysed, the only structured national army during the German Occupation was ELAS, which dominated the greatest part of the country. As mentioned in a previous chapter, the British and, later on, from 1947 onwards, the Americans took up the responsibility for the restoration of the national army. As Charalampis notes 'we can say that up to the last phase of the Civil War the direct, crude and administratively dominant presence of the British and the American military and

economic missions were necessary. The autarchic regime did not possess any means of sway, either of the composition of forced or consented coherence of the social body, or from the organisational aspect for the formation of the post-war state' (Charalambis:1989:148). The post civil-war political system, at least during the first years, was not based on a constitutional democracy, which to an extent existed and functioned exclusively with established parties, but on an extra-parliamentary military power, which was conducted under the direct guidance of foreign powers.

Political instability and dependency (1950-1952)

After the Civil War, the situation in Greece, although it was expected to lead to relative stability, unfortunately, did not change significantly. The hysteric anti-communist climate, that the extreme-right and royalist organisations were cultivating, kept hostage the weak political system and, even, the liberal democratic forces of the nation.

In March 1950, elections were announced again. 'The conduct of elections anew assumed significant importance for the electoral accreditation and legalization of the result of the Civil War' (Nikolakopoulos: 2000:156). The most important development was of course the participation in the elections by the Democratic Party, an alliance of small left-wing parties that had cooperated with EAM in the referendum of 1946. The parties that had collaborated after 1946 with the communist Greek Democratic Army were excluded from the Democratic Party since they had been outlawed. In these elections, the liberal parties of the centre got the majority of the votes. It must be noted, that the liberal centre was being represented by several parties, of which the most important one was the centre-left EPEK of General Plastiras. Other parties of the centre were the centre-

right parties of George Papandreou and the ‘Liberals Party’ which, after the death of the Prime Minister Themistokles Sofoulis, elected Sophocles Venizelos as its leader. Among the centre-left and especially EPEK and the centre-right there were significant differences especially on the issue of amnesty, a matter that related to democracy.

The results of the elections were impressive, not only because the right and extreme-right parties shrunk to below than 40%, but mainly because of the success of the left-wing and centre-left forces that got a satisfactory percentage. It is indicative that the Democratic Party, although it had candidates only in half of the constituencies and ‘despite the atmosphere of terror’ (Linardatos:1978:88) managed to get 10% and be the strongest in the regions of Athens and Salonica. These results show the mistake in the 1946 decision to boycott the election, a choice for which Greek Communist Party’s leadership was primarily responsible. The ‘United States factor’, which had by then assumed an important role in the political life of the country, was in favour of a centre and liberalisation government with General Plastiras in office. The liberal policies that the Americans attempted in Greece related to a pacification policy for the stabilization of the political system. ‘Finally, the strong intervention of the American ambassador Grady prevented the centre-right policies of Venizelos and imposed a government of three centre parties under General Plastiras’ (Diamantopoulos: 1997:169).

The liberal policies of the Prime Minister Plastiras annoyed the other two centre-right leaders that participated in the cabinet. Sophoklis Venizelos and George Papandreou were extremely annoyed by Plastiras’s announcement that concerned the closing down of Makronisos as a camp of political prisoners (Paraskevopoulos: 1987:105) and the abolition of the death penalty, so they began

to undermine him. Indicative of this was Plastiras's comment, to the famous journalist Maria Rezan, concerning his policy about the release of the prisoners: 'in the morning, I set free as many prisoners as I can, but by noon, the Minister of Public Order puts them back in' (Anastasiadis:2000:22). This phrase implied the opposition within the government that would appear later on.

The change in attitude of the Americans, who also started to change their foreign policy, affected Greece too, and contributed decisively to the subversion of Plastiras's government. The Americans began to favour the formation of right-wing governments. Apparently this was due to the beginning of the war in Korea, in June 1950, the increase in anti-communist hysteria that took the form of McCarthyism in the USA, and the intensity of the Cold War. The change of American policy in Greece was followed by the replacement of the ambassador, Grady, with John Peurifoy. The latter remained known in modern Greek history for his overt interference with the Greek governments and his strong sense of anti-communism. In August 1950, Plastiras resigned, to be replaced by the centre-right Sophoklis Venizelos, who did not manage to get the required parliamentary majority and was voted down. Finally, on 13 September 1950, the two centre-right parties along with the right-wing People's Party formed a government. The fact that from the election of March 1950 to the end of that year, five governments succeeded each other in office was an illustration of political instability and polarity. At the same time, the attempt by the far-right paramilitary organisation IDEA to organise a coup, at the end of May, did not succeed.

The participation of the People's Party in the government and the change of policy on behalf of the Americans affected developments directly. A new wave of extreme right terrorism began. In December 1950, Nikos Belogiannis, a member of the leadership of the Greek Communist Party who came back to

organise the party organisations, got arrested. His arrest would further aggravate the climate of terror and political polarisation. The governmental structure was unstable and an election was decided yet again, for September 1951, with all the three centre parties of the coalition agreeing to it. The People's Party was facing a serious crisis, due to financial scandals, which led to its split. In July 1951, General Papagos who as it has already been mentioned, had taken up increased responsibilities during the Civil War, announced the founding of a new rightist party, the Greek Rally Party (GRP). The GRP immediately attracted the vast majority of the former members of the People's Party as well as other centre-right personalities. Three days later, small leftist bands and the banned communists would set up the United Democratic Left (EDA). The GRP emerged from this election with 114 seats (without winning absolute majority), EPEK was second with 74 seats, then the Liberals with 57, and UDL, last, with 10 seats. George Papandreou did not get elected since his party only got 2.10% while the left-wing socialist party (SKELD) that did not ally with UDL disappeared. Consequently, as Papagos could not form a government, the second party EPEK combined its seats with the Liberals and formed a coalition on 27 October 1951. It is worth mentioning that the elected candidates of the United Democratic Left were in prison or in exile at Makronisos and therefore not present in the Parliament's assembly (Linardatos: 1977:304).

Despite the fact that Papagos did not manage to form a government his standing was undoubtedly impressive. The new American ambassador helped to support it since 'he came to Greece on a special mission: to bring a tough, firm, right anti-communist government to power. His, first care was to re-organize the right-wing political pole' (Tsoukalas: 1981:111).

The forming of government of Plastiras was followed by a massive attack from right-wing elements. Belogiannis was put on trial and the other communists were accused of espionage. Belogiannis and his comrades were sentenced to death by special court-martials five days before the new government took over, but as soon as Plastiras was in charge, he announced that the sentence would not be carried out. 'IDEA, CIA and the Greek Intelligence Services escalated their counter-attack in order to torpedo the tolerance measures and subvert the peace-making policy of the government' (Petridis: 2000: 6). The opportunity for a new American intervention appeared on the occasion of the discussion about the electoral system and the cutting down of military expenses by \$35 million. The statement of the American ambassador is characteristic: 'the political situation needs to be resolved once and for all. The only existing way is through election and the only system for the election of a viable government is simple majority representation' (cited in Nikolakopoulos:2000:193). John Peurifoy did not forget to remind the Greeks that if they did not adopt it, the American aid would then be withdrawn (Stefanides:2003:6).

Plastiras, not having a strong parliamentary representation, especially after the gradual departure of five MPs of his party agreed on the joining of two MPs from the United Democratic Left. This time the American ambassador would be more blatant. 'Due to the rapid political developments and the fact that EPEK has replaced two of its members with leftists coming from UDL, the recommendation that would be preferable to it is to conduct elections as soon as possible with the system of simple majority representation' (Tsoukalas:1981:114). Thus, under unbearable pressure on behalf of the Americans, Plastiras decided on a new election for November 1952. The execution of Belogiannis and three of his comrades, in March 1952, caused a serious crisis in the relations between EPEK

and UDL. The Left using the motto “No difference between Plastiras and Papagos” committed a serious historic mistake. The execution of Belogiannis and the rest was a political crime of the autarchic state (Vournas: 1981:536), for which Plastiras, despite his physical inability and illness to react decisively, is largely to blame. Nonetheless the identification of centre-left with GRP became an element that assisted the domination of the right, with 49.2% of the votes and 82.3% of the seats, in the election of November 1952. United Democratic Left despite the fact that it retained its power with 9.55% did not get represented in the Parliament because of the new electoral system. These tactics of UDL and the banned Greek Communist Party will be renounced later, by the 6th meeting of the central committee of the Communist Party in 1956. Anyhow, it should not be left unacknowledged that Plastiras and ‘the centre governments up to 1952, managed to restore the majority of the EAM followers back in the frame of a bourgeois political system, without, however, offering any political, perspective’ (Charalambis:1989:153).

The rise in power of the Greek Rally Party and the right, for almost a decade, would be followed by the expansion of the autarchic state, and the strengthening of the role of the army in the political life of the country. The process for the consolidation of democracy is complex. Even in occasions where elections take place and the parliament functions, political authorities may violate human rights, the freedom of speech and the press freedom. Some researchers, for example have characterized the post civil war political regime in Greece as a manipulated democracy (Mouzelis: 1987: 235), autarchic democracy (Charalampis: 1989: 182), autarchic regime (Tsoukalas: 1986: 18), atrophied democracy (Nikolakopoulos: 2003: 9), incomplete democracy (Diamantopoulos: 1997: 207). The increase of the GRP it would also be followed by the increased

dependence on foreign powers, especially the USA. At the same time, though, the economic advance of the country, as a result of the massive post-war enlargement of world capitalism, would cause important changes in Greek society, as we will see below.

Political stability (1952-1963)

The period that followed the electoral victory of General Papagos was mainly characterised by the significant parliamentary majority that GRP got, due to 'simple majority representation' electoral system. This fact led, in turn to stability in political state practice. A basic characteristic remained; the division between nationalists (ethnikophrones) and anti-nationalist (anti-ethnikophrones). Indicative of it, is the continuation of arrests of the Communist Party members and the imprisonment of writers and poets (Vournas: 1986:61). Still, the influence of the Americans was increasing. In November 1953, an agreement between the Greek and the USA government was signed, according to which US armed forces on Greek territory would have extensive privileges. Therefore, a series of purely American military bases was created, many of which, like Souda Bay in Crete, are still in use. At the same time, the issue of Cyprus began to enlarge and concern, seriously, Greek political life. The island remained under British rule while the majority of the Cypriots were asking for union with Greece (Linardatos: 1978:206). The government of Papagos appealed to the United Nations to issue a resolution for the independence and self-determination of Cyprus, while, at the same time, the armed struggle of the Cypriots against the British commenced. For this reason, the extreme-rightist Grivas went to Cyprus to organise EOKA. At the same time, the pro-unionist protests in Athens straightened the nationalist and anti-British climate in Greece. In October 1955, Prime Minister Papagos died. His

death would open the path for a dynamic reappearance of the monarchy in the country's political arena. The interference of the monarchy was a rule, before and during the inter-war years, which led to national schism, as we have already mentioned in a previous chapter. But after the restoration of the monarchy in 1946 up to 1955, the kings, King George II first and his son King Paul later, were significantly isolated. This seclusion was due to the civil war and the polarisation that did not allow room for considerable intervention of individuals, as well as, to the increased interventionism of the foreign factor. The royal interference took place when King Paul, with an impressive manoeuvre, circumvented the Greek Rally Party executives and the party itself, to appoint the (up-to-the-time) Minister of Transportation, Constantine Karamanlis, as Prime Minister, in place of the deceased Papagos. The royal intervention, although it was validated by the assembly of the parliamentary section of GRP, caused, as it was expected, the severe reaction of the parties of the opposition and of some of the GRP members. Obviously, it was considered as favouritism and constituted a deviation from the constitutional order and the regulations of the parliamentary system (Nikolakopoulos: 2000:210). These reactions forced Karamanlis to announce an election for February 1956. 'First, though, he set up a new party, National Radical Union (ERE), that absorbed GRP and passed a new electoral law that scandalously favoured the new party' (Diamantopoulos: 1997:175). At the same time, Karamanlis's move caused unrest in the centre parties and UDL that resulted in the formation of a people's front alliance between the bourgeois parties of the Centre and the Left. This pre-election alliance materialised in the form of the Democratic Union, which had George Papandreou in charge. This would be crucial for future developments because it created two political poles, which, in effect, substituted the post-war division in national-minded and non-national-

minded, without, drastically, changing the ideological and class characteristics of post-war schism. The new political division was between the Right and the anti-Right. The anti-Right movement included left-wingers as well as liberal Democrats who were against monarchy and extreme right-wingers. What is important in this development, as we will see further down, is that the bourgeois parties, for the first time in post-war history differentiated their policy as well as their stance to the Left. Parallel to the formation of DU by centre parties and UDL, the social forces of the Left were breaking the barrier of restriction and isolation to create the conditions for their relative political legalisation.

The results of the elections led to the comfortable dominance of Karamanlis, despite the fact that his party got fewer votes than DU. The electoral system was thus shaped by Law 3822/58 so as to allow for the Right to remain in power, something that finally happened (Nikolakopoulos:2000:231). In the beginning of 1958, 15 of ERE's MPs resigned and Karamanlis announced elections for March 1958. ERE won again. What was impressive, though, was not the victory of ERE but the fact that UDL took second place with 25% of the votes and 78 elected MPs, that left DU, with Papandreou and Venizelos, third. This result was obviously associated with a series of factors like the approach of the Left to the parliamentary system, with its participation in the election, the everlasting division and incapability of the Centre, and, most of all, the social conditions that were leading the masses towards more radical routes and therefore to the Left once again. One should also add that the developments in Cyprus, especially after the executions of Cypriot partisans Karaolis and Dimitriou by the British, created a strong anti-British and generally anti-western climate in Greece that could not be expressed either by the Right or by the Centre. After the death of Plastiras, the Centre's approach towards the Right resulted in an obscure political

programme, very similar to those of ERE. The success of UDL in the elections 'shattered the myth of the political strategies of the right and centre parties concerning the hindering of the rise of the Left' (Mendrinou: 2000:69).

The rise of UDL, instead of speeding up the measures for the democratisation and liberalisation of the Greek political system, caused new tensions and increased the absolutism of the state mechanism and the extreme right-wing organisations. According to Vournas, 'the rise of the Left in the place of the shadow government intensified the measures of its persecution. The law enforcement mechanism fiercely turned against its members and many previously released ones were sent back to camp in Ai Stratis. A hundred and seventy-five members of UDL were displaced after the elections' (Vournas: 1986:146).

The rise of the Left would stir the political leadership of the Centre, which would turn to a strategy of unification of its political forces, through a final rejoining of its big and small scattered parties (Linardatos:1986: 50-52). These small parties, which were usually dependent upon individuals, did not play any important role in post-war Greece. Their creation was a result of the proportional representation electoral system of 1946. But while this electoral system of the early post-war years assisted the formation of many parties, the majority system gradually discouraged their existence and the attempts for re-unions, collaborations and coalitions. In order to restrain the power of the Left, on the one hand, and assist the Centre to become a protagonistic factor in the political life of the country, on the other, George Papandreou founded the Centre Union (CU) in 1961. CU was a coalition of nine different parties that ranged in spectrum from ERE to UDL. But, its federal character would later become the Achilles heel for the most serious political crisis after the civil war in Greece, a crisis that would lead to the coup of 1967. Americans had also played an important role to the

process of assembling the CU, as, after the ascension of J. F. Kennedy to power, they changed their policy and begun to support the liberal Centre (Meynaud: 1966:106). In the meantime United Democratic Left was collaborating with the small National Agricultural Party (NAP) to form the Pan-democratic Agricultural Front of Greece (PAME). Thus, for the first time in 20th century Greece, only three parties asked for the people's vote, an indicative fact of the polarisation in political life and the re-appearance of the Left even through parliamentary procedures. The pre-election period was full of violence and systematic chase of the left-wingers (Linardatos: 1986: 22). This time, though, the bullying and the police violence were not limited only to the candidates of the Left but also extended to the candidates of Centre Union. During the pre-election period of 1961, a serious top-to bottom rupture of the bourgeois parties would take place for the first time. This split minimised, if not erased the political division in the national-minded and non-national minded and strengthened the division in right and anti-right.

In the election of October 1961, ERE was victorious, with Centre Union second and the Left third with 14.65%. But the atmosphere of unlimited violence and deceit pushed George Papandreou to disagree with the election's result, impeach the government and declare the so-called first 'Unrelenting Struggle' that is, the constant doubt about the government's legality. The comment of Sophoklis Venizelos that was published in the newspaper *Eleftheria* on 20 January 1962 saying that 'we do not consent to be colleagues with you under the prism of ethnikophrones, because of the conditions you have created' is characteristic. Indicative is the fact that on 20 April a huge demonstration of hundreds of thousands of Athenians ended up in a fight with the police forces, leaving Athens a battlefield for many hours. Meanwhile, George Papandreou begins a series of

tours in the country that are followed by massive gatherings. His turn to public gatherings that, at times, take the form of protest was called “Route to the Public”. This route gave the opportunity for the growth of a mass movement. Greek society was suffocating, for about two decades, under the oppressive measures of all post-war governments of which George Papandreou not only was a part but a key figure. Strangely enough, this leader would later head the biggest -since the end of the civil war- movement against an absolutist state that had been constructed with his active participation.

In the field of economic growth, the first signs of a significant change began to show. ‘While in 1960 the annual takings of foreign capital were \$11,683,700 in 1963, they reached \$50,026,290. In 1962, the contribution of the industry to Gross National Product was, for the first time, bigger than that of agriculture, while Greece began to export significant amounts of industrial products’ (Mouzelis: 1978:55). The ’60s were decisive because the degree of industrialization would be important and tended to restrain the basic characteristics of inter-war and early-post-war underdevelopment. At the same time this growth would cause further dependency. According to Fotopoulos ‘the process of development, especially in the post war period, does not present any of the characteristics that might have implied a somewhat more independent evolution. On the contrary, it shows that the Greek Economy had become more and more extroverted, due to the increasing dependency of industrial growth on foreign markets and the amplified control of foreign capital on dynamic key-sectors’ (Fotopoulos:1985:79).

The “Unrelenting Struggle” that Centre Union began against ERE signified, in practice, the end of the political consensus of the bourgeois parties in relation to the Left. The re-appearance of a mass political movement and generally

the social mobilization especially on issues relating to democracy and human rights was very important. Of course the “Unrelenting Struggle” could neither stop nor prevent violence against the Left that reached its peak in May 1963 with the assassination of the United Democratic Left MP, Grigoris Lambrakis, by extreme right-wingers. This assassination uncovered the relationship between the official State and the paramilitary mechanisms of the extreme right. Lambrakis’s memorial service turned into the largest ever post-war demonstration. This, in turn, led to the adoption of measures concerning the release of exiled communists that still remained displaced. While in 1950, there were 2,815 people displaced as communists, the number in 1963 was significantly reduced to 136 (Alevizatos: 1995:581). At the same time, though, the number of prisoners would only slightly decrease reaching, in total, 1,045 people. After a few days, a dispute between the King and the Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis took place having as pretext the expenses of the Palace (Linardatos: 1986:248) the clash led to the resignation of the latter and the announcement on election. The crisis in the relations between Karamanlis and the Royal Palace concerned a series of important matters, and, mainly the control of the army. Karamanlis, who knew that the actual power lay with the one who had control of the army, did not want the King’s interference with this vital institution.

In November 1963, the elections finally took place, pronouncing CU as the winner (42.04%). ERE was second (39.7%), UDL third (14.54%), and fourth, the Progressives’ Party, under Markezinis, who had previously resigned from CU. CU will be asked to form a government in November, and in December will ask for a vote of confidence from the Parliament. Within two months Papandreou’s government proceeded to the settlement of the agricultural debts, the establishment of free public education at all levels, and the release of almost all

prisoners. During the Parliamentary assembly, though, that concerned the vote of confidence to the government, Papandreou resigned and asked for a new election, since the parliamentary majority CU had, was not sufficient for the formation of a viable government. At this point, it must be noted that George Papandreou declined both the parliamentary votes of the 30 United Democratic Left MPs or any idea of coalition government with ERE.

The new election date was set for 16 February 1964. The parties that participated were exactly the same as in the previous election of 1963. It must be mentioned though, that Karamanlis, after his clash with the King and the latter's decision to allow the formation of a CU government for two months (Nov.-Dec) even without the Parliament's vote of confidence, departed for Paris. The co-leader and in-party opponent of Papandreou, Sophoklis Venizelos, suddenly died. Thus, on the election's eve, Papandreou remained alone, without any important personalities as his political rivals. However, this is not what ensured him the massive success in the election of 1964 but rather the objective conditions and the demand for democracy (Anastasiades:2005:12). CU got 52.8%, ERE, with Kanelopoulos as its leader, 35.2% and UDL 11.8%. The percentage of the UDL had fallen because of the withdrawal of its candidates in 22 electoral peripheries where the chances for a decent result were not high. In this way, UDL, even to a limited extent, assisted Papandreou's victory at the election.

Centre Union, immediately after its ascent to power, moved on to extensive reformations of the state and society, on the basis of the re-distribution of the national product, which, however, never took the form of a complete policy. Nevertheless, the Keynesian policy Papandreou's government followed, increased agricultural bounty, productivity, irrevocably instituted free public education, and, generally, vitalized sales demand and national consumption. This

could only happen due to the fact that the Greek economy was already on a dynamic path of development, despite its dependent character. On the level of democratization, Papandreou proceeded to break up the right wing paramilitary organisations. He made, also, significant changes in the representation of the trade unions and a relative democratization of the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE). Papandreou allowed for a small number of political refugees that had resorted to countries of Eastern Europe after the defeat of DAG to return home. 'The unprecedented circulation of ideas and political and cultural activities created a totally new climate. The general apprehension of students, professionals, workers and farmers about the promotion of these new programmes and the solution of various problems had shaken society, almost from its roots' (Tsoukalas: 1981:169). A question that rises is why Papandreou, suddenly, turned into a radical politician who led the country to spectacular for-the-time measures of democratization through the changes he proposed. The conditions in Greece had matured enough for such democratic and social demands. It seems that it was not Papandreou who acted as a catalyst in the growth of a mass movement but that, on the contrary, the movement itself was the one that, to a large extent, chose Papandreou, incidentally, as its leader. One should not overlook his political decision to clash with the Right and rely on the social movement. It was his personal choice that gave him the chance to express the movement itself and the changes that had accumulated in Greek society. In any case, the relationship of political leadership and movement was a relationship defined by the objective conditions in combination with the role of the subject in history. Finally, as Charalambis mentioned 'the Centre Union was not the party that represented the people's mobilization and the climax of their demands but the party that was

placed in this position because of the coincidences in the choices of extra-parliamentary centers of control' (Charalambis:1989:230).

The formation of the Cabinet however was problematic. The Centre Union remained a party of a confederate nature that had been founded by nine different small parties. These parties, though, were not directly connected to the social base they were addressing. They were, rather, parties of political clientelism and agents of political patronage. This, as we have already explained, had its roots in the peculiarity of the political system in Greece, which developed on the basis of an atrophied civil society. The composition of CU, with the many small leader-patrons would decisively affect the internal coherence of the party and the essence of its political programme.

The first signs of internal conflicts in the CU appeared immediately after the election. In March 1964, during the vote on the Parliament's Chairperson, thirty MPs of the CU voted against the candidate that Papandreou had proposed, G. Novas. In the meantime King Paul had died and Constantine had ascended to the throne, aged 24. At the same time, a group of progressive officers had been formed in the army, under the name ASPIDA, which asked for the democratization of the armed forces and the dissolution of the extreme right-wing organization IDEA. These officers seemed to have approached Andreas Papandreou, George Papandreou's son, who had returned from the USA where he was a University Professor, in order to take on the position of Deputy Minister. Andreas Papandreou was radical enough. When he was young, he was a member of a Greek trotskyist organization called "Marxist Archive" which was the biggest section of the 4th International during the inter-war period.

The regional elections that took place in July 1964 confirmed the result of the national elections, with an impressive increase in the power of UDL. In

Athens, Piraeus, Salonica and Larisa, UDL candidates came first, while in other big cities, Centre-Left politicians that were supported by UDL. In July 1964, UDL started to resume its mass character, with 50,000 members. At the same time, attacks against George Papandreou began, mainly by the Press and due to the ASPIDA case, while a group of CU MPs, around Constantine Mitsotakis, began to show its political differentiation. George Papandreou decided to replace the Minister of Defence, P. Garoufalias. The King did not accept it and the resignation of Papandreou's government followed on the 15 July 1965. 80 minutes later King Constantine appointed a new three-member government with George Novas as the head. A royal coup against the democratically elected government had taken place. The same night, Papandreou announced his second "Unrelenting Struggle" and on his descent from his lodge to the office of CU was accompanied by one million people. The protests continued. On 21 July, a student demonstration ended up with the death of a person and the injury of 200, after the attack of the police (Vournas: 1981:225). The same day GSEE decided on a national general strike. At the same time Novas was unable to win a vote of confidence and to form a government. On 20 August, the King appointed the former MP of Centre Union, Elias Tsirimokos –who had left the party along with another ten MPs, Prime Minister. But this government did not have the majority of the Parliament either, so the order for the formation of a Cabinet was given to another MP of the CU, Stefanos Stefanopoulos. He would finally succeed in forming a government after the departure of eight more MPs from CU. The agreement, between Papandreou and the leader of ERE Kanelopoulos for an election in May 1967, would signify the end of Stefanopoulos's government on 20th December 1966. The fall of the government occurred because ERE withdrew its support to it. The two parties agreed on a caretaker government, under

Paraskevopoulos, which would be finally replaced by a purely pertaining to ERE government, under Kanelopoulos, on the 3rd April 1967. On the morning of April 21st, the arms of the colonels would abolish democracy for seven years.

Media Developments 1944-1966

The freedom of the press was, obviously, non-existent during the period of German occupation. Nevertheless, most of Athenian daily newspapers continued to be published, under a state of severe censorship. The pre-war newspapers *Athinaika Nea* and *Elefthero Vima* of Dimitris Lambrakis continued their publication. The same happened with *Vradini*, *Akropolis*, *Kathimerini* and *Proinos Typos*. On some occasions, the former newspapers decided to continue their circulation in order to avoid making their employees redundant, even by conceding the title to them (Karikopoulos: 1984:127). On other occasions, in Larisa for example, the local daily newspapers, *Eleftheria* and *Kirix*, after suspending publication, decided to publish a new common newspaper *Larisaikos Typos* (Mayer: 1960:152). The same happened in the city of Ioannena, where the three local daily newspapers decided on the circulation of a common issue *Deltio*.

A press distribution company called “Greek and Foreign Press Company” founded by the Nazis, who controlled 51%, distributed the Athenian newspapers that continued to be published during the occupation. This company was the product of a force merger of two pre-war Greek distribution agencies, those of Spyros Tsangaris and of Takis Pikramenos. The newspaper *Rizospastis*, which had been banned during Metaxas dictatorship, continued to be published and circulated illicitly through the outlaw mechanism of the Greek Communist Party, which owned 40 printing presses, set up for the needs of the publication, during the time of Metaxas dictatorship. At the same time new pamphlets, mainly of

resistance character, began to be published and to circulate illicitly throughout Greece during the German occupation. Many of those were published in the secret printing offices of the Greek Communist Party. These pamphlets of resistance organisations acquired significant readership, due to the fact that they had the opportunity to write about the course of the war, the success of the allies, the actions of the resistance without imposition of any censorship. This sort of journalism could not be realised in the newspapers, which were still published under Nazis censorship (Karikopoulos: 1984:126, Mayer: 1959:321). According to data taken from the *Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive*, the total number of illegal resistance-newspapers reached the number of about 400 titles. The above archive has currently listed these titles. In the area of Chania, in Crete alone, the resistance newspapers that were published from May 1940 to the time of the liberation of the island exceeded 35 (Grigorakis: 2004:15). Many of these papers had a short-lived character while others were published on a more permanent and regular basis.

On 15 September 1944, due to a shortage of paper, the editors of all Athenian dailies decided to publish a common daily newspaper and a common evening one. Thus, the daily papers stopped their publication and the new one the *Enomenos Typos* commenced instead. Something similar happened to the publication of the evening papers with the *Vradina Nea* (Karablias: 1975:58). After the liberation, the newspapers began to circulate freely, including *Rizospastis*, the newspaper of the Greek Communist Party, and *Eleftheri Ellada*, the paper of EAM. The latter was first published on 20 April 1942. The government of George Papandreou decided that the newspapers, which continued to be legally published during the occupation, should not continue their publication. Many of them decided to change their title partly, while others

preferred to change it completely (Politis: 1984: 104). Thus, the newspaper from the city of Patras in Peloponnisos, *Tachidromos* for example, which was being published during the German occupation, changed its title to *Ethnikos Kirix*, a newspaper that is still in circulation. Something similar happened to the Athenian newspapers. For example, *Athinaika Nea* was renamed into *Ta Nea* and *Elefthero Vima* into *To Vima*. But after the December events the ban was lifted (Dimitras: 1997:98) and some Athenian newspapers continue to use their pre-war title like *Kathimerini* for example. In the period immediately after the liberation in 1944, Athenian newspapers were distributed by the 'Press Syndicate, an organisation which was established by the journalists union and those working in the newspapers' (Basantis: 1995:17).

Nevertheless, the political schism between *ethnikofrones* and anti-*ethnikofrones*, which began to appear immediately after the liberation, would very soon be reflected on the field of the Press. Thus, bourgeois (*astikes*) newspapers, throughout the duration of the national government, were not at all in favour of the participation of National Liberation Front (EAM) in it. The press existence for more than eight years under totalitarian regimes and severe censorship had affected, to a certain extent, its democratic function and had given to it an establishment and strong anti-communist character.

Thus, when at the end of November of 1944, George Papandreou appointed Ptolemaios Sarrigiannis, an ELAS general, as the new Deputy Minister of Defence, 'the bourgeois press criticised his appointment' (Alexander: 1984:273). Of course in this framework of the establishment (*kathestotikos*) press, some exceptions appeared, like the liberal newspaper *Eleftheria* which, for example, on several occasions, employed strict criticism on issues concerning human rights. During the conflict of December 1944, the newspapers "froze" their

publication and resumed it after the 15 January 1945 when the truce between the National Liberation Front and governmental forces was signed. However, the incidents of December 1944 would intensify and help to polarise press: On the one hand the nationalistic (ethnikofron), and establishment press and on the other, the anti-ethnikofron press. The establishment press included all the traditional daily newspapers, which during the inter-war supported the two main bourgeois party formations, the Venizelists and the Antivenizelists. The anti-ethnikofron press included, apart from *Rizospastis* and *Eleftheri Ellada*, the newspaper *Machi* which belonged to the Socialist Party that was led by Alexandros Svolos and Konstantinos Tsirimokos, two leading members of the National Liberation Front, who, nonetheless, were not members of the Communist Party. A significant number of resistance papers, which continued to circulate, especially in the countryside, after the liberation, should be included in the anti-ethnikofron press.

However, the immediate involvement of the press in the formation of politics in modern Greece was due to a series of historical factors as it has already been explained in a previous chapter. The basic element was the delay in the development of the commercialisation of the field. This was due to the underdevelopment of industry in Greece, in general, and the limited market. The Greek bourgeois, despite the fact that it was the most powerful in South–Eastern Europe, was not industrial but mainly involved in commerce and retailing. For instance Greece had the second biggest trade-navy worldwide during inter-war (Charlafti: 2003: 170). This delay in commercialisation was creating the conditions for the immediate involvement of the press in politics and vice versa. Most editors were at the same time party activists. According to Mayer, for example, ‘the editors of *Elefthero Vima* were all members of the Liberal Party and everybody, except Lambrakis, reached higher offices and became, repeatedly, ministers or presidents

of the first two bank institutions of the country. Diomedes even became a Prime Minister after the death of Themistokles Sophoulis' (Mayer: 1959:200).

On the contrary, in the USA, since 1900 'Newspaper owners and editors were no longer primarily political activists obsessed with winning elections and filling their newspapers with political argument. Some publishers proudly regarded themselves as businessmen rather than party activists; and almost everyone in the newspaper industry claimed to be independent of any party dictation' (Baldasty: 1992:139). In Great Britain too, the industrialisation of the press and the impressive introduction of advertising, that took place at the beginning of the 20th century, liberated the press from political parties. 'The enormous expansion of advertising weaned the national press from dependence on the political parties. Although most major press barons were Tories they were first and foremost newspapermen' (Curran- Seaton: 1991:59).

For these reasons, a huge number of various kind of Greek newspapers published before and after the Second World War maintained the relationship between politics and the press. This tradition was also connected with clientelism, the nonexistence of mass political organisations and the role of individuals, within the Greek society. Negrine suggests that in Britain 'One key influence in the loosening of the relationship between the press and political parties was the decrease in the number of titles and, in particular, of evenings and provincials' (Negrine:1994:49). The fact that in Greece the publishers and generally the press had an immediate involvement in politics does not negate the fact that journalism in Greece had its roots in the literary traditions that we come across in Southern Europe, mainly in France and Italy (Skamnakis:2000:357). Most Greek newspapers, until the beginning of the 20th century, had under their title "literary and political journal". This subtitle revealed the true relation of the Greek press

with the two fields, literature and politics: a relation that will recede a lot later, without completely vanishing. It was noticed in the first chapter that journalists in Greece considered their union as an intellectual institution, which was extremely closed and did not function like the rest of the unions of other professions. It was not a coincidence that the first president of the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers was one of the major Greek writers as we have already noted. In addition to that, the form of the contents of the newspapers in Greece was mainly oriented, apart from the political commentary, to chronicle a primarily literary way of writing that we encounter in Southern Europe.

In January 1945 two new distribution agencies were founded. The first one was called Newspaper Distribution Agency of Athens Press. The second was called "Spiros Tsaggaris", which would develop later, in 1952, into the "New Distribution Agency of Newspapers and Magazines" (Krippas: 1970:27). Thus, all the Athenian newspapers began to be distributed both in Athens and the country via these two agencies.

The truce between the government and EAM in mid January did not decrease the intensity and the polarisation in the area of the press, which at times was divisive and propagandistic. Characteristic is the main article of *Athinaiika Nea* of 25 January 1945 – a few days after the truce – that talked about 350 workers, killed by EAM members in Peristeri area and about a hecatomb of 1,000 bodies in the city of Elefsina, killed by ELAS warriors. The newspaper would continue in the next column with an extremely provocative and dividing comment. 'The German criminals of SS, the Italian carabinieri and the Bulgarian comitatzides would certainly envy the blood-thirst and the brutality of the civil army of the Communist Party' (*Athinaiika Nea*, 25/1/1945). Tis "hecatomb" was never brought to light and the relevant news was never confirmed.

On 17 February, *Rizospastis* denounced in its front-page main article the atmosphere of terror that, despite the Varkiza Agreement which advocated free expression of ideas and opinions through the press, aimed at the left press. In its main article, the newspaper asked the government to protect the freedom of the press and referred to incidents that happened in Athens and concerned the free distribution of the newspapers both by the newly-found distribution agency and some individual salespeople. *Rizospastis* writes that 'Last Tuesday, in the centre of Athens there was an armed attack against Tsangaris Agency, with beating, shooting, and tearing of the newspaper. On Wednesday, a new raid followed; the same things happened. The burning of all the issues took place in front of the very eyes of the English correspondent who was watching the scene irritated. In the streets, police officers beat the news dealer Giannakoulis, and at the royal bridges, the civil army tore the newspaper of Tsoupis. In Acharnon Street, four news dealers were beaten by a group of a paramilitary organisation' (*Rizospastis*, 17/2/1945)

On 21 February, the head of EAM visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ioannis Sophianopoulos, who was the chairman of the meeting in Varkiza, and protested against the actions of paramilitary organisations and the insufficient measures of the government concerning the freedom of the press. The evening of the same day the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced his intention to take strong measures to prevent the inhibition of the freedom of the press (*Eleftheria*, 22/4/1945). Nevertheless, neither of the minister's declarations had any influence, nor was the Varkiza Agreement put into effect. "White Terrorism" not only was not contained but, on the contrary, expanded even more, especially in the country. "The men of the police and other followers of the right-wing organisations had ruined most of the provincial newspapers and by means of blackmail had

convinced the left-wing publishers that it would be best to suffice to the two papers that were published in Athens' (Richter:1984:289). It is characteristic that the printing machine of newspaper *Roumeli*, the EAM newspaper that was being published in Lamia, in central Greece, got destroyed after two attacks from its opponents, resulting in the discontinuation of the paper's publication (Alabanou-Natsios:2001:9). Of course, the two left-wing Athenian newspapers rarely reached the country, either because the means of transport had, by chance, departed earlier, or because the newsprint that the government supplied these newspapers was not sufficient.

At this point, it must be explained again that the issue of the newsprint supply to the newspapers had always been an important negotiation means between political power and press, which defined, to a certain extent, their relation. From 1907, taxes imposed on imported newsprint had been abolished in Greece, via the passing of various decrees but not of a systematic manner (Antonopoulos: 1965:131). This measure favoured the newspapers but it also created a relation of interdependence between the press and the state. The more the newspapers needed newsprint, the more their relation to the state became closer. On each occasion the governments controlled the disposal and the fixing of the price of newsprint. Government defined by law which newspapers were entitled to newsprint and the exact quantity of it. As Antonopoulos mentions, those were not clear or unified for all newspapers (Antonopoulos:1965). During inter-war responsible for the allowance of newsprint were the Ministers of Economy and of the Press. After the war a special 'Committee of Newsprint' was established, whose composition the Minister of the Press decided. This committee defined who were entitled to newsprint and also how the imported quantity would be distributed among the newspapers and the magazines.

With the Laws 582/1945 and 159/1946, a special 'Bureau of Newsprint' was established in the Ministry of the Press. On some occasions the governments set criteria concerning the allocation of newsprint. They even defined by law (1092/1938, 1683/1939) the general content of the newspapers, if they were, for example, news and information oriented. The governments defined by Law also the number of the pages of a newspaper. As Antonopoulos mentions, that limited the freedom of the press (Antonopoulos:1965). After the war, the 'Committee of Newsprint' had the right, according to Law 1797/1951, to refuse the newsprint to a certain newspaper, for a defined period, whenever it judged it to be appropriate a sanction that was against the constitution.

The article 15 of the Law 4041/1960 imposed the penalty of expulsion of a daily provinsional newspaper from the Union of Oowners of Provinsional Daily Newspaper (EIHEE) if it were printed in newsprint that had not been disposed by the government but it was bought from somewhere else. The expulsion of a regional newspaper from EIHEE meant that this newspaper would have no financial state support, as for example, public announcements, and deduction on the telephone bills, and the insurance paid by the employees. We must note that the members of this union alone, which during that period was the only one, and the registration in which was obligatory for all the daily newspapers of the region, had the privilege of subsidies. In Greece during the '50s and the '60s, if a regional daily newspaper had no state support it would close down, simply because it had no other resources in order to survive. In a few words, the government had the absolute monopoly concerning the disposal of the newsprint and it could even impose sanctions in case a newspaper bought newsprint from somewhere else.

The direct and indirect state financial support to the press was and still is a reality that has historical origins in, almost, all European countries without being

everywhere the same (Murschetz: 1998:294). Most of all it is associated, especially in continental Europe with the role of the press, as an ideological lever of liberalism and of the democratic parliamentary system. In post-war and civil-war Greece, the limited, or even the zero supply of paper to leftist and resistance newspapers, was an indirect yet effective way of censorship, which would later be validated by law as we will later discuss.

The terrorism of the paramilitary organisations against left press would reach climax with the assassination of Kostas Vidalis, journalist of *Rizospastis* and correspondent of the American magazine *Life*. Kostas Vidalis was killed in August 1945, while on a journalistic mission in Thessalia (Vournas: 1986:54). But on a legislative level, and in order to fix the limitation of the freedom of the press, the civil-war government imposed a series of restrictive laws. Thus, Law 262/45 was discouraging the articles about the army and the allies' military missions in Greece. But the most important legislative action that restrained the press freedom took place following publication of an article about the creation of the National Army which was published in *Rizospastis*, on 21 November 1946. When the government intercepted all the copies of the paper the Council of the Magistrate's Court of Athens decided that the interception was illegal because the article did not violate any articles of the Constitution of 1911 or the existing law about the press. Hence, the government decided to bring to the Parliament a new law decree.

According to this decree the interception of written material would be allowed if there were contents in the articles that were aiming at actions that could lead to the subversion of "the democratic bases of the state or were against the safety or the order of the state". Finally, the Parliament – and despite the strong objections of certain MPs, advised on the IE law which became the beginning of a

series of laws and decrees that actually led to the restriction of the freedom of press. At the same time the policy of exclusion was continuing for other left-wing papers too, which were not affiliated to Communist Party or EAM, like *Machi* for example. Because the above decree could not be used in the case of the newspaper of the Socialist Party, because it did not support the communist Greek Democratic Army, the authorities chose different ways to minimise its circulation. As it was written in *Machi* 'In all the big cities of Sterea Ellas, Thessalia, most of Macedonia and South-West Peloponnese the newspaper does not reach at all. In the city of Rethymno in Crete, the local director of the distribution Agency is forced by the police to hand in a detailed list with the names of our buyers' (*Machi*, 4/1/1947).

The Decrees of the Parliament LA (17 October 1947) and LB (22 October 1947) would impose one more definitive halt to newspapers, that supported the Communist Party or the Democratic Army, and the closing of printing presses and life-sentence for the editors and journalists. It is characteristic that in October 1947, in an application of various laws that limited the freedom of press 'two decisions were published by the Council of the Court of Appeal according to which 62 newspapers closed down, among which were *Rizospastis* and *Eleftheri Ellada*' (Alevizatos: 1995:509). Of course these laws and the decrees of the Parliament which limited the freedom of press would continue as for example the enactment of Laws MH and ΞΑ of 1948 which punished the expression even of ideas that aimed at the subversion of the state (Antonopoulos: 1965:51).

In fact, all the laws and decrees that were being put in effect during the civil war limit the freedom of the press. Alevizatos mentions that some of these Laws were even againsts the Constitution (Alevizatos: 1995) But even after the end of the civil war and the halt on laws that limited the freedom of the press, the

state of persecution for the anti-ethnikopron newspapers continued to remain. In June 1950, the trial of *Machi*, the newspaper of the Socialist Party of Elias Tsirimokos and Alexandros Svolos, commenced, concerning the articles about the horrible torture of the prisoners in Makronisos Island. In August 1950, the police arrested the editor of the newspaper *Democraticos Typos*, the paper of the “Union of Democratic Left-wingers Party”, which had as its leader the ex-minister of Foreign Affairs, Ioannis Sophianopoulos. The reason was the article about the maltreatment of juvenile delinquents in the prison of Kifissia. The Left Democrats of Ioannis Sofianopoulos and the small Socialist Party, as it has already been mentioned, participated in the election of March 1950, under the umbrella of the Democratic Party, which got the majority in the three biggest cities of Greece, Athens, Piraeus and Salonica. The success of these two left parties and their collision is apparently associated with the almost simultaneous persecution of their newspapers. In December 1950, the journalist of the newspaper *Democratikos*, Stathis Domazos was arrested, while at the same time the head of the printing services of the same paper, Dionysis Christakos, who happened to be an elected MP, got arrested too. Members of the illegal Communist Party published *Democratikos* in August 1950. In the same period the military commander of Athens asked for the remove of parliamentary protection from the leaders of the Socialist Party, Alexandros Svolos and Elias Tsirimokos. Both were writing against the recovery of the 3rd Decree of 1946 and anti-democratic laws that were instituted during the civil war, laws that would finally be re-instituted at the beginning of 1951, a few months after their abolition.

At the end of 1950, most of the publishers of the bourgeois newspapers, with Dimitris Lambrakis and Georgios Vlachos leading, began to promote general Alexandros Papagos to the political scene as an alternative political solution. The

choice of the publishers was in complete accordance with the American views on the matter. The USA government wanted to control the army and the state by a person they could trust and that is what Papagos was. From January 1952, the new constitution of 1951 was put into effect, according to which the interception of printed material got multiplied. The new constitution not only restored the previous laws and decrees, it significantly limited the freedom of the press, but also introduced even more measures which lead to almost complete repression of the left press.

At the beginning of 1952 the closing down of the newspaper *Democratikos* and the closing of its head-office is decided, following a trial. As Linardatos mentions 'the army had asked a long time ago for *Democratikos* to close down but the Americans hesitated to take measures against the freedom of the press; they only were convinced when the newspaper strongly attacked the U.S.A, for the War in Korea' (Linardatos:1977:183). The newspaper *To Vima* adapted the same stance. The mentioned newspaper wrote that 'we are in position to know that the banning of publication of the paper *Democratikos* finds the Americans to agree completely and it is considered by them as a proof of the government's decision to strongly resist the communist threat' (*To Vima*, 20/01/1952). In August 1952 *Avgi*, a newspaper that reflected the views of the United Democratic Left, (EDA) was published. From October 1952 it became a landmark for the Left, to the extent that it begun to bring together a readership and mainly offer an alternative in journalism.

In 1953, Parliament, in the framework of imposing more suspending measures against the press, decided on a new law, according to which in case of offence of the press, the tax-exemption of the newsprint could be lifted for one to two years (Meynaud: 1964:191). This law was the Law 2493/1953. As we have

already argued - not providing tax-exemption on newsprint was not only a form of censorship but also meant in effect the closing down of a newspaper. During the pre-election period of 1956, the establishment press, because of the impressive advance of the Left, under the electoral collision of United Democratic Left, would clearly take sides with the right-wing National Radical Union (ERE), under Constantinos Karamanlis. As we have already mentioned as establishment press (*kathestotiko tipo*) (Komninou:2002) we could define the newspapers that identified with the politics of the autarchic post civil war regime, irrespective of their occasional support towards either the right or the center political parties.

It would also restore the events of the civil war and the political climate of that time. The last few days before the election, the right-wing newspapers, were published with their front pages covered in photos of bodies from the battle of December (Vournas: 1981:122). But with an austere legal framework about the press, the persecutions against the anti-right newspapers continued. This fact is related to the advance of the Left in the election of 1956, when it came first, but was unable to form a government due to a majority electoral system. In December 1958, the director of *Avgi*, Manolis Glezos, would get arrested and charged with espionage.

In July 1959 the director of *Avgi* and hero of the resistance against the Germans, was sentenced to five years imprisonment. The accusation of espionage was built on testimonies of police officers that claimed that the defendant had secretly met with the secretary general of the Communist Party. 'Manolis Glezos would be finally released in 1962 while *Avgi* would be prosecuted over 20 times during the government of ERE' (Meynaud: 1966:375).

Political instability of the first post-civil war years would be followed, as already mentioned, by a period of relative political stability with a right-wing

government. However, even in that period the press reflects the intense political and party divisions, especially the new dividing line between Right and Anti-Right. This new dividing line, which substituted the division between nationalistic (ethnikophron) and anti-nationalistic (anti-ethnikophron) press, would not be reflected in serious changes in political orientation of the establishment press. It would allow them, though, to move among the at-the-time party formations of the right and the centre and to intervene in the arguments caused between the two main bourgeois parties of the time. In a few words, the publishers' involvement was not simply through their editorial opinion, which could be published in their newspapers. The publishers participated in many crucial meetings among the leaders of the political parties and other important party leaders for the determination and the shaping of the parties' policies. On some occasions they even suggested the future leaders of political parties (Tsoukalas: 1984: 136).

As Komninou mentions, 'the relation of the press with parties, since the market was not yet playing an important role in the function of publishing business, had contradictory consequences. On the one hand, it allowed for the readership to be an important factor in the formation of the policy of the publishers and on the other hand it allowed big room for the publishers of the newspapers to define and shape their political strategy' (Komninou:2002:75). For example, the publisher of the newspaper *To Vima* was present at the meeting of Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis with Georgios Papandreou, in the house of the latter in spring of 1961, in order to discuss the issue of the election (Linardatos: 1986:16). A second example was the editor of the right-wing newspaper, *Kathimerini*, Helen Vlachos, who was included with those who pressured for the resignation of Constantinos Karamanlis from his office in 1963 (Young:1969:292).

In 1964, a second Left newspaper, connected to United Democratic Left (EDA) was published, called *Democratiki Allagi*. In the meantime *Avgi* started to demonstrate a significant increase in its circulation, which in 1964 reached about 27,500 copies per day. This number was satisfactory enough, if one takes into account that the average daily circulation of Athens's newspapers was, that year, approximately 650,000 copies (EIHAE:2006). To that we will have to add the fact that the state of persecution of the readers of the left-wing press was in effect, especially in the country-side. The persecution of the readers usually happened via detailed recording by the police forces. Even nowadays, elderly readers continue to fold the paper in four to prevent the title from showing.

The political crisis that would break out in July 1965 would yet again confirm the political character of the daily Athens newspapers. The papers *To Vima* and *Ta Nea* of Lambrakis group would, this time, dynamically support, George Papandreou and the Center Union. This support, that was associated with social and political demands would lead to a spectacular increase in their sales.

It is significant how the readership of *Ta Nea* increased during the events of July by 65% while the overall annual increase was about 20% over 1964. Specifically, the average daily circulation from 156,008 copies per day in 1964 reached 185,611 in 1965 and 195,278 in 1966. On the contrary, the liberal newspaper *Eleftheria* which from supporting the Center Union ended up supporting government, appointed by the King that did not have any social support, experienced a significant fall in its sales. Thus, from 36,700 copies, daily average circulation in 1964, it fell to 26,800 in 1965 and 14,849 in 1966 (EIHAE:2006). A relatively small increase appeared in right-wing newspapers, which was favoured by the polarised political climate.

But even the public radio, the government intervention was total, confirming that the Greek radio was strictly controlled by the state. On 15 July 1965, the Minister of Public Order threatened to send to military court the officials of the National Broadcasting Institute if they broadcast a message of the leader of the Center Union and ex-Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou, (*Ta Nea*, 16/7/1965). A few days later, the director of the radio station, Anastasios Peponis, was ordered to take "holidays" that led to his resignation (*Ta Nea*, 20/7/1965). In weak and atrophied societies the role of the interventionist state defines the extent of the relative autonomy of the media. In France, for instance, in which a strong civil-society was historically developed, 'the French were kept most immediately informed by the radio about what was taking place in the Latin Quarter in Paris. In fact, the 1968 events provided the radio with an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the multifaceted nature of the medium' (Kuhn: 1995:81). In times of political tension and social mobilisation, like that of July 1965, the Greek press confirmed its political orientation and its strict attachment to the two big bourgeois party-formations. At the same time, it followed the new political division between the right and the anti-right, resulting, however, in a relative internal division. This division in the coherence of the bourgeois press was retained after the civil war on the basis of anti-communism. This coherence did not, however, impede the capacity of the publishers to move among the two big bourgeois parties and to influence their tactics on the basis of their personal, political and financial choices. Thus, very soon the publishers, because of the intensified political and social crisis, mainly due to the huge public movement, began to get involved in the search for a political solution and propose in collaboration with the monarchy and the centre-right-wing politicians a new compromise.

'The publishers of the Athens dailies were not merely trying to influence political decision-making through articles and editorial but often took part in all-important decision-making themselves. For example, publishing tycoon Christos Lambrakis reportedly had suggested elaborate plans for political manoeuvring to the King in July 1965, and these were allegedly followed precisely' (Karmakolias:1974:127). Thus, when the Prime Ministers appointed by the King failed to form a new government and a new temporary government was assigned to Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, it seems that, in this agreement, the publisher of the newspapers *Ta Nea* and *Kathimerini* participated also (Meynaud:1966:131). As Komninou mentions, 'some of the Youth of the Centre Union considered Christos Lambrakis's support to the new government as unacceptable and burnt issues of his newspaper in front of the Club of the Liberals' (Komninou:2002:77). In a recent interview ex-king Konstantinos said that his various public speeches, at that period, were written by the publisher of *Eleftheria*, Panos Kokas (*To Vima*, 29/1/2006). The period from the liberation of Greece and the Civil War up to the military coup of April 1967 the press was under severe censorship. The newspapers of the Left were either closed down or persecuted bylaws, which at times abolished the freedom of the press and at times just restricted it. In the meantime, bourgeois press not only expressed but also tried to modulate the policy of the two big party formations of the Right and the Centre.

The period which was characterised by the political division among the ethnikoprone and the non-ethnikoprone allowed publishers to broaden their relations with the dominant parties and acquire a steady point of ideological reference. It also allowed them to enjoy press subsidies, something that signifies the strengthening of their papers at a political and financial level. In the second period that of the division between the right and the anti-right publishers moved

within the frame of the two big bourgeois party formations and assembled the readership around the base of the political polarization of the 60s. At the same time, they were actively involved in the political decisions of the ruling parties as we have already seen.

The Greek press continued to remain closely linked to politics. This was because of the lack of a civil society which led to an increased role for the army, foreign intervention and leader-oriented parties. The under-development of the Greek capitalism did not allow the press's orientation to market conditions and its transformation from journals of opinion to commercial products. The events from the civil war till the-1967- military regime, despite the political instability, censorship and lack of a civil society of the time, assisted the development of the press, especially the daily newspapers of Athens.

A determining factor, in this early stage, remained the participation of the Athenian publishers in politics something that gave them the opportunity to enjoy press subsidies. As we have formerly explained, and other researchers have agreed to it, 'Greek newspapers have a long history of divisions along party lines which has literally split the country during its modern political history' (Papathanasopoulos:2001:113).

Newspapers

We can distinguish two periods in the circulation of Athenian newspapers and the development of the press in Greece from the end of the Civil War until the regime of 1967. The first period is from the Liberation to the end of the 1950s, during which Athenian newspapers did not present any particular increase of circulation. The second period is that from the beginning of the 1960s till 1967, when

Athenian dailies begin to present a significant increase in their sales and to win the market in both the centre and the periphery.

The first period is characterised by intense fluctuations in the circulation of Athenian newspapers which remained, almost, at the levels of the pre-war. It is characteristic that the Athenian newspapers, from 350,000 copies maximum average daily circulation in the middle of 30s, reached a maximum limit-up of 386,711 copies average daily circulation in the 50s. For this reason the pre-war period and the period after the Second World War have, in the terms of newspapers circulation, much in common (EIHAE:2006). This is mainly related to the existence of severe censorship and laws that restricted significantly the freedom of the press, as it has already been mentioned. It also revealed a crisis in the trust of the readership towards the bourgeois newspapers, to the extent that the latter got directly involved in the formation of an anti-democratic and authoritative politics before and after the Second World War (Komninou:2002). Of course this crisis continued and became a factor that determined, to a certain extent the particularly low percentage of newspaper circulation in Greece, compared to other European countries, which will be analysed further. At the same time, though, the general conditions of underdevelopment in Greek society continued to characterise the country during the 50s played a very important role to the crisis. They impeded the formation of a satisfactory market in the field of the printing industry, which, in its turn, might have led to an advance of the newspaper sector. In the economic area, despite the significant increase in the Gross National Product whose average annual increase reached 6% during the 1950s, 'what was dominating was poor agricultural productivity, an oversized and parasitical sector of Civil Services and an industry incapable of absorbing the superfluous labour forces of agriculture' (Mouzelis:1978:54). This led to a big

wave of internal and external migration. At the same time, unemployment remained on a high level while salaries were extremely low. Therefore, it is obvious that the combination of political and economic factors of the first post-war period in Greece influenced decisively the evolution of the newspapers' circulation and the market formation of printed media. Other important, secondary factors, contributed complementarily to the limitation of readership and therefore sales. To these secondary factors one should include illiteracy which at the end of the decade reached 15% while those who had not even completed primary education were about 23.5% of the country's total population. A supplementary part was played by the inadequate transportation frame of the country that prevented the quick distribution of the Athenian press to the periphery, which had always been a strategic target of the publishers of Athens. For example, in the early 50s, the Athenian press was transported to Larisa by plane and from there on to Trikala, by bus (Basantis: 1995:29). But these last two factors, that is illiteracy and means of transportation, can only be considered as secondary and not as main ones, since their elimination did not affect significantly the further increase in the circulation numbers of the newspapers (Kominis:1985: 76).

In the second period, from 1960 to 1967, the circulation of Athenian newspapers saw an important rise that reached a peak in 1966. In particular, that year, the average daily circulation reached 740,532 copies. The factors that lead, almost, to the doubling of the circulation of the Athenian press were yet again political, financial and widely social. On a political level, the centre-wing governments limited the strict measures of censorship that impeded the freedom of press while the new political division between the right and the anti-right liberalised part of the bourgeois press. As it was already mentioned, some newspapers, even temporarily, turned to relatively supporting the political

demands of movements that appeared in mid-60s, something that resulted in a significant increase of their circulation.

Meanwhile, the country's economic situation presented an important increase that was expressed with the impressive rise in all the areas of production, especially industry, which in 1962 exceeded agriculture's contribution to GNP. This increase was due to the massive inflow of foreign capital, which was multiplied by ten from 1961 to 1966, 'taking up over half of the total of industrial investments in the same period' (Fotopoulos: 1985:154). As a result of the industrial and general development, unemployment decreased significantly while, at the same time, buying capacity increased something that, perhaps, led to an increase in the sales of newspapers. But as Leandros notices, in that period, 'the branch of printing and publishing presented only a small increase in relation to the rest of the manufacturing industry' (Leandros:2000:188). From that it could be inferred that the rise of the press should have been accordingly small. But the limited increase in the printing industry, in relation to the rest of the industry is not the definitive factor that influenced the development of Athenian press at the time. An important development associated with the economic advancement of the 60s and with extremely controversial effects that would be expressed much later, was internal immigration from the country to the capital. This internal migration led to a "swelling" of the population of Athens and Piraeus which resulted in the accumulation of 25% of the country's population to Attica. This population boom in Athens, contributed complementarily to the increase in the sales of the Athenian press.

Under these circumstances Athenian newspapers turned national since they managed to assert themselves both in the centre and at the periphery. At the same time, the publishers gradually started to turn into businessmen, who,

however, did not rely on an independent business activity but mainly on state funding and bank loans as it will be explained below. Karikopoulos pointed out that 'the new procedures of press subsidies and the state bank loans created a new type of dependency in the field of press' (Karikopoulos: 1984:106).

From Liberation until 1967, over 48 daily newspapers were published most of which were short-lived. Among these were the 3 newspapers that were published during the journalists' strike, between 3 and 24 February 1950. The journalists' newspaper called *Epimerida ton Sintakton* (Journalists' Newspaper), the second called *Athinaios Typos* (Athenian Press) published by the publishers' union and the third called *Deltio Eidiseon* (News Bulletin) published by the Ministry of the Press (Karablias:1975:62). The journalists strike at that time had stopped publication of all Athenian newspapers.

Four families steadily controlled the biggest part of the market and played the leading role during that period. Dimitris Lambrakis, who, after his death, was succeeded by his son Christos, published *Ta Nea* and *To Vima*. Both newspapers had an increasing circulation, which reaches its peak in 1965. Lambrakis played a defining role in Greek political life, mainly expressing the liberal centre.

The second important editor was Angelos Vlahos, who published *Kathimerini* in the inter-war, as has already been mentioned. After his death, his daughter, Helen, took over the newspaper and in 1961 she moved on to the publishing of a second daily, *Mesimvrini*. These two newspapers had also a gradual increase in their sales up to 1967, mainly supporting right wing party formations.

The third important publisher was Athanasios Botsis who, in 1945, published *Acropolis*, and in 1952 moved on to the publishing of the daily paper,

Apogevmatini. These newspapers saw an increase in their sales, mainly by expressing the right-wing political pole.

In 1963, the brothers Panos and Tzortzis Athanasiadis entered the publishing arena, by buying the newspaper *Vradini* while a little later they published the morning paper *Imera*, which stopped its publication in 1966. According to Leandros, these three families controlled 49% of the sales of Athenian press in 1952, while all four of them controlled 73.68% in 1965 (Leandros:1992:139).

One should also note the important role of the editors of *Eleftheria* Panos Kokkas, and of *Estia*, Adonis Kyrou, as well as United Democratic Left, whose newspapers *Dimokratiki* and later on *Avgi* and *Anexartitos Typos* began to acquire a significant readership despite all the persecutions mentioned above.

In the country as a whole the situation will be defined by the final domination of Athenian press in public communication on a national level. The big publishing groups of Athens managed to control the circulation on the readership of the periphery on the expense of traditional local daily newspapers. An important role in relation to that was played by the expansion of the dealing network of Athenian newspapers with the creation of 200 country-distribution agencies up to 1955 (Basantis:1995:31). The latter did not have an immediate effect, in the 50s but it created the infrastructure and the conditions for the following years. The reasons, were not only limited to the expansive strategy and the political strength of the Athenian newspapers and the distribution agencies but to the economic underdevelopment of the Greek countryside and therefore the provincial newspapers.

With the exception of the industrial areas of Patra and Volos, and the large agricultural centre of Thessaly, Larisa, in the rest of the country, the local

newspapers were facing objectively restrictive factors that prevented/impeded their development. A basic characteristic is the domination of agricultural relations of production in the Greek periphery—a fact that caused an extremely scattered and limited market. The lack of serious infrastructures, especially on road works, prohibited the quick transportation of local daily press in other towns and villages of the region. Thus most of the local dailies were circulating in the capitals of the prefectures by personal means, and to the other areas of the province, by mail. The internal and external migration of the 50s and 60s would create a strong population draining of the country, something that would limit the reading public of the local newspapers. An important factor was, however, the lack of serious investment from the publishers of the periphery. The state financial support and the public funding was mainly forwarded to the publishers in Athens despite the fact that the provincial press, almost in its majority, supported the authoritative post Civil War governments and had immediate involvement in the maintenance of clientelistic relations and patronage of that time. Yet again the element of trust of the readers of the provincial towns towards the local dailies seems to play the same role as what was formerly analysed in the case of Athenian papers. Some of the local dailies though, that were published before the war managed to survive during the post war period and despite the objective intrinsic difficulties and the intense antagonism of the Athenian newspapers. In the meantime new publishing attempts took place around the country. Some of those published from the end of the Second World War until 1967, although they were relatively newer, they managed to survive because of press subsidies. Athenagoras Mykoniatis published the paper *Patris* in Heraklion in 1946. In 1946, *Proodos* published in Rhodes, by George Diamantidis and in 1951 *Thessaliki Icho* in Karditsa. In 1953 *Proini* of Kavala was published and in 1958

Erevna of Trikala. The *Rethemniotika Nea* of Yannis Chalkiadakis was published in 1965. The regime will later imprison the latter publisher and discontinue the paper's publication.

All these new publishing attempts along with those of the inter-war and some prior, which have already been mentioned, constituted the regional press in Greece, which in 1956 acquired its professional representation. Measures of significant state support were legislated, which however had extremely controversial results for the future development of the provincial daily press. This will be analysed below.

The development of the radio

In the area of radio broadcasting, the German occupation forces and the puppet government of Tsolakoglou set up a company called Radio Broadcasting S.A. using the two pre-war radio stations the first in Ilion area in Athens and the second that of Tsiggiridis, in Thessaloniki (Gaitsis–Barboutis:2001:65). The illegal establishment of radio by resistance organisations was impossible, because of limited access to radio-technology of the time, and, due to the fact that in the big urban centres the censors could easily trace radios.

In 1948 begins the creation of military radio-stations, which aim to broadcast the government's propaganda during the civil war. This phenomenon is unique in the history of countries with constitutional democracy and it reflects the obviously enforced role of the army in the political system of the country. Thus, in 1948, the radio station of the "Armed Forces of Central Greece" was set up in Larisa. In 1949 Law 968 officially established the Central Radio Stations for the Greek Armed Forces. In the same year three more stations were founded, one in Ioannina "The Armed Forces Station of the 8th Batallion", one in Kavala "The

Armed Forces Station of Kavala” and one in Tripoli “The Armed Forces radio station of Peloponnese”. At the end of 1950, and despite the fact that the civil war was typically over, the “Radio Station of Armed Forces of Western Macedonia” was founded in Kozani (Demertzis-Skamnakis: 1998:244). The creation of this last military radio station was related to the increased power the Democratic Army had in this region.

The existence of a network of Armed Forces stations will remain for many years, as will be analysed below. Foreign intervention was also in the radio broadcasting. As Zacharopoulos pointed out ‘The United States which had taken a major role in the Civil War, helped the Greek government by building two radio stations that would transmit Voice of America programmes part of the day and the Greek government programming the rest of the day’ (Zacharopoulos:2003:3).

But apart from the Armed Forces radio stations the Hellenic Radio Foundation (E.I.R.) was established in July 1945. At the same period the government asked Tsiggiridis Radio Station in Thessaloniki to broadcast the national signal but when he refused, they closed it down. The government wanted total control of broadcasting, as it could play an important role ensuing Civil War. EIR proceeded to build its own station in Thessaloniki in 1947. (Zacharopoulos: 2003:3). In 1948 three local radio stations of the Hellenic Radio Foundation were established in Volos in 1948, in Patra in 1950 and in 1951 in Chania, Crete. But, in any case, both radio networks were under the tight control of the post civil-war governments and were mainly used for reasons of propaganda rather than actual information of the citizens. Thus, radio-broadcasting in Greece would consecutively become, from its beginning to 1950, a tool of the Metaxas’s regime, an organ of the German occupation forces, and a means of propaganda for the semi-parliamentary autarchic regime of the first post-war era.

The result was, in contrast with the radio of other European countries that elements of autonomy and self-regulation, relative independence and journalistic ethics did not develop. For instance, in Greece, the first code of journalism ethics was introduced within the journalists' unions in the middle of 1990. The state intervention was again here associated with an atrophied society in which the state has to take on additional political and ideological functions (Mouzelis: 1987:261).

In the field of radiobroadcasts, the two networks, that of Hellenic Radio Foundation (EIR) and Central Radio Station of Armed Forces were expanded, almost to nearly the whole territory. As Dimitras mentions 'the Armed Forces dominant role in the post civil-war led to an unchecked expansion of that radio network into a fully equipped service, antagonistic to EIR' (Dimitras:1997:100).

In 1952-3, \$1,000,000 was given to EIR for the modernisation of the machinery as part of the American Fund. With Law 2312/1953, EIR became a legal Entity of Public Law and acquired the monopoly over all electronic media. EIR network continued to expand. In 1954 the radio-stations of Komotini and of Rhodes were created while in 1956, the 2 private stations of Amaliada and Mesologgi were placed in EIR. Lastly, in 1957 the radio station of Corfu was set up. It should be also noted that since 1946, the National Programme was in effect by EIR, with the addition of a 50KW transmitter in 1952. This central networking on a programme level will continue with the structuring of two more national programmes that will be relayed by all the local stations of EIR. The so-called Second Programme was established in 1952 and the so-called Third Programme in 1954. Additionally the Voice of Greece was in operation with programmes that appeal abroad, since 1947.

Professional organisations

As we saw in the previous chapter, the journalists' unions developed in ways that were to a great extent determined by state intervention via a series of laws. It was also important that the journalists' unions were of a closed character, which was mainly due to the literary tradition of the journalist profession in Greece, and secondly due to the state financial support that started being awarded in the mid thirties. The Law 1093/1938 continued partly to determine the operation of the journalists' unions after the war. Thus the five journalists' unions continued to operate on that basis, although there were some changes in their statutes – with the exception of the publishers' professional association, where the structure that the Decree Law 1093 put in place was essentially annulled. In 1945, the Journalists' Union of Periodical Press was renamed to Athens Journalists' Union. As Mayer suggested, the renaming took place 'because it was decided that new members would be accepted from the daily newspapers of Athens whom the Journalists' Union of Daily Athens Newspapers did not accept' (Mayer: 1960:355). In 1965 the Union once more changed name, and became once again the Journalists' Union of Periodical Press. In 1947, the Journalists' Union of Daily Athens Newspapers was restructured on the basis of a new statute that was voted by the general assembly of its members. The new statute contended that members of the union would have to be those who practice the journalism profession. It also suggested the creation of a school of journalism. The criterion of fulltime employment in journalism was introduced for the first time and marked the changes which took place towards professionalism. As it was explained above, before and during the inter-war a strict definition of who was a journalist did not exist. The journalism profession was open to everybody. Obviously the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspaper wanted to restrict further the

boundaries of the profession. But the fact that the Journalists' Union statute posed the criterion of full-time employment, it strengthened even more the closed character of the union.

In 1951, the Union of Daily Athens Newspapers' Publishers was established by the Decree Law 1798. The first members were the 11 publishers of the daily newspapers *Acropolis*, *To Vima*, *Vradini*, *Ethnikos Kirix*, *Ethnos*, *Eleftheria*, *Empros*, *Estia*, *Kathimerini*, *Ta Nea* and *Proodeftikos Fileleftheros*. The Union of Daily Provincial Newspapers' Owners was founded in 1957, based on the Decree Law 3619. Members of this union were the owners of the daily newspapers of regional Greece. The Law 4286 of 1963 marked the foundation of the Union of the Provincial Press. This union included all the weekly newspapers circulating in regional Greece except Athens and Thessaloniki. With the creation of this union the cycle of the journalists' and editors' professional organisation was almost completed throughout the country. This form will be retained for many years. The basic characteristics of the unions and mainly their closed character will continue to exist. From 1944 to 1967 the Journalists' Union of the Daily Newspapers of Thessaly, Sterea Ellada and Evia increased its members by 59 according to its members register (ESIETHSEE: 2002).

Journalism education

As it was explained in chapter I the literary tradition of Greek journalism did not allow room for the establishment of a school of journalism during the inter-war period. The conception of 'talent' or 'journalists are born and not made' was the dominant view therefore no school was needed. This perception related with the prevalence of literary authors and other educated people in journalism. Many of

them were members of self-educated elite, who believed that one did not need any special education or training to become a journalist.

The war and post war period was marked with few efforts for the training of journalists. In 1943 the Nazi-inducted government, with Law 510, formed a Department for the Science of Journalism in Panteion School, which, however, never did operate (Skamnakis: 2000:117) In 1952 the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers invited the American professor Kenneth Olson from North-West University to give a series of lectures (Bourquin: 1958:170). In 1958 the very well-known journalist Dimitris Avramides, the vice chancellor of the Panteion School of Social and Political Sciences Giorgos Papachatzis and the member of the Hellenic Academy Spyros Melas established a private School of Journalism which covered the void in the field of journalism for many years. However, this private school did not offer a recognised diploma but a certificate of attendance (Kyriakidis: 1960:147).

In February 1967 the Minister of Education decided to establish a postgraduate programme in journalism in the School of Philosophy of the National and Kapodistriako University of Athens. However, either this programme never started.

Press Subsidies

The period after the war came to strengthen even more the relationship between the press and politics, through a series of laws that were voted and aimed to secure both direct and indirect press subsidies. A special mention was made of the issue of the abolition of tax on the newsprint used by newspapers, a measure that benefited the publishers of the establishment newspapers. A special mention was also made regarding certain income from the Journalists' Lottery, which was

allocated to the journalists' unions. Yet the subsidies were not restricted to the above. On the contrary, they continued, and created a framework of important subsidies for newspapers. Greece was not the only European country with this kind of policy. European states provided significant state aid to newspapers in a broad variety of forms (Skogerbo:1997:99-100). However, as Picard pointed out 'the development of the subsidies has been a matter unique to each nation and different patterns of intervention have been produced that reflect the different economic policies, political situations and cultural differences within the nations' (Picard:1999:2). In Greece the atrophied civil society, the clientelistic relations, the weak political system of democracy and in general the underdevelopment of capitalism formed a great degree of interdependence between state and the press as it was explained above. Under these circumstances the press subsidy became a dominant part of that relationship. Press subsidies in Greece did not simply have the character of securing pluralism or of supporting press economically in order to become a developed industry. Political power pursued its financial support because press was an important political means for the dissemination of their political views and programme. Only in this way newspapers were able to survive and to continue to represent the political opinions of the parties and the political personae. The low circulation of the newspapers and the absence of a commercial media market in Greece did not allow them to be profitable businesses and have a financial independence. Political powers were constantly passing special laws in order to back up the newspapers whose political support they expected.

The attempt to collect and register the tens of laws regarding the press subsidies that were voted in the period 1944-1967, is beyond the scope of this thesis. However we will mention some examples of this kind of Laws:

With a series of laws, especially the Law 1805 of 1951, the Law 2029 of 1952, the Law 3394 of 1955 and the Law 3686 of 1957, all the daily newspapers did not have to pay tax on any printing machinery they imported.

There was also an important exemption regarding the telephone, telegrams and the electricity used by the daily regional newspapers, based on the Laws 3619 of 1956 and 4041 of 1960.

Summary

The period from the Second World War until the establishment of dictatorship in 1967 is characterized by the function of an autarchic state and polarization in social and political level. Political divisions between nationalists and anti-nationalists and, later, between right and anti-right were reflected in press as well.

During the first phase from 1944 until the middle of the '50s, political division existed mainly between nationalists and anti-nationalists. Almost the whole of bourgeois press supported the nationalist political powers while left press was either not allowed circulating or was under very austere censorship. In that period political authorities reinforced even more press subsidies. On the other hand, publishers because of the political instability were directly involved in the shaping of politics, either openly or behind the scenes. In the same time, radio was transformed to a mechanism for state propaganda and the appearance and development of the military network of radio stations reflected the increased role of the army in country's political and social life.

During the second phase from the middle of the '50s until 1967, political division between nationalists and anti-nationalists had subsided and was progressively replaced by a division between right and anti-right. The

establishment press followed the new political division, while publishers continued to be actively involved in politics' shaping.

Censorship continued to exist for the press of the left, whereas the newspaper *Rizospastis* was forbidden to circulate, since GCP was illegal from the end of the '40s. During all the post war period until 1967, interdependence between press and the political powers was even more reinforced because of the civil war and the political instability that characterized that period.

CHAPTER 3: DICTATORSHIP AND MEDIA (1967-1974)

The dictatorship of the colonels enforced conditions of very strict censorship on all spectrum of society, including the press. The freedom of the press, which was very limited anyway during the period 1944- 1966, was virtually abolished immediately after the establishment of the military regime.

The newspapers of the democratic left were not allowed to circulate. Those that continued their circulation published articles that had to be approved by the regime. Journalists were arrested and sent to special prisons, which had been created during the civil war. Radio and television, which had just started to make its appearance, were transformed into instruments of propaganda by the junta. The newspapers' circulation decreased in relation to the last period, because of censorship.

The Political Context: 1967-1974

In the last chapter we discussed the role of the army, and especially, its constant interference with the political life of the country. The establishment of the dictatorship of the 21 of April 1967 is the result of this historical particularity, but also of the political conditions that followed the civil war. The possible participation of Center Union in the elections that were planned for the 28 of May 1967 had created an intense skepticism and fear in the Army, where the extreme right-wing officers were prevailing. This fear was not so much due to the leadership of the Center Union, as to the massive mobilization and to the pressure for further liberalization of the political system.

Two main elements composed the characteristics of the army during the period before the dictatorship. The first has to do with the prevalence of the

extreme right and anti-Communist officers, both at higher and in lower levels. In the last chapters we pointed out that virtually both in 1935, with the failed movement of Salonica, and during the Metaxas dictatorship, but also a bit later, in the Middle East, the army had experienced a substantial bloodletting of its most democratic officers. In all this we must add the blockade of all the officers who during the period of the German occupation joined EAM- ELAS, and these were not few. At the same time, the cold war and the interference of the USA factor amplified even more the extreme rightist viewpoint of the Greek army.

Secondly, the Army from a relative autonomy which it gained against the political parties and the bourgeoisie, and which was expressed in 1936 with the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship, went progressively after the civil war to establish conditions of total autonomy. These two elements, the autonomy and the peculiar extreme rightist ideology which prevailed in the army, pushed it towards the coup d' etat in April 1967 (Charalampis: 1985). As Gursoy mentions, 'since the military was relatively powerfull and autonomous, its alliance with the bourgeoisie was occasional. The military had its own perception of threats which could diverge from the bourgeoisie's. In 1967 even though the military thought that its well-being and security were threatened, the bourgeoisie did not perceive any dangers associated with democracy. As a result the military acted alone in establishing the dictatorship' (Gursoy:2000:22). Mouzelis also pointed out that 'the greatest push for the enforcement of the military dictatorship came from the army itself and it was directly connected with the threat of the ongoing political mobilization against its prevalence in the existing conditions' (Mouzelis: 1987:251).

However, the foreign factor, and especially the USA, played an important role in the ensuing sustenance and reinforcement of the dictatorship. The Cold

War, combined with the political instability of Greece and the rise of the Left, had created an intense preoccupation in the USA. The continuance of the dependence of the country could be better achieved with the enforcement of a dictatorship supported by USA. (Charalampis:1985, Tsoukalas:1981). Besides, Greece had a tradition concerning dictatorships and military coups as we have already seen. At the same time, the developments both in the Arab world and in Cyprus could be better faced with a directly controlled military government in Greece. According to Clogg, 'The Pentagon was particularly anxious to maintain good relations with Greece so as to continue to enjoy base facilities in a country whose strategic importance to the Western alliance had increased following the Arab/Israel wars of 1967 and 1973 and the rapid build-up of a Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean' (Clogg:2003:192). Iatridis, also, argues that 'Whatever the American role in those events there can be no doubt that before April officials in Washington had come to accept a right-wing military coup as a way out of the political impasse and the one likely to benefit American interest in Greece (Iatrides:1980a:71).

Even though the Americans may have wanted a military government in Greece and they probably encouraged the King and the generals, they were surprised with the outbreak of the coup, with the low rank officers at the head. The telegram of the British ambassador in the USA, Patrick Dean, to the Foreign Office, a few days after the outbreak of the coup of the colonels is indicative 'the nature of the coup which has occurred was quite different from that the CIA had been expecting...they had had no warning of the Colonels rebellion. They knew very little about the individuals concerned or how they had managed to maintain some form of conspiratorial organisation' (cited in Nafpliotis 4:2005).

The military squads that moved and occupied the parliament and the other public services operated on the basis of a NATO contingency plan, whose title was Prometheus. According to it, in case of war with a country-member of the soviet block, or in case of a civil clash, the army and the police would make massive arrests based on specific lists of names. This plan was implemented immediately and besides the politicians and the officers of the left wing, dozens of reporters, newspaper editors, and even newspaper publishers were arrested.

The Prime Minister himself Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and other members of the government and of the opposition were arrested. 8,000 people, in total, were arrested in only a few hours. Later in the morning of the 21 of April a Decree, purportedly signed by King Constantinos II, was issued proclaiming martial law. At the same time special courts-martial were created. The decree stated that: 'the armed forces have taken over the government of the country. The King in accordance with article 91 of the Greek Constitution following a proposal by the cabinet in case of serious trouble or an obvious threat to the public security and order of the country has ordered the suspension all over the country of certain articles of the Constitution. In the course of the day the creation of a nondescript civilian government headed by a Supreme Court prosecutor, Constantinos Kollias, was announced. It soon became apparent, however that the new civilian prime minister was a mere figurehead and the real power lay in the hands of Colonels George Papadopoulos and Nikolaos Makarezos and Brigadier Stelianos Patakos who were backed up by a shadow so-called Revolutionary Council (Clogg:2003:186).

On the same day of the coup the junta enacted a 'State of Siege' Decree according to which

1. individuals can be apprehended and arrested without charge.
2. There is no bail for political crimes.
3. All citizens, independent of position, can

be brought before an emergency court-martial. 4. All gatherings indoors or outdoors are forbidden. 5. It is forbidden to form a union or group with labour union aims. Strikes are completely forbidden. 6. It is permitted to search houses, political premises, public buildings, all buildings, day and night without a special warrant. 7. It is forbidden to announce or publish any kind of information in any way through the press, radio and television without censorship before hand. 8. Letters, telegrams and all means of communication will be censored. 9. Crimes, political crimes as well as those of the press whether they have to do with private life or not, as well as the crimes to be judged by the court of appeal, will be judged by court-martial. 10. Everyone who commits a crime which should be punished by law even if it is not against the army will also be judged by a court-martial (Ogbondah:1989:9).

A few days later the junta took more measures. 'In conformity with the law concerning siege and the royal Decree the the following are prohibited: open air gatherings of more than five people indoor gatherings of the same number, the bearing of arms, temporary hospitality given at home to persons one's family without police permission' (Ogbondah:1989:9). The dictatorship abolished parliamentary democracy, the constitutional rights of the citizens, and it tried to enforce its power with peremptory laws. But it also used many undemocratic laws, which the ruling parties of the bourgeoisie had voted after the civil war in order to shield the semi-parliamentary political system against the left. As Alevizatos mentions 'the regime of the 21 of April had the immense political advantage of finding intact the totality of the anti-constitutional laws of the last period. What it simply did was to secure their enforcement under the new circumstances' (Alevizatos: 1995:601).

There was no organized reaction from the political organizations during the first days. With the exemption of the mass rally in Heraclion, Crete (Vournas: 2002:20), that was broken up by the army, there was no other organized reaction. This fact is associated with many historical factors. Firstly, the political parties, as we have already mentioned, were parties of persons without, virtually, any mass organizational structure (Charalampis: 1985).

The Communist party, the only party with a mass political base, was banned outside the law, and tens of thousands of its members took shelter in the eastern countries or were imprisoned. Even the massive mobilizations of the '60s did not create the preconditions for massive organized political schemes, because of the fact that these mobilizations were under the directive of the Center Union, a clientelistic party. Secondly, the working class in Greece was not the major social class, because of the fact that Greece remained mainly an agricultural economy (Yannopoulos: 1972:109-127).

Despite the existence of the labor body of laws the labor unions with only few exemptions, were under the government's guidance. According to Yannopoulos, 'Labour unions have also been under considerable government patronage especially since the introduction of a law under the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936, under which union membership fees were collected by the government and then distributed to the various unions by the state. Through this device post-war governments exercised considerable control over the trade-union movement' (Yannopoulos:1972:112).

The fact that parallel to the aforementioned general approach concerning the situation of the labor movement in Greece there were important elements of its mobilization and organization, especially during the last five years before the coup, seems to have played no important role for even an elementary reaction. For

example, the creation of the Co-active Workers Organizations (Seferiadis: 1998:15), which, as an opposition to the governmental GSEE, had come to rally almost 1,000 trade unions in the beginning of 1967, but also the immense wave of strikes during the period 1964-1966, is indicative of the changes in the organization of the labor unions. But they do not comprise elements that could cause a radical change in the organization of the working class, so that it could react effectively during the outbreak of the coup.

King Constantine expected that after the coup, progressively, he could regain control, and for this reason he adopted a waiting attitude. But after eight months and since he was assured that the military had no intention whatsoever to hand him over the power, he moved to overthrow them with a countercoup. But this movement from the part of the King, with some officers who were loyal to him, was ineffective. So King Constantine II was forced to leave Greece in the beginning of 1968. A bit later, the junta appointed as a regent general Zoitakis, and George Papadopoulos became the Prime Minister. The junta needed an institutional frame, to constitute its ideological starting point. Of course, since the dictatorship was unable to produce ideology, it borrowed ideological elements from different ideological streams (Clogg: 1972:36-58).

Religion and nationalism, worship of ancient Greek civilization and of Byzantium, the moral principles of the family and anti-communism, but also the defense of the weak and the poor, comprised a mixture, which constituted a peculiar and ambiguous ideological base of the regime. These characteristics were synopsisized in the two famous epitomes 'Country, Religion, Family' and 'Greece of Christian Greeks'. However, the military regime can not be included in the category of the classic regimes with fascistic ideology for two reasons.

First, fascism requires a mass social base, which the colonels did not have, and second, their nationalism was not aggressive, despite the rhetoric about the lost homes. According to Clogg, 'Observers have described the regime's ideology as populist or, more often, as fascist. The populist thesis has greater plausibility than the fascist one although as I have tried to show the regime's populist rhetoric has largely been belied by its practice (Clogg:1972:51). Charalambis says, 'the fascist organization of the community was not the target of the dictatorship, nor were there popular fascist forces that supported it' (Charalambis: 1985:275).

The first resistance organizations started, little by little, to appear, which were organized in small teams with activities mainly abroad. The main anti-dictatorship organizations with many branches in Europe included the Patriotic Antidictatorship Front (PAM) led by members of the UDL. Between them Antonis Brilakis, the well known composer Mikis Theodorakis and two journalists Aristides Manolakos and Giorgos Votsis. Another organisation was the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) led by Andreas Papandreou. A third one was the Democratic Defence led by Professors Vasillis Philiass, Sakis Karagiorgas and Costas Simitis including three journalists Ioannis Starakis, Ioannis Kapsis and Kostas Kaligas. There were also the secret organisations of the Greek Communist Party as well as various small trotskyst and maoist groups.

In January 1968, the USA hurried to acknowledge the regime after a small period of suspension of diplomatic relationships. The suspension, or better, the waiting attitude, had obviously to do with the ascertainment of the intentions of the colonels concerning the geo-strategical interests of the super-power in the area. From now on the USA will support the regime steadily. This acknowledgment of the regime was followed, as it was expected, by Great Britain, two days later, and then by most of the countries of the world. The

acknowledgment of the dictatorship encouraged the regime and created much disappointment for the resistance.

In February 1968, the Communist Party split into two parties. One party was under the leadership of the party members who were in Greece, many of who participated in EDA and the other with the members of the party which were in the countries of Eastern Europe. The first was the named Communist Party of Greece (inland) and was influenced by the so-called Euro-communists of Berlinguer in Italy. The second will continue to carry the name Greek Communist Party (KKE) and it will follow the political line of Moscow. In August 1968 there was an attempt to murder George Papadopoulos by members of the resistance organization called "National Resistance" that was under the leadership of Alekos Panagoulis in Athens, and Eleftherios Verivakis, Ioannis Klozinakis and Lekanidis from Chania in Crete. The attempt failed and the members of the organization were arrested. Alekos Panagoulis was sentenced twice to death, and the others were sentenced to life imprisonment or with other, heavy sentences. Later, the dictatorship changed Alekos Panagoulis's sentence to life imprisonment.

On 29 September 1968, the junta organized a referendum for a new constitution. The military regime claimed that with the new constitution there would be accorded freedoms, including the freedom of press. The referendum gave 99.63% for the new constitution, and this fact alone betrays the extent of the falsification (Vournas:2002:135). In November 1968, George Papandreou died while he was under house arrest. The funeral of the historical leader of the Center Union was converted to a mass rally of 500,000 people against the dictatorship. Actually the funeral of George Papandreou was the first organized mass reaction

of the Greek people. But it couldn't be converted into a mass uprising against dictatorship because of the absence of organized political forces.

It is characteristic that besides the edicts against the operation of political parties, 'one hundred and fifty-eight unions were dissolved by order of the military authorities on 4 May 1967 for alleged violation of their constitution' (Yannopoulos: 1972:113). On July 1969, there was an explosion in the house of Professor Sakis Karagiorgas of Panteion University of Athens. Karagiorgas was constructing a bomb, and because of a mistake it exploded. As Murtugh mentions, the members of the Democratic Defence' believed that a mild campaign with bombs, with targets symbols of the regime not people, would prove that not everybody was determined to live for ever under the dictatorship' (Murtugh: 2005:284). After the police investigations in his house, the whole armory of the Democratic Defense, that was an organization of the resistance, was discovered. The dictatorship arrested 35 members of Democratic Defence, and sent them to a special court-martial. Among them was the French-Greek journalist Ioannis Starakis, who was correspondent of the French media in Greece. Starakis had co-acted with two Greek researchers in the Department of Nuclear Energy of the Imperial College in London for the manufacturing of the bombs.

In 1969 a discussion in Strasbourg started which concerned the possible sepxulsion of the dictatorship from the Council of Europe. In August 1969 the dictatorship submitted to the international organization a time schedule according to which censorship would stop and the constitution of 1968 would be implemented gradually till 1970. But a few days before the final decision of the Council of Europe, the junta decided to withdraw, considering apparently that expulsion was certain. It is characteristic of USA though that the representative of the US State Department testified in favor of the military regime. Even Panagiotis

Kanellopoulos, leader of ERE, when he was informed by the Greek newspapers about the statements of the American representative, did not believe them, and made a public declaration, posing the question 'so is there any alternative of democracy in Greece for the American State Department?' (Alikaniotis:1987:70).

In November of 1971, the vice-president of the USA, Greek-American Spyros Agnew visited Greece officially and was welcomed warmly by the military regime. The presence of the American vice-president was a move of direct support by the USA for the dictatorship, and this fact reinforced the anti-Americanism in the country. Later, in January 1972, the dictatorship announced the agreement for the granting of facilitation for the ships of the 6th American fleet in the ports of Piraeus and Elefsina. In July 1972 the American Foreign Minister, Rogers, visited Greece.

In February 1973 there was an uprising of the students of the Law School of the University of Athens against dictatorship. It was virtually the second mass reaction against the regime. This uprising did not have the expected results. But it was a starting point for a bigger student uprising which took place in November 1973, this time at the Technical University of Athens.

The dictatorship maintained the monarchy as the country's regime till the second attempt at overthrow, which took place in the spring of 1973, this time with the initiative of some officers of the navy. The planning of the overthrow of the junta anticipated the sailing of the Greek fleet from Athens in the morning of the 23 of May, with its destination Crete. From there they would make an official declaration to the Greek people and send an ultimatum towards the government of the colonels calling for a return to legalism. (Vournas: 2002:233).

The plan was discovered and almost all the navy officers were arrested before their embarkation to the ships. Only the destroyer Velos managed to sail

and finally took refuge in Italy, where the crew asked for political sanctuary. As Diamantopoulos mentions, this movement of the navy had the King's support but also the support of the economic interests who were, justifiably, afraid that the unpopularity of junta would also drag down the social status quo' (Diamantopoulos:1997:247).

Because of the movement of the Navy, the junta went ahead and abolished the monarchy, and converted the regime into Presidential Democracy. The military regime could all by itself, arbitrarily, make decisions even for the state's issues, and, above all, to appeal to its own democracy.

In July the regime, in order to accredit this decision, held a referendum. The aim was again to legalize its decision. The referendum once again resulted in favor of the dictatorship, with 78% for the abolition of monarchy. Most observers believe that the will of the people was not expressed with this referendum of the military regime, but later, as we will see in the next chapter. Papadopoulos, who was also acting as a Prime Minister, was self-appointed for a while as President.

In August 1973, the dictatorship abolished military law and granted a general amnesty for all political crimes. In October of the same year, the military regime assigned as Prime Minister an old politician of the center-right and leader of the small Progressives Party, Markezinis, in order to prepare the country for elections. On the 16 of November there was an uprising of the students of the Technical University of Athens. This time the uprising became a generalized conflagration with the participation of the workers. The students had organized committees and they were operating inside the Polytechnic School a radio station through which they called the citizens of Athens to take part in the uprising. The dictatorship reacted and on the 17 of November the army invaded the School with the support of tanks and squashed the uprising.

The events of November created conditions of collapse for the military regime and of internal crisis. On 25 of November 1973, Demetrios Ioannidis, chief of the Secret Army Police, with a group of officers of the junta, overthrew Papadopoulos and replaced him as the head of the military government. The new leadership of the junta followed a right-wing nationalistic policy. It appointed a new government with Prime Minister Andritsopoulos and President of the Republic general Faidonas Gizikis. In this new military government no army officer took part, while Ioannidis himself never made any public appearances. On July 1974, the junta encouraged the outbreak of a military coup in Cyprus, which led to the overthrow of the President of the Republic Archbishop Makarios. Its target was through the establishment of a military nationalistic government in Cyprus to declare the union of the island with Greece. The result was tragic for Cyprus, but for Greece also. In the next few days Turkey invaded with an army and occupied almost half of the island. More than 200,000 Greek-Cypriots fled from the northern part of the island, while hundreds of Greeks were killed in the battles with the Turkish army.

On 23 of July, the junta invited the ex Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, from Paris, and assigned him the task to bring the country to democracy. The junta had tragic results for the Greeks. Almost 87,000 people were arrested for political reasons, from 1967 till 1973, without any warrants. Almost 10,000 people were sent away to special concentration camps, and 2,800 people suffered torture. Ten people were killed and another nine died under unknown circumstances. Finally, almost 30 died during the uprising of the Technical University, most of them were students (Alevizatos: 1995:606). But this period created conditions of intense radicalization and social mobilization. It radically converted the political, cultural and social landscape of the country and it

created conditions of democratic rebirth. The collapse of the junta freed huge powers, which were trapped and manipulated in the post civil- war state.

An especially important role in this social and political radicalization was played by the students' uprising. The uprising changed dramatically the political and the class interrelations, and it marked the end of the period of the clientele and individualistic parties, but mainly, it contributed to the massiveness of the organizations of the working class. If 1944 was the starting point of the political, social and ideological dominance of the minority, 1974 was certainly the starting point for the restoration of the political, social and ideological forces, which constituted the majority of the country.

The Media during the dictatorship

As it was expected, the dictatorship suspended all democratic freedoms and, abolished the freedom of the press with the suspension of the constitution. In particular, with the Royal Decree 280/67 was put into practice the Martial Law of 1912 that applied conditions of 'State of Siege'. According to it, the regime could prohibit the announcement and the publication of information, and it could, as well, confiscate newspapers before or after the publication. All the Athenian left newspapers and all printed material of the left were forbidden. The newspaper of the Communist Party was, anyway, forbidden since the party was illegal. The rest of the daily newspapers of the left, that is *Democratiki Allagi* and *Avgi*, were shut down the same day of the coup. Their assets were confiscated and the offices of the two newspapers were ransacked. Most of the journalists of these two newspapers were arrested and many were rounded up and sent into exile in bleak camps on the islands of Makronisos and Yaros. The dictatorship confiscated even

the funds of the newspaper *Avgi* that were designated for the wages of the workers (Karablias: 1975:35).

At the same time the armed forces seized the National Radio Foundation (EIR) and the Greek Telecommunication Organisation (OTE) buildings and imposed prior censorship on what went out. On the same day of the coup, three more daily newspapers of Athens suspended their circulation of their own accord, in Particular, the newspaper *Eleftheria* of Panos Cokas, which before the dictatorship supported the Center Union, and later had supported the members of the parliament who seceded and participated in the governments that King Constantine appointed. The publisher managed to flee abroad.

Helen Vlachos' conservative newspapers, *Mesimvrini* and *Kathimerini*, also closed down. In the next few days, *Athenaiki* closed as well.

In total, during the first months after the coup, almost 50 journalists were arrested, 15 of which were sent to exile, to Yaros. Christos Lambrakis, the publisher of the newspapers *Ta Nea* and *To Vima*, was sent into exile for six months, despite the fact that his newspapers continued to circulate.

On September 1967 Helen Vlachos was arrested and questioned for four hours about an interview published in the daily italian *La Stampa* in which she called the dictators 'mediocrities' and in October she was placed under house arrest. In October, Helen Vlachos gave a secret letter-appeal to the correspondent of BBC in Greece, titled 'Don't stop harassing the colonels'. This article was sent through the International Press Institute to all the newspapers of the world, and became the main article in the first page of tens of newspapers. Among them was the British paper, *The Observer*, on the 8 of October 1967. The global campaign against the dictatorship was started by the publisher Helen Vlachos. Later Vlachos escaped from her house and found refuge in London, from where she continued

the fight against the dictatorship giving interviews, lectures in universities and writing in the magazine *Spectator*. Today, Helen Vlachos is among the 50 press heroes listed in the World Newspapers Association

The military regime continued to imprison and to pursue journalists. Another action of the colonels was to demand from the Journalists Union the expulsion 140 of its members because their views were leftish or even democratic. Unfortunately, 'the Journalists' Union of Athens obeyed the orders of the regime, expelling, eventually, 30 journalists' (Zigdes: 1977:358). The dictatorship turned against the correspondents of the foreign press. It expelled seven foreign correspondents, among them Leslie Finer of the BBC and of the *Guardian*. Another case was the Italian journalist Franco de Cleva of RAI, whose return to Greece was forbidden. In the provinces a number of newspapers closed too, either voluntarily or by force. For example, in Crete alone, there were closures of the newspapers *Paratiritis*, *Kirix*, and *Alethia* in Chania, the newspaper *Rethymniotika Nea* in Rethymno, and *Allagi* in Heraklio (Papiomitioglou:2005:336). In 1973, the dictatorship closed also the newspaper *Ipirotikos Agon* in Ioannina, Ipirus. But most of the newspapers accepted the coup and continued to circulate despite the strict censorship.

As Stratos mentions, 'evaluating the attitude of the newspapers during the coup, there is a number of arguments that one can hold. 'One of them and perhaps the most important, is that since the newspapers continued to circulate, they had accepted the situation' (Stratos: 1995:34). But the question why a number of newspapers continued to circulate adopting a passive attitude and rarely expressing some diversification, at least for the first few years, is very important. Except for the two newspapers that openly supported the regime, that is *Estia* and *Eleftheros Kosmos*, the newspapers *Acropolis*, *Apogevmatini*, *To Vima*, *Ta Nea*,

and also *Ethnos* and *Vradini*, continued to circulate. The answer to this question has many different aspects.

Firstly, the bourgeoisie newspapers were used to functioning in a general frame of political instability, military intervention and coups, inside which they tried to shape politics. Secondly, the newspapers in Greece had always enjoyed special economic benefits that, as we described before, were further reinforced through a number of governmental subsidies.

During the dictatorship, according to data that were published in the Year Book of the Greek Ministry of the Press, the total sum that was granted yearly for the newsprint was 750,000 Euros (Year Book of Greek Press: 1968:19).

Thirdly, the relative rise of the working class and of the popular movement in Greece during the '60s combined with the Cold War, caused fears among the most conservative publishers about a possible dominance of the left. It was probably this fact that created a relative tolerance and a passive confrontation of the political problem.

Finally, the dictatorship managed to impose itself and to overpower every reaction, even temporarily. Even the syndicates and the political organizations had no reaction whatsoever during the coup, as we have already mention.

The move of the military was excellently prepared and planned in such a degree that it took many of the publishers by surprise. It was not by chance that there gradually started to emerge a group of newspapers with the characteristics of opposition, which was reinforced with the so called measures of liberation that we will mention later.

As Peponis mentions, for example, 'the attitude of an opposition from the Lambrakis group at first moved carefully, I would say scouting, but as time went by their oppositional attitude became more obvious' (Peponis:2002:247). Of

course this block of oppositional newspapers included more newspapers. According to Komninou, in this category belonged the newspapers *To Vima*, *Ta Nea*, *Ethnos* and *Vradini* (Komninou: 2002:127). As Kominis notes, 'even if all of the publishers had decided to close their newspapers, the military regime would, probably, have found a way to impose their publishing' (Kominis: 1985:184). It is indicative that the newspaper *Ethnos* had asked to be put into liquidation right after the coup, but the dictatorship refused, giving an obligatory loan to its publishers.

Still, the fact that five newspapers of national circulation closed as a result of their opposition to the dictatorship, as well as a few others in the regions, is indicative of a certain change which can be compared to the past. For example, during the Metaxas dictatorship in 1936, almost all of the newspapers continued their publication without changes. This time the total separation of the army from the parties of the bourgeoisie and from the monarchy created a severance between the army itself and the parties of the bourgeoisie, but also between the army and the bourgeoisie press. This severance took the shape of either a passive attitude with gradual formation of oppositional characteristics or of protestation.

The dictatorship took another initiative in order to gain the absolute control of the information flow. It created a special office of censorship called 'Press Service' in the Ministry of the President, whose responsibility concerned with all matters pertaining to publications. This service not only forbade the publication in the Greek newspapers and the broadcasting of certain issues on Greek radio, but it also forbade the republication of articles from the foreign press, if, of course, the junta did not approve of them. On the other hand, the foreign press was circulating freely in Greece, and in most circumstances the articles concerning the situation in the country were criticizing the junta, and this

fact annoyed the dictators. For this reason, the dictatorship decided to reinforce the mechanism of public relations of the Greek embassies abroad, in order to publish paid articles by well known foreign reporters. Of course, these articles were positive for the regime and they were republished in the Greek newspapers after orders from the Press Service. The German magazine *Der Spingel* issued in the 1 of November of 1976 an extended article with the full list of the German journalists who were being paid by the dictatorship (Ios, 1/6/1997).

At the same time, the dictatorship imposed on the Greek newspapers a status of obligatory “Commentaries” and “News” that were daily sent to the newspapers by the General Secretary of Press and Information. For example, the coverage of the royal countercoup of December 1967 was almost identical in all the daily newspapers of Athens. As Stratos mentions, ‘the news coverage and the commentaries in the newspapers during the days of the countercoup are characterized by a similarity in all the newspapers. This similarity implies something more organized and orderly, like the blunt intervention of the regime in the function of the press and the dictation, in some way, of a certain line’ (Stratos: 1995:39).

At the same time, the news from abroad that was sent to the newspapers through the Athens News Agency was either false or represented a shameless distortion of the real facts. These releases praised the regime and its politics. In a few words, the dictatorship imposed a system of total censorship and created a mechanism in order to propagate its politics in Greece and abroad. The readers during the first years of the dictatorship bought the daily newspapers mostly for the sport news, and not for the political events. It was the period when the Athenian went to the kiosk and asked ‘Give me a newspaper, I do not care which one’ (Vlachos, 1972: 63). Actually, the Greeks could get informed by the three

Greek programmes of the BBC, Radio Paris and Deutsche Welle, and by the radio station of the Greek Communist Party 'The Voice of Truth' that was illegal, as well as from the foreign press that circulated in Greece. In September 1968, pro-junta daily newspaper *Nea Politeia* was published, that was directly connected with George Papadopoulos.

The military regime intended to enforce its propaganda mechanism because of the referendum for the constitution that took place in September of 1968, as we have already mentioned. For this reason, it reinforced the publication of another friendly daily newspaper. The constitution of 1968 that was put into practice by the dictatorship after the supposed referendum, called for the abolishment of any preventive censorship, while with a ministerial decree in January 1969, not only the republication of articles from the foreign press were allowed to the newspapers, but, also, the publication of articles besides the ones that the committee of censorship imposed. But in reality the abolition of censorship and the freedom of the press were never put into practice, since most of the provisions were never implemented. In other words, the dictatorship broke even the constitution that it had created and which it had tried to impose with a supposititious referendum. As Zigdes mentioned, 'despite the supposed abolishment of censorship, the commissioner of the court martial ordered the arrest of the two publishers and of the editor of the newspaper *Apogevmatini*, when it published a few photos about the crimes of the Americans in Vietnam. Eventually, after an interrogation, they were freed' (Zigdes: 1977:362).

In November 1969, the dictatorship passed a new Decree for the press, the 346/69, which was put into practice at the beginning of 1970. According to this law, the matters concerning the press no longer belonged to the jurisdiction of the court martial, but of the regular court. Apparently, the dictatorship tried, in the

context of the discussion in the Council of Europe, to change the negative climate with the implementation of a new, less strict law. But in reality this new law continued to punish a series of publications and it forbade the involvement of a jury during the hearing of a case.

Among others, it forbade a) every publication about the armed forces that could shake the trust of the public, b) the publication of names of people that were involved in secret organizations and in Greek or foreign secret services, c) the publication of pictures and images that could revive political antipathy. All the above are characteristic of an exceptionally protective policy, which the junta pursued for itself and for its supporters. The army and usually the ones that supported the regime were above criticism (Zigdes: 1997). But the new law imposed also a new import duty system for the newsprint that promoted indirect censorship. According to Vlachos 'the new law had as an extra a unique article designed to punish a newspaper for the simple crime of being read. This came out in the form of a new and very heavy import duty on newsprint (Vlachos:1972:69). According to this law the newspapers that had an average daily circulation up to 25,000 copies did not pay any import duty on newsprint. The newspapers with this circulation were usually the ones that supported the regime. On the contrary, the newspapers that did not belong to the friendly environment of junta had to pay from 50 to 95% of the import duty on newsprint. In particular, the newspapers with a circulation 25,000- 50,000 paid 50%, while the ones with circulation 50,000- 75,000 paid 75% of the import duty, and the ones with circulation more than 100,000 paid 95% of the import duty on newsprint. In effect, all the newspapers that were not pro-junta had to pay high import duty on newsprint.

Once again the press subsidy was used as an instrument for censorship, since the non-commercial character of the Greek press did not allow it to import

newsprint without government support. Only in 1973 did the dictatorship bring back the system of total remission from the import duty on newsprint for all newspapers, regardless of their circulation. In December of 1969, the dictatorship issued a complementary decree 372/69, which dealt with the propagation of fictitious news. This law punished journalists with one to two years imprisonment for reporting news that the regime did not favour; issues concerning the army, the government, economic policy and international relationships. The dictatorship had of course its own criteria for what was real and what was false or fictitious. The vagueness of that particular law was such that anything could be characterized as false. Exactly this was the case with the newspaper *Ethnos*.

In May 1970 the dictatorship arrested the publishers and the reporters of the newspaper with the pretense of an interview with the ex-Minister of Industry of the pre-dictatorship government of the Center Union, Ioannis Zigdes. The publishing of this interview was characterized as 'propagation of false news' by the colonels. Ioannis Zigdes was arrested and imprisoned. The same happened to the publishers and to the editor in chief of the newspaper. The newspaper was also excluded from the exemption of paying import duty on newsprint for five months. On the 4 of April *Ethnos* stopped its circulation. The conviction of the publishers and the reporters of *Ethnos* gave rise to a storm of protests abroad. The International Press Institute, the International Federation of Journalists and the World Newspapers Association condemned it.

During the same period, and specifically on the 27 of March 1970, began the trial of the 35 members of the Democratic Defense, who had been arrested. Not only did that event draw the attention of the international media but also of the humanitarian organizations. As a result of the international hue and cry over the imprisonment of the publishers, the reporters and of the ex-minister, but, also,

for overtrial of the members of Democratic Defence, George Papadopoulos organized on the 10 of April 1970 a press conference, where he announced new measures for the liberalization of the regime (Zigdes:1977:205).

These announcements were of course made with the intention of appeasing public opinion abroad, and did not intend to foster any real change in the politics of the junta concerning the matters of the freedom of the press. As Alevizatos mentions, 'after the withdrawal of censorship, the newspapers dedicated entire pages to the proceedings of the trials, proceedings which were actually accusations against the arbitrary methods of the regime' (Alevizatos: 1995:637).

It is obvious that a number of newspapers chose the indirect criticism against the junta of the colonels, with the straightforward report of the trials, without any comments. In this way the view that gradually begun to take shape a group of oppositional to the regime newspapers is reinforced. At the same time, a relative slackening drove to an increase of their circulation. As Vlachos mentions, 'Once again the newspapers that published the proceedings, without any comment, saw their circulation rise to new heights while all four of the pro-junta newspapers remained mostly unsold, hanging forlornly outside the kiosks' (Vlachos:1972:71).

In the summer of 1971 another pro-junta newspaper was published, the newspaper *Simerina* which was the afternoon edition of *Eleftheros Kosmos* raising the number of the pro-junta newspaper to four. As Papadimitriou mentions ' those newspapers were intended to propagandize the modernist and above-parties character of the regime, uttering an ideological speech that emphasized the corruption of the politicians even of the right, as the reason for the undertaking of the country's governing by the army' (Papadimitriou:2005:80). On December 1973, Ioannidis shut down the newspaper *Vradini*. The reason was an article by

the exiled ex-Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, in which he attacked the military regime. In all the above we must add the closure of the newspaper *Christianiki*, and the fact that its publisher, Nikos Psaroudakis, was sent to exile to Yaros, as well as the exile of Dimitris Chorn, publisher of the weekly English-speaking newspaper *Athens News*.

The period of the dictatorship certainly created conditions of a crisis in the press, and it shook the trust of the public, at least towards the newspapers that openly supported the junta. Those newspapers, after the restoration of democracy, were limited to extremely low levels of circulation.

The newspapers

Naturally the enforcement of the dictatorship had a negative impact on the circulation of newspapers, as well. There are three reasons for the fall of the sales of the Athenian newspapers: a) The very strict censorship, b) the fact that a number of newspapers were shut down. The five newspapers which, as we have seen, closed down as soon as the coup took place had, all together, almost 200,000 copies average daily circulation and c) the hindrance of the circulation of some newspapers.

The reason for the fall of the daily newspapers was not, of course, because of the appearance of television but, mainly for the above mentioned reasons. For example, the newspapers' circulation started to rise significantly after the fall of dictatorship, as we shall see further down. As Stratos mentions 'the regime of the colonels made interventions in the circulation of the newspapers, implementing the direct hindrance of the distribution. Many local distribution agencies, most of them in the periphery, often took orders not to distribute "opposed" newspapers

or even to withdraw them from circulation, returning them to Athens' (Stratos: 1995:26).

In 1966, the average daily circulation of the Athenian evening and morning newspapers was 740,537. In 1968 it fell to 625,088 copies and in 1971 to 567,938. In 1972 the average daily circulation rose again to 634,844 copies, and in 1973 to 714,939 copies. The rise after 1971 is connected with the measures of the slackening of censorship, which we mentioned above.

The first semester of 1974, the average daily circulation fell again to 668,000 copies. From July of 1974, when democracy was restored, the rise will be impressive. The second semester of 1974, since all of the newspapers were republished and circulate freely, the average daily circulation rises and approaches 1,000,000 copies (appendix 1).

During the dictatorship, the pro-junta newspapers had known a rise in their sales. For example, the newspaper *Estia*, which as we have already said supported openly the dictatorship, more than doubled its circulation. Specifically, from 5,963 copies in 1966 it sold 13,629 in 1969, while *Eleftheros Kosmos* from 22,000 copies sold 59,270 copies in 1969. The pro-right newspapers also had a rise. Specifically, the newspaper *Apogevmatini* rose from 43,773 copies in 1966 to 145,348 in 1969. The same happened with the pro-right newspaper *Vradini*, which from 42,695 copies sold 101,217 during the same period.

On the contrary, the newspapers that supported the Center Union before the dictatorship had a fall in their circulation. For example the newspaper *Ta Nea*, from 195,278 copies in 1966 fell to 133,151 copies in 1969, whereas *To Vima* from 91,213 to 44,187.

Ethnos experienced a fall as well, and from 28,236 fell to 26,031 copies during the same period. The rise of its circulation in 1970 to 44,361 copies is

mainly connected with the trials against it, and the campaign of support that some organizations of the resistance started. As Peponis outlined, 'The publisher of *Ethnos* Kostas Kiriazis and his wife Artemis asked for our support. We started a campaign of collecting subscriptions. Women, men, youngsters mobilized, and the newspaper managed to survive the pressure and it increased its circulation' (Peponis: 2002:248).

But given the identical contents, the readers did not have much of a choice. Fear drove many of them not to buy pro-center newspapers, but to prefer the most conservative and pro-right ones. Even the reading of the pro-center newspapers could be characterized as an indication of left-wing views. In the area of the regional newspapers, besides the obligatory or voluntary closure of a number of newspapers, there were no new initiatives that could change the already shaped landscape. Most of the newspapers continued their circulation under the same conditions of censorship as the newspapers of Athens.

It is especially noteworthy that during the period of the seven years the sales of the morning daily newspapers were significantly reduced compared with the sales of the evening daily newspapers. In 1966 the difference in the average daily circulation between the morning and the evening newspapers was almost 130,000 copies. In 1971 the difference exceeded 220,000 copies and in 1973 it was almost 275,000 copies.

In 1974 the difference rose to 390,000 copies. The evening newspapers had over-doubled the difference in the sales compared to the morning newspapers. This progressive change of the readers and their turn towards the evening newspapers is connected with a number of factors.

First, the dictatorship imposed the closure of the contents of the morning newspapers at midnight, since it forbade the reporters and the technicians to work

between 12-4 am. It was a move of good will to the media people and especially to journalists taken by the Colonels. The Colonels did not want an opposition or criticism especially by the press people. For this reason the junta took this measure in order to satisfy the journalist professional demands. At the same time, the evening newspapers were able to close their contents from 4 till 6 or 7 am, since they circulated later. Thus, the evening newspapers could offer their readers more up-to-date news, since they were able to record events which took place between 12-6 am.

Secondly, the evening newspapers started, gradually, to circulate before noon, breaking the law, which defined that their circulation would start after 12 o'clock. This fact became the rule, especially in the provinces. The morning and the evening newspapers of Athens were circulating almost simultaneously. The difference was that the evening ones had more up-to-date news. So the reader could choose and, naturally, he chose what was timelier. As Kominis mentions, 'in most of the provinces the morning newspapers arrived at the same time with the evening ones, and, as far as their circulation was concerned, the second prevailed. No one controlled this impunity, and, as a result, the morning press languished. (Kominis: 1985:196). Of course this was one side. The other was connected with the negative impact it had in the circulation of the daily press in the provinces, which was morning, too. So the earlier circulation of the evening newspapers had a decisive effect in the shriveling of the morning Athenian and of the morning provincial press. At the same time, the evening newspapers of Athens enriched their contents and increased the number of their pages. In this way they became more competitive against the morning ones.

In the gradual prevalence of the evening newspapers contributed also to the working hours of Greece that were adjusted to the Mediterranean

environment, but also to the character of the Greek economy. The working hours were usually between 7 a.m. and 2.30 p.m. the reader preferred to buy a newspaper on his return home and to read it before his siesta and not early in the morning.

Press subsidies

The dictatorship maintained a large part of the state subsidies to the press, as the various governments set them after the Second World War. But it tried to place them inside an antidemocratic and despotic framework. In many occasions it abolished or limited some of the subsidies.

In July 1967, with the Decree 143/67 the Journalist's Lottery was abolished, and this fact made the journalist associations release a statement of protest. But in December 1967, the dictatorship passed the Decree 248/1967, for the establishment of EDOEAP as a supplementary organization of medical and pharmaceutical care of the journalists and those who worked in the daily newspapers on Athens and Salonica.

The income of the organization came mainly from a part of the Advertising Stamp which it extended also to the advertisements that were placed in the non-daily newspapers and in the magazines that circulated in Athens and in Salonica.

In the area of the subsidizing of the newsprint it created the scale of subsidizing, which we mentioned above. According to the same law, in case of a conviction against a newspaper, the regime could abolish the exemption for up to one year. Also, conviction ended the special tax status for the newspapers' profits. In the area of the newspapers of the provinces, with the Decree 1263/1970 it

reframed extensively the status of the obligatory publications of the various public organizations but, also, of the governmental organizations.

But it introduced important criteria of assignment, which could be used against the newspapers that were not friendly towards the dictatorship. Specifically, with the article 3, paragraph 1a, 'the various announcements of the Prefectures were given for publication according to the judgement of the Prefect and not on the basis of certain objective factors, as, for example, possibly circulation.

Greek television and radio

Television was essentially born during the dictatorship. Of course, there had been some experimental broadcasts by private citizens during the international exhibition of Salonica, in 1960. Those broadcasts continued infrequently. In 1965 television shows and the radio network were initially tested, which belonged to the army and the state radio that is EIR, as already mentioned. In February 1966 almost simultaneously started an experimental channel and the two radio and television networks, almost started simultaneously.

The military television channel was named *Tileorasi Enoplou Dinameon* (Television of the Armed Forces- TAF), while the channel of the state radio was called *EIR-Television*.

It is noteworthy of course that the owners of television sets during this period did not exceed 2,000 in all of Greece. However TV became very fast a family medium. On the morning of the 21 of April the dictatorship invaded the studios of EIR-Television which was located at the 3rd September Street, and posted military management.

As Dambasis mentions 'the army was placed in the entrance of the building and a censor outside the room of the television shows, beside the technicians. He was authorized to cut any programme, whenever he suspected that something was wrong, and to show the sign 'BREAK' (Dabasis: 2002:68). Censorship on the radio and on television did not there. The military went on and destroyed material that had any connection with the left. It is characteristic that all the music recordings of the great Greek composer Mikis Theodorakis were collected and destroyed with a hammer, while some television documentaries were cut down irrevocably.

On 27 of September 1967, TAF showed the first advertisements. In 1968, TAF started a regular program and a bit later EIR- Television started a regular program as well. In 1970 with the Decree 722, TAF changed its name to YENED and in the same year with the decree 745, EIR changed its name to EIRT. By the end of 1969, the television sets were, in total, about 100,000 in Greece, and the demand in the market for new sets was enormous.

Under the dictatorship, the two radio-television networks were transformed to mechanisms of propaganda. It was natural that television, as a new media, attracted the interest of the citizens. The dictatorship took care to invest in TV. The News was what the regime specified and the few Greek productions were under the direct control of the junta. The members of the junta were present almost everyday on the two television channels. This fact did not contribute to the creation of a better image for the dictatorship. On the contrary, as Komninou mentions 'maybe the constant presence of the leaders and their propagandists reinforced the power system, but the everyday exposure of the leaders of the dictatorship weakened the image of strength that they were trying to send to the public' (Komninou: 2002:138).

Professional organizations

During the period of the dictatorship the basic structure of the associations of the journalists and of the publishers remained the same and was analyzed in our last chapter. The only exception was the dissolution of the Journalists' Union of Athens Press (ESAT). This association that functioned parallel to the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers (Enosis Syntakton) was more open to the registration of new members and it had almost the same number of members as the latter. As Leandros mentions 'ESAT had center-left orientation, while, on the contrary, Enosis Syntakton had always maintained a conservative direction.

Finally, the junta decided to dissolve ESAT, when it refused to expel its members who were political opponents of the regime and to send a congratulatory telegram to the dictator George Papadopoulos on the occasion of the failed attempt against his life in August 1968' (Leandros: 1992: 270).

In the interior of the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspaper there was some opposition, as for example the refusal of three of the members of its board to co-sign the expulsion of 30 left journalists. But, in general terms, this historical organization of the journalists accepted passively the regime, while in 1969 the general convention elected as president, Troumbounis, who was an ardent supporter of the dictatorship.

The most possible explanation for this election is that the members of the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers were probably afraid that the dictatorship would dissolve their association, as it had done with ESAT. And that is why they elected a president who had very friendly relationships with the regime.

The contribution of many journalists to the anti-dictatorship struggle was important, and some played a leading role. Beside the ones who participated in organizations of the Resistance and of whom we have already talked, tens of journalists, privately, opposed the dictatorship. We must mention Nikos Kiaos and Aristidis Manolakos, who later will become presidents of the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers. Both of them were imprisoned and tortured by the military regime. The dictatorship, with the Decree 1004/1971 for the journalism profession, tried to enforce control over who could practice this profession and who had the right to be called a journalist. This issue was directly associated with the establishment of a journalism school as we will discuss later, and with the issue of obtaining a journalist's license.

According to the same law, if someone was expelled from the journalists' union or was convicted for a number of offenses, including political ones, he could not practise the profession. The law defined that if a newspaper failed to obey the above mentioned, it would be punished with abolition of the duty free newsprint for up to four months. The most important factor was, though, that the new decree 1004/ 1971 adopted the Decree 1093/1938 for the parallel work of the journalists in the public sector. The only difference was that according to the new law, the parallel work in the public sector was on a part-time basis. In a few words, journalists were allowed to work parallel to the press offices of the public organizations and business but without having a permanent position. Many journalists work in the public sector because of the low salaries in Greece. On the other side governments wanted to control the profession by offering this kind of additional job. In this way there a special relationship was created between the journalists and the state. For example, an economic reporter of a newspaper could also be in charge of the press office or to be an advisor in the Ministry of Finance,

or a reporter who covered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could also work in the press office of the same Ministry.

The two decrees that the dictatorships of 1936 and 1967 passed for the parallel occupation of the journalists in the press and in the public sector, created conditions of interdependence and limitations on the autonomy of the profession. They also reinforced the ‘‘Subjective Objectivity’’ (Donsbach and Klett:1993:53-58) of Greek journalism and the clientelist relationships of the journalistic profession with the political powers.

This situation continued to exist even after the fall of the dictatorship, and it created a number of problems in the function of the profession, as we will see further on.

Journalism education

At the end of 1967, the junta passed the Decree 248/67 *‘for the establishment of the Health Section- Journalists Organisation of Insurance and Pension’*. According to the Article 16, paragraph 3, the capital from the Journalists Social Security Fund (*Angeliosimo*) that belongs to the Daily Athens Publishers’ Association as well as that belonging to the Employment Organisation of Athens Daily Newspapers, till the time of the publication of the Decree were disposed for the following purposes:

a) The sum of money belonging to the Daily Athens Publishers’ Association was transferred for the establishment of a Journalism School, which was going to run under the control of the State, according to what has been officially defined by the Ministry of State. Specifically, the Act defined that within six months following the date of publication of the mentioned Law, the Daily Athens Publishers’ Association was obliged to take the necessary measures

for the establishment of the School, which had to be completed within three years. If the Association did not complete the task within that period, an extension of six more months could be given. If the Daily Athens Publishers' Association could not manage to complete this task, the Ministries of Education & Religion and Affairs, had the right to take decisions to dispose the tied capitals to the *Health Section- Journalists' Organization of Insurance and Pension*, for the realization of the same purpose.

b) The sum of money belonging to the *Employment Organization of Athens Daily Newspapers* was also directed toward the establishment of a Department, within the Journalism School specialized in the training of the personnel of daily newspapers for the positions of management, advertising, distribution and accountancy.

In 1970, three years after the publication of Decree 248/1967, the Athens Daily Publishers' Association had done nothing about the establishment of the school of journalism. The reasons for the publishers' refusal were connected with the antidemocratic regime and the formed political situation overall that apparently did not allow the undertaking of such initiatives (Skamnakis:2000). They feared also escalating salaries for trained journalists as we will see below.

By the end of 1970 a new Decree 752/70 was passed concerning the 'School of Journalism and Public Relations'. It was decided and ordered, according to the terminology used by the military regime, that 'the paragraph 3, article 16, Act 248/67, was replaced as following: a) The capitals from the *Journalists' Social Security Found* belonging to Daily Athens Publishers' Association were disposed for: a) the establishment of a Higher School of Journalism and Public Relations, which was going to run as a Legal Entity, under the authority of the Ministry of Education & Religion. The Daily Athens

Publishers' Association was definitely obliged to complete the establishment of the School within five years. If, it did not complete this task within that period, Daily Athens Publishers' Association might take an extension of a year's time. In case the Publishers' Association was unable to complete this task, the tied capital would be given to *Health Section-Journalists' Organization of Insurance and Pension* for the realization of the same purpose. b) The capital belonging to the *Employment Union of Daily Athens Newspapers* were disposed either for 'the establishment of a Department, within the Journalism School, specialized in the training of the personnel of daily newspapers for positions related to management, advertising, distribution and accountancy. The aim of the Department would be the development of the personnel according to the standards of most developed countries or the financial support of *Health Section-Journalists' Organization of Insurance and Pension*' According to the Law, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education & Religion were to decide about the following issues: a) The organisation and the function of the school. b) instructors' qualifications, specific number of the teaching posts, the hiring process for both instructors and employees, employment of university professors and other scientists c) program of studies, the entrance, mid-term and final exams d) years of attendance, students' graduation, diploma offered by the school. Other issues like student rights and obligations, management and financial resources of the school were also to be defined by the same decision.

In 1971 the Presidential Decree, number 1004, about the 'Journalistic profession' passed. Chapter B, Article 3 defined the necessary qualifications for obtaining a journalist's license. According to the mentioned Decree, journalists should graduate from the School of Journalism and Public Relations or any other recognized school of journalism from abroad. For the first five years of the

operation of the school a high school certificate (*Apolitirion*) could be also accepted. In reality, the dictatorship tried, with the Presidential Decree 1004/71, to regulate and licence entry into the profession through using the establishment of the school of journalism. In the authoritarian system professional training and access to the profession are strictly regulated. The school of journalism in question never operated. Zacharopoulos argues that, 'For decades there had been talk of opening mass media or journalism schools in Greece, but financial difficulties and objections did not allow such plans to materialize' (Zacharopoulos:1996:53). As it was outlined above, the Decree of 1967 had secured the financial sources for the establishment of such a school. It is true, however, as Zacharopoulos correctly pointed out that 'other press groups, such as newspapers owners feared escalating salaries of trained journalists' (Zacharopoulos:1996:53). The last was the most important reason for the non-creation of the journalism school, and not so much the overall political situation.

Probably, the political situation and the realization that the dictatorship intended to gain total control over the journalistic profession were good arguments for the refusal of the publishers. But, as we will explain further down, the developments contradict this assumption.

Summary

The establishment of dictatorship, as a result of the reinforcement of the army's role during and after the civil war, led to the abolishment of the freedom of the press. A number of newspapers in Athens and the provinces closed down in protest, while others were closed down on the regime's orders. Those that continued to circulate either supported the military regime or adopted a passive,

waiting attitude. In the same time journalists were being arrested and imprisoned, while some were sent to exile.

Television, which had already made its appearance, was under the strict control of dictatorship, which reinforced especially the military radio-television network. In the same time the junta reinforced press subsidies in an effort to gain the publishers' and the editors' favor. The establishment of dictatorship had as a result the liberalization of part of conservative press, the publishers and editors of which assumed an active role for the restoration of democracy. Anyway, during the military regime, press played an important political role either as opposition against junta or by supporting it.

CHAPTER 4: POLITICS AND MEDIA (1974-1990)

After the fall of the junta, censorship ceased to exist. Newspapers began to circulate normally, without any serious limitations. For the first time, since the civil-war, the circulation of the newspaper of the communist party *Rizospastis* was permitted. Still there were some problems in relation to the newspapers of the left. But generally, during the first few years, democracy functioned in a better way than any time in the past (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos:2003).

The increase in the circulation of the Athenian newspapers was impressive. However, there was a serious fall in the circulation of the morning newspapers. The interference of the publishers in politics continued for the first years, while political power continued to provide the press with subsidies. Businesspeople gradually began to enter the field of the press from other economic sectors and the traditional publishers were displaced. Towards the end of the same decade the de-regulation of the broadcasting field began. The beginning was made with radio, and television followed.

This fact created new conditions in the field of the media, which were mainly related to commercialization and concentration. At the same time new conditions of interdependence were created between the political powers and the Media.

Political Context

The period after the collapse of the junta until 1989 is very important for Greek politics and for Greek society, because democracy attained stability then. The main developments on a political level are defined firstly by the creation of

massive parties with extended social participation, secondly by the definitive abolition of monarchy in 1975, thirdly by the country's entrance in the European Economic Community in 1979, and, finally by the rise to power, for the first time, of a socialist party in 1981. Of course there were also other, equally important factors that contributed to democratic stability, as for example the enactment of a new constitution in 1975, the democratization of the trade union movement and the resolution of the linguistic problem with the introduction of the demotic language. All these factors contributed to the expansion of the political rights of the people. Indeed, according to Mouzelis & Pagoulatos 'the political rights were reinforced after the abolishment of kingship, the annulment of the army's capability to get involve in parliamentary politics, the unobstructed function of GCP, the termination of the falsification practices of the elections' results and the cessation of the methods of political oppression in the provinces. All these developments characterize the Third Hellenic Republic as the most democratic period in modern Greek history' (Mouzelis & Pagoulatos: 2003:17).

At the same time, these developments led, in the long term, to the reduction of the political divisions, which, nevertheless were not eliminated during the period that we are discussing. The main political schism acquired the shape right- left, since the political centre gradually shrank and got incorporated either in the right or, mostly, in the socialist left, as we shall see later. In the last chapter we explained that before the dictatorship the political cleavage were juxtaposed between two main poles, the right and the anti-right. In the anti-right, as a wider pole of political and social forces, the left, were included through the United Democratic Left (EDA) but also the liberal democratic centre through, basically, the bourgeois party of the Center Union (CU). In this sense the formation of an extensive block of the liberal democratic forces with the decisive

participation of the left attained the characteristics more of an anti-right than of a clearly left political pole. As Moschonas mentions, 'the political cleavage between right- anti-right does not respond to the classic social-economical content of the classic political cleavage between left-right of the industrial societies' (Moschonas: 2000:169).

Nevertheless, after the dictatorship political division right- left was not shaped only on the basis of shrinkage and the disappearance of the bourgeois centre-wing party, but also of the appearance of the socialist left. It relates to a number of political, social and economic factors that were formed after the fall of the dictatorship, factors that of course differ from those of the pro-dictatorship period. For example, the democratization, the appearance of massive parties and of a left radical movement, that we discussed earlier. But the new political division will be extremely short-lived, and it will tend to become once again incorporated in the political cleavage right- anti-right because of history and national peculiarity. The restitution of democracy was accompanied by the return from Paris of Konstantinos Karamanlis, ex leader of the right party ERE. Karamanlis became Prime Minister on the 24th of July 1974, after a joint agreement between the military and the politicians. For this reason the government was formed by the entire political spectrum. Karamanlis immediately had to face the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, an immense anti-American movement in the interior of the country, and generally the elementary democratization of the political system, including the solution to the problem of the monarchy. Of course the handing over of power from the military to the politicians had not definitely solved the problem of democratic stability, and for this reason Karamanlis undertook a series of important initiatives.

The first action he took was to withdraw Greece from the military part of NATO and to start a discussion about the closure of the military bases of NATO and USA in the country. This did not, however, take place. Greeks held the USA and NATO responsible for both the dictatorship and for the invasion of Cyprus by a country member of NATO, Turkey. With this decision Karamanlis tried to express public feeling and, also, to gather wider groups of citizens around him.

Secondly, at the level of the democratization of the political system, he legalized the Greek Communist Party (KKE) after 27 years, but also the Greek Communist Party-Interior. This fact was especially important for one more reason. The powerful organizations of KKE, which were outside the law, became with their legalization important guardians for the strengthening and the defense of democracy. In reality, Karamanlis with the legalization of KKE did not pursue only the democratization of the political system. Above all he legalized a political party that could mobilize tens of thousands of his followers in case of a new military coup, since the organizations of KKE, after their legalization, were the best organized at a political level. Of course the fact that KKE did not demand the immediate abolishment of capitalism, but, on the contrary, the democratization of the political system had an important contribution to Karamanlis's decision.

Furthermore, the legalization of KKE played an important role in the prime ministers' will to accelerate the process of the entrance of the country into the European Economic Community, 'which meant that he was obliged to build a democracy according to the standards of western Europe' (Voulgaris:2002:38). Briefly, Karamanlis had to legalize all the political parties and to allow their function on the base of the principles of Europe.

Finally, the Greek Prime Minister began talks with Turkey in order to avoid a war between the two countries because of the invasion by Turkey of

Cyprus but also because of the disagreements in the matter of the definition of the borders in the Aegean Sea. At the same time he proclaimed elections in November 1974 and he founded a new right-wing party, New Democracy, as a successor to the old ERE.

In the last chapter it was noted that the Greek parties had always been parties of patrons without an extended social participation. An exemption was KKE mainly during the period of the German occupation. But KKE could not be extended and expressed, because of the civil war on the one hand and, because of the fact that the party was proclaimed illegal for the period 1947- 1974 on the other.

The conditions that appeared in Greek society after the collapse of the dictatorship created the ground for the emergence of a dynamic and powerful radical movement that had a catalytic impact on the party system of the country. The old pro-dictatorship parties ceased to exist or were renamed, while new parties were created. The common denominator of almost all the parties, right and left, was the massive participation of the citizens in them. The massiveness of the parties began mainly from the left wing parties and it expanded towards New Democracy. The only exemption was the centre party formation, which started to shrink and eventually disappeared from the political scene by the end of the '70s. This new element, that is the appearance of massive parties, was probably the most important development in the Greek political and party system since the birth of the modern Greek State. It signals the end of the prolonged period of political instability, of the military coups and of the extreme anti-democratic behavior of the political authorities. At the same time it represents the starting point for the active participation of the citizens in the shaping of politics and in the democratization of the political system.

New Democracy, as the new party agent of the right, acquired new structure in the context of the broader changes that its founder and leader Konstantinos Karamanlis pursued. Actually this right wing party absorbed the whole the old right and also a few groups of the centre. Many pro-monarchy supporters enrolled in the new right-wing party, since the right had traditionally been almost identified with the monarchy before and after the Second World War.

The Greek Communist Party, after its legalization, saw a significant increase in the number of its members and, mainly, in its impact, especially inside the students' movement and in the syndicates. Its split in 1968 had, as it was expected, a negative impact since KKE-Interior managed to incorporate a part of the communists, but not the larger one.

The most important development concerning the massiveness of a party had to do with the establishment and the emergence of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). PASOK was founded after the initiative of Andreas Papandreou. It was the result of the merger in a unified party formation of two anti-dictatorial organizations, in particular of the Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) and of Democratic Defense (DA) that we mentioned in a previous chapter. In the process of the formation of this new party, other smaller organizations mainly from the Trotskyist left, such as the Workers' Group and Workers' Democracy, participated as well. This new party managed to grow very quickly mainly because of its political slogans and principles. It was situated to the left, the so-called "third road", and it rejected the model of the traditional European social-democracy as well as Stalinism. Its ideological identity accepted Marxism as a methodology and as a tool of thought (Katsoridas:2006). Its basic principles were summed up in the self-administration of the means of production, in the nationalization of the bigger industrial sector, in the complete exit from

NATO, including the exit from the political part, the closure of all the foreign military bases and in the non entrance of the country in the European Economic Community. These views were expressed with the so-called ‘‘Manifesto of 3 September 1974’’, a date that signaled the official foundation of PASOK.

As Manesis mentions, ‘it is certain that PASOK was placed right from the beginning on the Left, and its staffing corresponded to that. Even more so, with its activity in the massive circles and the ideological fermentation it caused, it achieved something that no other party of the Greek left had ever been able to achieve. Thanks to PASOK, the socialist idea came out of the margin, it was renewed and it gained massive power’ (Manesis: 1984:20). With the creation of PASOK and its positioning at the wider political spectrum of the left, a dichotomy inside Greece it was created during the second half of the ‘70s. The traditional left that was expressed mainly by the two communist parties and a second socialist left, which was exceptionally heterogeneous, and was expressed by this new party. The heterogeneity of the left of PASOK was ideological as well as social, a fact that later had an impact on its evolution. A number of political scientists have different approaches concerning its character. Some of them classify it in the centre (Mavrogordatos: 1984, Katsoulis: 1990:32), others in the social-democrats (Diamantopoulos: 1997:295), while others emphasize its populist character (Mouzelis: 1980, Charalampis: 1989). Both its manifesto and its programme, but above all its social foundation, could classify it in the typology of a left populist party. And this because populism can adopt different forms (Demertzis: 2004:12). It is characteristic that even in 1985, as Nikolakopoulos mentions, ‘almost all the political parameters of that period that measure the parties’ affinity on the level of public opinion, reveal a common ideological composition among the non right parties’ (Nikolakopoulos: 1990:208). Thus between the social base of PASOK

and that of the communist left there were party affinities and a common ideological composition which nevertheless did not lead in the long run to the formation of a political alliance.

This fact is due first of all to the gradual shifting of the PASOK towards social-democracy and to the adoption of populism, and secondly to the political choices of the communist left, which we shall discuss further down, and its identification with the regimes of the Treaty of Warsaw.

The impressive massiveness of PASOK was not accidental, nor was it due to the charismatic personality of Andreas Papandreou. The role of the personality in history is very important, but it is not always the dominant one. PASOK managed to express the quest for legalization of the most suppressed social groups through its founding principle 'National Independence, Popular Sovereignty, Social Emancipation, Democratic Process'. The massiveness of PASOK was accomplished with such a speed that even today it is a subject for research. The commitment of the leadership of PASOK for self-organization was enough for the creation of hundreds of local and departmental organizations through the country in less than a year (Katsoridas:2006:14).

But the evolution of the Greek parties from parties of personae to massive parties was not accompanied by their disentanglement from the clientelistic relationships or by the effacement of their leader-oriented character. Despite the appearance of new massive parties, most of the politicians and of the members of the parliament were coming from old parties, before the dictatorship, or were young men, many of whom were the children or the nephews of the old members of parliament. This fact was most discernible in the two bourgeois parties that are New Democracy and Center. So, despite the appearance of new elements in the Greek political and party system, the clientelistic networks of the local patrons

and the leader-oriented character of the parties continued to play an important role in the political life of the country.

The aforementioned had also a decisive impact on the matter of the internal democracy of the parties. Indeed, 'after 1974 the political organs of the big parties were either functioning in a democratic way only at a high central level in order to have the periodical election of the party leader without a wider participation of the party base or were functioning typically at a lower local level, and the expression of their opinion did not affect the political resolutions of the leadership' (Katsoridas: 2006). It is characteristic that even PASOK organized its first congress ten years after its foundation, in 1984. So an inconsistency appeared. On the one hand the massiveness of the parties became the most important factor for the democratization of the period of the political reform, and on the other the parties themselves continued to use undemocratic methods internally.

This element reinforced a hard, centralized, leading core inside the parties, and this fact had a decisive impact not only on the subject of the party's democracy but also on the wider democratic context, as we shall see further down. The leading group of PASOK proceeded between 1974-1979 to three massive expulsions of its members a) of the so-called Horizontal Connection of 29 local organizations of Athens that were controlled by the Trotskyists, b) of the Youth of PASOK that was under the influence of the Maoists and c) of the high- ranking members of the Democratic Defense who had social-democratic beliefs. The elections of November granted Karamanlis an overwhelming victory with a percentage of 54.4%, whereas the center with the party Center Union- New Forces (EK-ND) received 20.4%. Center Union- New Forces (EK-ND) was a union of the pre- dictatorship Center Union (CU) with a new organization of the center, the

Movement of New Political Forces. In these elections PASOK made its first appearance and it received 13.16%. Finally, United Left in which participated EDA and the two Communist parties, received 9.5%.

It is worth mentioning though that despite the fact that the two electoral formations of the left, that is, United Left and PASOK, received in total 23.1%, they only won 20 seats of parliament, that is, the 7.67% of the total of the parliamentary seats. This fact was due to the electoral system of the reinforced proportional representation (Mendrinou: 2000: 91).

A particularly interesting fact concerning the professional origin of the members of the parliament that were elected in 1974 is that 52.3% were lawyers and members of the law, and the second largest group was that of the doctors, with 12.7%. The journalists had a small percentage of 1.7%. Among them was Helen Vlachos. Gradually this percentage will be reinforced, and it will reach 3, 8% in June 1989 (Drettakis: 1991:61). A month after the elections, on the 8 of December of 1974, the government of Karamanlis decided to proclaim a new referendum about monarchy. This time the referendum took place within a democratic system and it obviously did not contain the distorting of the referendum that dictatorship had held in 1973. We must note that King Konstantinos had not return to Greece after the fall of the dictatorship, and that he continued to live in London.

The parties of the left, but also EK-ND, were against monarchy, whereas the governing party kept a neutral position. The neutral stand of Karamanlis was mainly determined by the fact that a big percentage of his voters had friendly feelings towards monarchy, whereas another percentage, maybe an even larger one, was against it. A possible position pro or against the return of the King would probably lead to the splitting of the newly founded party of New Democracy or it

would create serious problems for the conservative leader. The result of the referendum was 70% against monarchy and 30% pro. According to Clogg 'the referendum of 1974 reproduced almost exactly the results of another referendum that was the only one that took place under democratic conditions, in 1924' (Clogg: 2003:200).

Thus, from 1974 onwards the matter of the monarchy ceased to exist definitively for Greece. Konstantinos Tsatsos was elected as the First President of the Third Hellenic Republic. He was a professor of Philosophy of the University of Athens. In 1975 the trials of the members of junta took place. The three leaders of the coup d' etat of 1967, Papadopoulos, Pattakos and Makarezos were sentenced to death, a sentence that was changed to life imprisonment, while the man responsible for the second dictatorship, brigadier Ioannidis, was sentenced to seven times life imprisonment. At the same time, the process of removal from all the important state posts of the people of junta started a process that satisfied the democratic feelings of the Greek people.

Karamanlis focused on foreign affairs and mainly on the enrollment of Greece in the European Community. His politics were determined up to a point by the problems that emerged in the relations between Greece and the USA, and mainly by the understanding that the future of the country was connected with that of the rest of the countries of Europe. The new constitution that was passed by the parliament of Greece on the 9 of June 1975 followed the basic features of the Greek constitution of 1952 which was restricted. Still it gave increased responsibilities to the President of the Republic, a fact that led the left and especially PASOK to characterize it as totalitarian (Peponis:2002). According to Makrydemetres the constitution of 1975 gave to the President of the Republic 'the capability of assuming a prevailing determinative role, creating a virtual diarchy

in the executive authority that might have led to an unavoidable collision with the Prime Minister in the event he had expressed different political views and beliefs' (Makrydemetres:2002:140). Nevertheless this theoretical hypothesis never materialized before the revision of the constitution in 1986, when the so-called super-authority of the President of the Republic was abolished.

Despite the important interventions of Karamanlis, he and his party never managed to get over their historical identification with the authoritarian semi-parliamentary regime of the period 1946-1967. One must note that on a social and economical level, despite its Keynesian politics, the government of New Democracy did not proceed to broad reforms for the workers and the farmers, who comprised the majority of the population of the country. That led to an important decreasing of the percentage of New Democracy in the elections of 1977. Specifically, New Democracy gained 41, 9%, that is 12, 6% less than in the elections of 1974.

The Union of Democratic Centre (EDHK), which was the evolution of the central coalition of EK-ND, received 12%, and it occupied the third place. This rapid fall of the central political space in the elections of 1977 confirmed the definite ending of the old parties, and, also, the new political division between left and right.

PASOK almost doubled its percentage and it reached 25.3%, occupying the second place. KKE this time took part in the elections by itself and it received 9.4%, whereas the coalition of the Euro-communists, EDA and some other smaller parties received just 2.7%. According to Nikolakopoulos, 'the elections of 1977 not only did confirm the arithmetic superiority of KKE against KKE-Interior, but they also appointed KKE as the almost unique representative, at the

level of the social base, of the communistic tradition' (Nikolakopoulos: 1984:112).

Another important development was the reinforcement of the pro-monarchy right, which in those elections took part with the party of National Parataxis, receiving 6.8%. The appearance of a pro-monarchy right wing party was mainly due to the annoyance of the extreme rightists because of the result of the referendum concerning the monarchy, on the one hand, and because of the neutral position of New Democracy, on the other.

The same electoral system of reinforced proportional representation was applied to these elections as well, a system that favored the first party and posed serious limitations to the smaller ones. After the overwhelming loss of EDHK in the elections the party was dissolved and most of its members of the parliament and its high-ranking members joined PASOK. This fact, and also the various electoral systems that favored the two bigger parties, signaled the beginning of the appearance of a bi-polar political system, which, of course, will be shaped gradually, as we shall see further on.

The developments in the country were rapid, mainly because of the continuing and fast shifting of parts of the electoral body towards PASOK and the simultaneous attrition of New Democracy. We must especially note that the second oil crisis of 1979 created serious problems for the Greek economy. Inflation went to 24.9% in 1980, while industrial production went down to 1% in 1980, and as a result a number of industrial businesses reached the edges of collapse. The Gross National Product (GNP) from 6.7% in 1978 went down to 1.8% in 1980 (Kazakos: 1990:141). It is obvious that this fact contributed greatly to the attrition of the governing party.

In 1980 Konstantinos Karamanlis resigned as Prime Minister and was elected President of the Hellenic Republic with the required majority of the parliament,. George Rallis who replaced the Prime Minister as leader of New Democracy was a moderate politician. During the very short period that George Rallis was Prime Minister, Greece re-entered the military part of NATO, and the treaty for joining the EEC was signed.

At the same time, ND, in its effort to coil up the whole of the right in order to face the rise of PASOK, turned towards the pro-monarchy right, absorbing most of its supporters. As Manesis mentions: 'this policy damaged ND in the elections because it repelled a portion of the moderate conservative voters and at the same time it benefited PASOK because it pushed the consistent centre-wing voters towards it' (Manesis: 1984:15).

In October 1981 the parliamentary elections took place. PASOK, as it was expected, accomplished a crushing victory, with a percentage of 48%. For the first time in the political history of the country a socialist party formed a government. New Democracy received 36%. The fact that the bigger part of the pro-monarchy right was finally absorbed by New Democracy made the defeat of the right party even heavier. KKE raised its percentage to 10.9%, to the disadvantage of the Euro-communists, who received 1.4% and failed to get a seat in parliament.

After the elections the leader of New Democracy, George Rallis, resigned and was replaced by Evangelos Averoff-Tossizas as leader of the party, a politician with an emphasis on the post civil- war rightist policy. An extensive programme of political, social and economic reforms accompanied the rise of PASOK. In the political area, it officially recognized politically the National Resistance Organisations. Here we must clarify that while Karamanlis legalized KKE in 1974, as we have already seen, he had not recognized politically the

National Resistance Organisations. So the struggle of the fighters of the resistance was still illegal and nonexistent for the state. With the political recognition of national resistance tens of thousands of Greeks were restored morally and politically.

The new government of PASOK granted them a special pension, and it gave the members of their families' priority for appointments to working posts in the public sector. At the same time it allowed the unobstructed return of all the Greeks who were political refugees in the countries of the Eastern Europe since the period of the civil war and it introduced the 25 of November as a day for the national celebration of the National Resistance. According to Voulgaris 'the official state formed an alternative policy of memory, adopting in this way a different reading of the post war history' (Voulgaris: 2002:27).

At a social level it introduced the right to vote at the age of 18, the civil marriage, it de-criminalised adultery and it took serious measures for the equality between the sexes by changing family law. The first measures that the government of Andreas Papandreou took in the economic field were to award big increases in the salaries of the workers and the admission of the lame duck industries of the private sector to a state unified carrier without reduction in the number of employment seats. PASOK proceeded to the nationalization of these industries, the bigger part of which suffered from losses because of the bad management of the past owners (Iordanoglou:2003:83). Also the new government of the socialist party took special measures for working women and farmers and it proceeded to the democratization of the General Confederation of Labor (GSEE) and the Panhellenic Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives (PASEGES). Finally, in the field of foreign affairs, PASOK continued its policy of friendship with the countries of Eastern Europe and it negotiated the reduction

of foreign military bases in Greece, which had as a result the closing down of two American bases. The policy of PASOK towards Turkey was especially tough, and it changed the defensive dogma of the country. In particular, from the perception that the danger for the country came from the north, the government adopted the perception that the danger came from the east. Very particular was the relation that it developed with the various 'national-liberation movements', as for example the Sandinistas and PLO. In 1984 during the first congress of PASOK Yaser Arafat was welcomed by Andreas Papandreou with honors of a Head of State, and that caused serious problems for Greece's relations with Israel.

Despite the important reforms, PASOK did not implement all its policies. Greece remained a member of NATO and important military bases of the Atlantic Coalition continued to be in operation. At the same time Greece remained a member of the European Economic Community, despite the pre-election commitment to leave it. New Democracy started to face serious internal problems that worsened after the results of the first Euro-elections that took place in June 1984. Despite a rise in the percentage voting of of New Democracy (in comparison with the national elections of 1981), PASOK once again won the elections. At the same time the election of Evangelos Averoff- Tossizas as leader of the party had created serious internal opposition. The new leader was unable to make the necessary changes inside the party because of serious problems concerning his health. So, on September Averoff resigned and Konstantinos Mitsotakis was elected in his position.

The new leader of New Democracy was a nephew of Eleftherios Venizelos and had been born in Chania, Crete, where he was elected continuously since 1946 with the parties of the center. He had been a minister of the government of George Papandreou during the '60s. In July 1965 he left United Centre and

participated in the appointed by the King's government with the so-called July Renegades, as we have already mentioned. He was re-elected in 1977 as the leader of a small 'Party of New Liberals' which was active mainly on the island of Crete. In 1978 he joined New Democracy and became minister of economic coordination. The assumption of the leadership of New Democracy by Konstantinos Mitsotakis in combination with the presence of Andreas Papandreou in the leadership of the other big political pole reproduced the political divisions of the '60s. As Voulgaris mentions, 'the rise of Mitsotakis in the leadership of New Democracy meant a precipitous rise in the thermometer of political polarization. To the confrontation PASOK- New Democracy the personal conflict between the two men was added' (Voulgaris: 2002:247).

The reproduction of the antithesis of the '60s by the two parties led to the embodiment of the political and social division right-left in the political cleavage right-anti-right. As, Moschonas mentions 'the political parties are in the same time active forces that tend to transform a social division into a political cleavage' (Moschonas:2000:160). In March 1985 Konstantinos Karamanlis' term in the Presidency of the Greek Republic came to its end. New Democracy announced its support for its founder, but PASOK, with a spectacular movement, proposed a judge, Christos Sartzetakis, who during the '60s as a young magistrate had sent to trial those who had murdered the left Member of Parliament Gregorios Lambrakis. In the end Christos Sartzetakis was elected President of the Hellenic Republic. At the same time PASOK started the process of revising the constitution of 1975. The main revision referred to the reduction of the powers of the President of the Republic, and their transfer to the Prime Minister and the elected government. The new constitution of 1986 was the most democratic concerning the matters of the freedom of the press, as we shall see further down.

With the favorite climate that had been created in Greek society concerning both the level of grants and the function of democracy, PASOK achieved a second victory in the elections of June 1985. PASOK received 45.8%, ND 40.9%, GCP 9.9% and, finally, the Greek left of the Euro-communists 1.8% and one seat in the Parliament. This time a programme of economic frugality accompanied the re-election of PASOK.

After a period of intensive social policy, the second government of PASOK had to face a big external and internal deficit. The economic policy of the government was based on the reduction of expenses and the effort for increasing the profits. This fact caused huge social mobilization with strikes and created an internal crisis in the socialist party that was expressed with the resignation of a large group of high-ranking syndicalists. According to Zamparlounkou, 'the decision of a part of the syndicalistic leadership that was close to PASOK to differentiate its position from the governmental policy shows that the syndicalistic leadership did not intend as a whole to confirm to the decisions of the party notwithstanding their content' (Zamparlounkou:1996:113).

The political turning of PASOK in 1985, in combination with the massive resignations and the expulsion of its left members and the high-ranking syndicalists had a catalytic effect in its left populist features (Katsoridas:2006:18). To that, the massive entry of new members that came from the centre played an important role. The entry of high-ranking members of the centre to PASOK started gradually after the dissolution of EDHK, and it came to its peak after the rise of the socialist party in power. The old high-ranking members of the Center Union were especially trained in the logic of the clientelistic relations, a fact that had an important influence in the gradual evolution of PASOK after 1981. The old left members of PASOK used to call the new members 'nineteeners' because they

entered the party after the 18 of October 1981 when PASOK took office, with the aim of exercising clientelistic relations. At the same time the political division between left-right began to limit further, because of the shift of PASOK towards the centre and the abandonment of its radical ideas. With this shift PASOK separating lines between itself and the communist parties were created. In turn, PASOK tried unsuccessfully to monopolize the broader field of the left. As Nikolakopoulos mentions 'the events that followed the elections of 85 altered in many ways the arrangement of the political forces and the shape of electoral rivalry. The governmental choices and the crisis of reliability that accompanied them functioned as determinative elements that gradually drove to the isolation of PASOK. So started the breaking of the bonds of kinship that existed between the two anti-right poles' (Nicolakopoulos: 1990:211).

The abandonment by the government of a series of radical ideas of PASOK and its turning to more conservative positions was accompanied once again by a reinforcement of the anti- right rhetoric. The leadership of PASOK believed that in this way it could avoid the isolation and, mainly, that it could rally the majority of the anti- right voters and so to succeed social consent about the measures of frugality it advanced (Voulgaris:2002). The social dissatisfaction because of the economic policy of PASOK was expressed in October 1986 during the municipal elections. The candidates of New Democracy gained important victories in a series of municipalities, including the three bigger municipalities of the country that is Athens, Piraeus and Salonica.

In 1987 the policy of frugality was abandoned and the government of PASOK turned once again towards a social policy. The internal crisis of the party but also the rise of New Democracy, as it was expressed in the municipal elections, urged the government towards this decision (Voulgaris:2002). In

January 1988 a meeting between Andreas Papandreou and the Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, took place at Davos. A serious crisis between Greece and Turkey in the spring of 1987 had preceded it, which finally put the two countries in a state of war. The crisis of 1987 was finally surpassed with the appropriate diplomatic negotiations. The meeting between the two Prime Ministers was accompanied by an agreement that led to remission of the tension between the two countries.

In the summer of 1988 the Prime Minister and president of PASOK Andreas Papandreou left suddenly for London after sudden worsening of his health. For two whole months the government was without a Prime Minister, and the result was intense criticisms from the parties of the opposition. During the same period a huge scandal was revealed that had as a leading person a banker, George Koskotas, president of the Bank of Crete, and someone who had interested in the press as well, trying to create a publishing colossus. Koskotas from a simple employee, through accounting tricks and some non-transparent co-operations, became owner of the Bank of Crete. He then began a rapid expansion that made him in two years the owner of a powerful group of businesses of various kinds including media and football teams (Voulgaris: 2003:33).

At the same time, as Clogg mentions 'there were rumors that state- owned corporations had been encouraged to deposit their reserve capital in the Bank of Crete with low deposit rates, while someone usurped the difference between these and the current ones' (Clogg:2003:228). These revelations were expanded and to other areas with accusations of direct involvement and bribery of certain ministers and politicians of the governing party. A leading role in the effort of making known the scandal was played by the publishers of the Athenian newspapers, who for many months maintained this topic on the front pages of their newspapers. Later the person directly responsible for the scandal, George Koskotas, accused

the Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou himself of involvement, an accusation that was never proved during the trial.

But the general climate created serious problems for the socialist party that were expressed in the elections of June 1989 with the significant decrease of its electoral percentages. At the same time a short period of political instability started the first after the fall of the dictatorship, with the formation of short-lived governments. This instability did not have the characteristics of the periods of '30s and '60s, either in essence or in duration, as we shall see below.

An interesting development during this period was the transformation of the clientelistic relations and patronage. As we have already said, before but also a little after the fall of the dictatorship, these relations continued to be dominant in the formation of politics in modern Greece with their traditional form, as we have analyzed it in a previous chapter. After 1981, these relations were placed in a different context because of the appearance of a series of new, objective factors.

Firstly, the massiveness of the parties gradually transformed the clientelistic relations from an affair of isolated party patrons to a collective affair of the parties. As Mouzelis and Pagoulatos mention 'when the parties gained the organizing ability of reaching the most isolated villages of the country, given the particularly increased resources that they had in their disposal, they managed to exercise the clientelistic practices in a much more broader scale' (Mouzelis & Pagoulatos:2003:17). In a few words, the organized party occupied the place of the isolated patron, and it not only developed but it also reformed the already shaped clientelistic networks.

Secondly, the leader-oriented party character and the deficiency of internal democracy in the parties, but also the existence of one-party governments of long duration, allowed these governments to exercise determinative control over the

institutions of democracy. As Sotiropoulos mentions 'the leader-oriented character of the parties and the deficiency of internal democracy in the parties shaped party leaderships so powerful that they could, transforming into one-party governments, control the institutions of democracy efficiently' (Sotiropoulos:1993:93).

The leader-oriented character of the parties in combination with the existence of one-party governments contributed to the control of the state bureaucracy by the parties. In Greece state bureaucracy did not assume historically a kind of autonomy, in contrast with the developed democracies of Western Europe where 'the gigantism of the state administration led to its autonomy' (Serafetinides: 2003:392). Powerful bureaucratic tendencies appeared inside the frame of a party many times. Under certain circumstances these bureaucratic tendencies could be reinforced and shape a kind of party bureaucracy that co-identified with the state bureaucracy or was complemented by it. As Makrydemetres mentions 'were the occasions not rare when the parties themselves were bureaucratized and the result was not only their estrangement from society but also the substitution of their original goals by others promoting the interests of the party oligarchy' (Makrydemetres:2002:195).

Thirdly, the expansion of the broader public sector, since both parties that ruled the country after 1974 reinforced the role of the state in economy each one for its own political purposes. It is characteristic that between 1981 and 1985 public expenditure had almost doubled (Iordanoglou:2003:69), whereas between 1981 and 1986 the number of public servants was increased six times more than the active population during the same period. The party control became particularly noticeable in public organizations and especially concerning the issue of hiring new personnel, that was done with the method of seasonal or extra

workers, in order to by-pass the legal procedure. Usually that was done almost always before the elections, in order to manipulate the electoral body.

As Spanou mentions, 'during the period January- July 1989, 96,801 employees were hired in the public sector, of whom 85,716 were under fixed-term contracts or were seasonal. Even if we accept that not all these hirings were pre-electoral, still the sizes are impressive' (Spanou: 1990:171).

The conditions of expansion of the state, especially in the sector of human resources in combination with the states and the bureaucracy's control by one powerful party bureaucratized leadership and the appearance of a collective patron-party, altered the traditional form of the clientelistic relations. The massive party is now in the position to organize and expanded clientelistic networks, with the support of the state bureaucracy, which, being under its direct control, contributes to the guidance of the electoral body.

The formation of a party and bureaucratic clientelism (Lyritzis:1983) constituted an important development for the Greek political system and it defines up to a point the developments even today. The results of the elections of June 1989 appointed as the first power New Democracy, with 44.3% and PASOK second, with 39.1%. The percentage of PASOK is considered high despite the particularly negative climate because of the scandals. Despite the severance between PASOK and the rest of the left, a big part of the centre and left-wing voters continued to support PASOK. More specifically, in these elections, based on relative research of the Center of Political Research and Education, PASOK got 'the biggest part of the non Marxist-socialists (75.5%), a big part of the socialist- Marxists (34%) and not an insignificant portion of the conservatives (7.6% and liberals 8%) (Katsoudas: 1990: 247). In this way PASOK confirmed, in especially negative conditions, that it constitutes one of the most important factors

of the Greek political. Third power was appointed to the Coalition of the Left and Progress that was a pre-electoral collaboration between the Communist Party and the Euro-communists of the Greek Left, with the percentage of 13.1%.

The elections of June 1989 were done with a system of simple proportional voting which, as it was expected, did not help in the formation of a self-reliant government, and as a result, there was formed for the first time in the political history of the country a government comprising of the right, the KKE and the United left of the Euro-communists was formed, with the Prime Minister a high- ranking member of New Democracy, Tzanis Tzanetakis.

The collaboration, even though it was limited, between the communist left and the right on a governmental level constituted one of the paradoxes of Greek politics. Still it contributed to the minimization of the post civil war political polarization and to the relative lifting of resentment between the right and the communist left. At the same time it contributed to a greater political schism between PASOK and the rest of the left. This government was not formed on the basis of a political program and it did not have as a goal to use up the whole four years term, but on the basis of the so-called 'catharsis'. Andreas Papandreou and other high-ranking members of the last government of PASOK were sent to trial. At the same time the government proclaimed new elections for November of the same year, again with the system of simple proportional.

In these elections New Democracy increased its percentage to 46.2%. PASOK too increased its percentage to 40.7%, while the percentage of the electoral coalition of communists and Euro-communists decreased to 11%. The decrease of the percentage of the Coalition of the Left and Progress must be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the non acceptance by a large part of its voters of its choice to collaborate with New Democracy, a fact that was to be confirmed

later with the resignations of high- ranking members from both the parties that had formed the coalition, that is KKE and the Greek Left. Secondly, by the dramatic collapse of the regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe, a fact that created serious ideological and political problems, especially for KKE. The increase of the percentage of the two bigger parties established the domination of a dipolar party system. As Mendrinou mentions the percentage that the two parties gathered, in total, was the biggest that was ever recorded during the whole of the after the dictatorship period. More specifically, it reached 86.87% (Mendrinou: 2000:113). In this way a dipolar political system was created, with the existence of three basic parties: PASOK, New Democracy and the communist left.

New Democracy could not form a self-reliant government, nor did it manage to form again a government of collaboration with the Coalition of Left and Progress. Finally the political leaders of the three parties agreed to the formation of a national government the well- known Greek economist Xenophon Zolotas as Prime Minister, and fresh elections were programmed for the April of 1990, so that the election of the new President of the Republic would be voted by a fresh parliament. The elections of April 1990 brought New Democracy back to power, although its 7% advantage in popular vote amounted to a very slight majority of only one MP out of 300. More specifically New Democracy received 46.9%, PASOK 39.3% and the Coalition of Left and Progress 10. 6%. A few days later the parliament elected for the second time as President of the Greek Republic Konstantinos Karamanlis.

Democratic stability and the satisfactory functioning of the parliamentary system characterize the whole period from the fall of dictatorship till 1990. At the same time a new political culture was formed. According to Demertzis these modern tendencies could be summarized in the following four points: a) Gradual

healing of the traumatic political experiences (national schism, civil war) b) Renewal of the political personnel c) Expansion of political participation d) Extension of political communication (Demertzis:1990:76). For the last one we shall make a special analysis further down.

Media Developments: 1974-1990

The fall of dictatorship was accompanied by the definitive abolition of censorship, the re-appearance of all the newspapers that had been closed down, and, of course, the re-organization of the broadcasting sector. At the same time, new publishing efforts began to appear in Athens and in the regions. For the first time after 27 years, the newspaper of the Communist Party *Rizospastis*, was re-published since KKE was legalized.

But the most important development had to do with the de-regulation of the broadcasting sector, which materialized at the end of the '80s. This development, as we shall see further down, not only changed the field of mass media in the country, but it also reinforced the tendencies for commercialization and shaped a new powerful, but extremely inconsistent, market. At the same time, the ground for a gradual change in the relations between the parties and the press was created. The constitution of 1975 repeated some of the basic guidelines of the constitution of 1952, which was quite restrictive, in comparison with some of the '30s (Dagtolou:1989). The only provision it did not repeat was the one that allowed the existence of repressive measures for the protection of youth. At the same time the new constitution authorized parliament to pass a new law that would define the requirements and the qualifications for entry to the journalism profession 'a provision potentially dangerous for the freedom of the press' (Dagtolou: 1989:38). The existence of a series of restrictive laws concerning the

press that continued to be in force restricted the freedom of expression (Alevizatos:1995).

Those laws had been enacted during and after the civil war, as we have already said, and unfortunately they were not abolished right after 1974. The laws governing the regulation of newspaper circulation system and the requirements for the licensing of newspaper sellers were used against the members of the parties of the left. The members and the supporters of various political young organisations of the left but also of the left parties used to sell the newspapers of their organizations without possessing a special license, as the law required. That practice had to do more with the attraction of supporters and with the dissemination of the ideas of the small parties. But the police arrested the sellers of the political organizations and sent them to trial. According to Paraschos 'It is estimated that between 1974 and 1977 more than 4,000 persons were arrested and tried for such "illegal" dissemination. The vast majority of those arrested were distributors of the two Athens communists dailies *Rizospastis* and *Avgi* and the communist student papers *Odigitis* and *Thourio*' (Paraschos:1984:50). Following pressures by the parties of the opposition, the Secretariat of the Press of the Ministry to the Prime Minister issued an Executive Decision in 1976, according to which it allowed the distribution of newspapers without the interposition of distribution agencies.

Despite the significant decrease in arrests, police continued in many cases to arrest members of the left parties that sold the newspapers of their organizations. So, although the constitution mentioned the free dissemination of ideas, a series of laws restricted the freedom of expression.

In the broadcasting sector, article 15 of the Constitution secured the public character of television and radio, but not with the increased constitutional

protection that the Press had, a fact that could lead to preventive measures. As Kiki mentions 'the freedom of expression of article 14 applied and in the case of radio and television' (Kiki: 2003:48) and as a result the press freedom extended to the freedom of the broadcasting media as far as their content was concerned. The revision of the constitution of 1986 reinforced even more press freedom, since paragraph 3 of article 14 prohibited the seizure of newspapers before and after their publication, with the exemption of offense against various religions, not only against the Christian, as it was provided in preceding constitutions, and against the President of the Republic. At the same time it allowed the seizure of newspapers in case of indecent publications and publications that revealed information concerning the country's defense. Of course any order for seizure should be given by the authorized Public prosecutor and not by the government.

With the above mentioned constitutional changes and with the abolition of a series of laws that limited the press freedom, especially after 1986, a democratic environment was created that led to the free dissemination of ideas and opinions. However, the adoption of the press freedom in Greece and in almost every country is always a matter of class conflict, politics and ideology (Antonopoulos:1965). In general the deeper constitutional democracy was embedded the more functional the press freedom became. A weak political democratic system, the lack of radical social movements and the domination of reactionary and autocratic governments have been and will always be, solid reasons which explain why the freedom of the press is restrained even within the most developed democracies. For example during the Algerian War in the 60s the French newspaper *Le Humanite* was dragged into court 209 times and twenty seven editions were seized (Napoli:2001).

An other example of ‘soft’ censorship was that of the Falklands War during which the British Government developed a censorship mechanism (Schlesinger:1989). But an interesting development was the introduction of provision 8 in article 14 of the Greek Constitution, according to which the conditions concerning the financing of newspapers and of other printed media should be made known. It is obvious that this development was important because it contributed to the transparency of the financing of newspapers by the state. This was preceded by an informal agreement between the leaders of political parties during a discussion on ‘Problems of Press and Journalism’ that was organized by the Journalists’ Union of Athens Daily Newspapers. Almost everybody agreed then that transparent provisions must exist for the financing of newspapers and that newspapers should be subsidized but not on the basis of governmental decisions (ESIEA: 1977).

The broader political frame that was shaped after the fall of the dictatorship, and especially the existence of new political divisions, as those analyzed above, did not allow the definitive disentanglement of the press from politics nor did it entirely prevent the interfering of political authorities with the media. The state interference in the media could not have the characteristics of the periods of the military coups, or those of a semi-parliamentary political system, as the one that was developed after the civil war. The democratic stability after 1974 was in continuous progress and that limited the possibility for the development of censorship mechanisms but also of non-transparent methods of state financial support for the press. Besides, for the last one there was a constitutional regulation, as we have already mentioned. So, after the political change over, the noticeable slackening of the direct intervention of political authorities in the press began.

However, the state continued to exercise indirect influence on the press through the continuation of the press subsidy, the shaping of which under the new conditions we shall analyze further down. The same happened with the publishers who under the new circumstances limited their entanglement in the shaping of politics. There were two reasons for this new attitude of the publishers.

Firstly, the gradual political stabilization and the broader democratization left no scope in the publishing complexes for exercising direct influence in politics. It is characteristic that the publishers' entanglement took place especially during periods of political instability. But this entanglement is being limited since the role of the parties and of the social organizations is upgraded after 1974, mainly because of their massiveness. In a few words, in Greek political life new groups are appearing, clearly enlarged and more collective.

Secondly, the trends for commercialization in the field of the media shifted the publishers' interest from the political to the business field. This fact was reinforced after the entrance of industrialists in the field.

Because of all the above, the interdependence continued to exist, but it gradually began to get reduced, at least as far as the form and the characteristics of the last periods were concerned.

In the first period, right after the fall of the dictatorship, the Athenian press continued to have a basic political orientation towards the big parties while the publishers continued their direct entanglement in the shaping of politics and of the party system. It is characteristic that Christos Lamprakis, the publisher of the two large newspapers *Ta Nea* and *To Vima*, played an important role in the formation of the centre-wing party EK- ND in 1974.

As we have already noted, pre-dictatorial CU and a new central group that was named Movement of New Political Forces (MNPF) formed the party of EK-

ND. In the beginning this new political organization, MNPF, aspired to create a new central party and to take part autonomously in the elections. But this plan was abandoned and very quickly there was an agreement with the new leader of CU George Mavros for the merger of CU with MNPF and the participation in the elections as EK-ND. As Peponis mentions 'the agreement with George Mavros was closed at the beginning of October during a night meeting in the house of Christos Lambrakis, at Anagnostopoulou Street. This meeting lasted for hours. Lambrakis encouraged the merger but avoided expressing his opinion concerning the process and the shape' (Peponis: 2002:368). Helen Vlachos, publisher of newspaper *Kathemerini* that circulated again after the fall of the dictatorship, was elected as member of the parliament with the party of New Democracy at the elections of 1974. Helen Vlachos because of her struggle against the dictatorship was a symbol for Greek politicians and journalists. She has written 'although I was obliged to go to the parliament, I tried to leave as fast as I could and to go back to the newspaper where I wrote my impressions, comments and reports of what took place there. Anything I could not say while I was in parliament, my readers, but also my colleagues MPs, read the next day' (Vlachos: 1992:275).

During the same period newspapers started gradually to replace old technology with new forms of printing, mainly with the introduction of phototypesetting, which made a decisive contribution to the improvement of newspapers' quality (Leandros: 1992). But the introduction of new, for this era, technology created new problems concerning the financial situation of newspapers. The non-commercialized character of the newspapers pushed them once again towards the search for financial support, from the state and the banking system. At the same time, a large part of the traditional publishers began to look for buyers, since the accrued debts were huge.

A reference to the loans that were given by the state may be useful in this phase. According to official data that were published in 1982, the debt obligations of the national newspapers towards the state reached 4 million euro during this period. Two out of three were loans that were given during the '70s to the three bigger publishing houses' (Leandros: 1992:158). The sum, given the facts of this period, was huge. On the same subject Kominis mentions 'loans were given by all the governments to the newspapers and in many cases these were never paid back to the state' (Kominis: 1985:192). Loans were not only given, or better donated, to the Athenian newspapers but also to the regional. It is characteristic that debts from loans of the regional newspapers that were given time after time by the state were written off. In his speech in the parliament, on 21/9/ 1994, the Minister of the Press and Media of the time, Evangelos Venizelos mentioned: 'Concerning the regional Press we have taken the brave and generous measure of writing of all debts that the regional newspapers had in the Loan and Consignment Fund' (Venizelos: 1996: 102).

This kind of direct granting continued to maintain the press's dependence by the state and to limit its relative autonomy. At the same time the state control over television and radio had converted both media to instruments of propaganda for the government policy. The absence of the oppositions' political views during the period 1974-1981 was particularly noticeable. The government of New Democracy had followed a policy of blockading the views of the other parties from television, a fact that had forced the leaders of the opposition to publicly accuse the government many times. Especially PASOK after the pre-electoral period of 1981, as Zacharopoulos mentions 'it promised to change this structure because it was used to promoting only the party in power especially before elections' (Zacharopoulos:2003:5).

The shrinkage and eventually the dissolution of the centre party led the newspapers that traditionally supported the center to shift gradually towards PASOK. Especially newspapers *Ta Nea* and *To Vima* followed a slow but steady shifting towards the positions of the socialist party, a shifting that could be characterized as parallel to that of the central electoral body. In this way in the press too, two poles were formed. The newspapers that supported PASOK and the newspapers that supported New Democracy. Newspapers *Rizospastis* and *Avgi*, supported the corresponding party formations of the Communist Party and the Euro-communists.

During the pre-electoral period of 1981, the press functioned at an intense political environment. The Athenian newspapers not only supported the positions of the two bigger political parties, they almost identified with them. It was usual in Greece during pre-electoral periods for the newspapers to express a more intense political orientation, but in the given situation of the elections of 1981 that orientation became almost identifiable with the existing parties. The Athenian newspapers, in their bigger part, followed and expressed the political dipolar system of the period (Pesmazoglou: 1984:47). But even after 1981 and the rise of PASOK to power, the press as a whole, continued to follow the political divisions and to remain intensely attached to the parties.

The huge deficits that had been accumulated by the newspapers because of their low circulation, but also because of some investments that had been made during the '70s, contributed to the passing of most of them into the hands of businessmen that were active in other fields as well, and especially in the fields of shipping, public construction and telecommunications. This phenomenon did not occur only in Greece. According to Mancini in Italy 'the limited market for printed matter has always meant very limited earnings if not debit balance-sheets

which has made the ownership of the press pass into the hands of industrial groups which draw their income from industrial activities and not publishing' (Mancini:2003).

The entrance of businesspeople was at first done carefully enough. At first phase they began to buy titles of old but well known newspapers, which were not published anymore. So, two newspapers that had not re-circulated after the fall of dictatorship were bought as titles at the beginning of the '80s by well known businesspeople. Specifically, the newspaper *Mesimvrini* of Helen Vlachos, after it was re-published in January 1980 by Christos Siamantas was eventually sold in October 1982 to a company that belonged to the group of the Vardinogiannis family, who were active in the fields of shipping and refining.

The newspaper *Ethnos* was sold to George Bobolas, a businessman in the field of public constructions. Its re-publishing with the new ownership status took place in September 1981. In April 1983, Voudouris, a businessman and public supplier bought an old title *Eleftheros Typos*. *Eleftheros Typos* was originally published in 1922 and then again in 1963, for a short period.

In 1987, Helen Vlachos' *Kathemerini* was also sold to George Koskotas, who played a leading role in the scandal that led to PASOK fall and to the political crisis of 1989. *Kathemerini* was bought as a newspaper with all its assets, but these did not have much value. As its publisher mentioned in one interview 'Kathemerini had to purchase new printing machines because it was printed in linotypes that had been bought in 1936. But we did not have the money' (Psarakis: 1993:154). In 1988 Koskotas bought *Vradini* as well. At the same time the basic characteristics of the clientelistic relations changed. As we have already mentioned the clientelistic relations are by now carried out by the party- patron and the dependent state bureaucracy on a massive basis.

During this period, the state, whose role in the economy was significantly increased, continued to be in the centre of the clientelistic relations. It is characteristic that even after 1974 the governments of New Democracy and the governments of PASOK as well preceded more to nationalizations and not to privatization. So most of the economic activities in Greece had, and continue to have, as their main reference axis the state and the businesses of the broader public sector. A strategic goal of businesspeople was, and continues to be, to secure state contracts. With the takeover of titles and the acquisition of newspapers, businesspeople could now negotiate from a better stance with the ruling party-patron that, in its turn, wished to support the newspapers of the businesspeople. As Papathanasopoulos mentions "The entry of businesspeople, shipping company owners and other business interests into the media scene is an important way for these interests to try to influence public opinion and to exert pressure in the political arena to the benefit of their business interests" (Papathanasopoulos:2001: 519).

In this way a peculiar clientelistic relation was shaped between the ruling party, the owners-businesspeople of the newspapers and the voters-readers. In a few words, the businessmen-owners of media exercised pressure for the assignment by the ruling parties of big public projects, in exchange for their support through the media that they owned. The media because of the influence they had in the shaping of public opinion secured voters for the party-patron. This clientelistic relation was a little later reinforced with the emergence of private radio and television that added to the readers the viewers, as well. This new form of clientelistic relations that was the result of a) the entanglement of the economic elite in the field of media, b) the party-patron as it emerged after the fall of dictatorship and c) the atrophied society of the citizens could be called Media

Clientelism. Although there is a considerable body of research on clientelism it is generally to be found in political science (Charalampis:1989, Mouzelis:1978) rather than in media-related studies (Hallin-Papathanasopoulos:2002). For the specific purpose of this study, media clientelism is being treated as a new emerging field and can best be defined as a social form of interdependence between political and media elites within a state characterised by a bureaucratically oriented market system and the atrophication of civil society. Political powers deliver state services and economic access to the media owners in exchange for the delivery of political support by the latter.

Thus, while interdependence between politics and media tended to become limited after 1974, with the entry of businessmen in the field of media it became broader and it took a new form. This new form of interdependence could not possibly have the directness of the last periods, when the press and political power were directly interfering in the function of the other and vice versa. The new interdependence was indirect but very effective. The publishers-businesspeople considered the press as the necessary extension/ safeguard of their business activities (Komninou: 1996:236) while politicians increased their efforts to approach public opinion through the media (Blumler: 2000:365). It is exactly the convergence of both, that is of politicians and businesspeople towards media, that reformed interdependence and gave it a new content. The year 1988 constitutes a turning point for politics but also for its relation with the press. The revelation of Koskotas' scandal denoted the antithesis that began to emerge in the field of publishers-businesspeople and the new antagonism between them that was also caused by the imminent de-regulation of the broadcasting field. The introduction of private television created realignments, of which the publishers- businessmen had to take advantage securing at the same time their positions.

The dynamic entry of Koskotas with the purchase of two daily newspapers and the publishing of a third one, his significant investments in the wider printing sector and in other sectors as well, alarmed the rest of the publishers and caused them to react. His relations with the ruling party were revealed not by the opposition but by the publishers themselves. The privileged treatment of that particular businessman and publisher by the government and the ruling party disturbed the balance. The publishers, in their whole, reacted dynamically and the result was an intense political crisis. In a few words, the Koskotas scandal not only reaffirmed the interdependence but it also constituted one of its extreme manifestations.

After these developments and with the collapse of Koskotas' enterprise, the takeover or the publishing of new newspapers by businesspeople continued. *Kathemerini* was bought by the family Alafouzou that was active in the field of shipping, while Socrates Kokkalis who was active in the field of telecommunications published the newspaper *Epikairologia*.

The Deregulation of the Broadcasting Field

After the fall of dictatorship the law 230 of 1975 was passed. With this law EIRT was renamed to ERT, and constituted an artificial entity of the Private Law that had as a unique stockholder the state. YENED, despite the intense reactions of the opposition continued to operate with the same name till 1982, when the socialist government (with the law 1288) renamed it ERT 2. So at the beginning of the decade there were two broadcasting state networks, which were formed with distinct operation, ERT 1 and ERT 2. The income of both of the radio-television media came from a return duty that was incorporated, and continues to be so, in the electricity bills, but also from advertisements.

During the same period hundreds of pirate stations continued to broadcast. The fall of dictatorship contributed to their rapid multiplication, and, as a result, their number exceeded 5,000 in the whole country (Vasilakis: 2006:37). Most of them were short-lived and their range was that of a neighborhood (Milatos: 1995:22). Gradually some of these stations began to occupy themselves with politics and updating news (Barboutis: 2001: 133) a fact that will influence the future developments, as we shall see further down.

At the same time, inside PASOK and also inside the Central Union of Greek Municipalities and Communities (KEDKE), they began to discuss the idea for the creation of municipal radio broadcasting stations. 'This was a time PASOK members were in control of local government in most large cities. However, following the 1986 municipal elections in which New Democracy candidates won in several major Greek cities, PASOK shelved the idea' (Zacharopoulos: 2003:6).

In 1986 the 'Movement of Citizens for Free Radio' was created, that operated the illegal News station, Channel 15. In that organisation and in the illegal station, about 50 Greek intellectuals and journalists participated, who presented various informative radio-programmes (Tzanetakos: 1995:26). In March 1986 police confiscated the machinery and arrested 17 producers and journalists of Channel 15. This action stirred up very large publicity concerning the matter of free radio with political dimensions.

The election of mayors who belonged to the opposition in the three bigger cities of the country, that is Athens, Salonica and Piraeus, was decisive. The three mayors, who were high ranking members of New Democracy, seized the opportunity from the experience of the operation of Channel 15, but also of the propositions that were done earlier, and moved almost simultaneously for the

creation of three municipal radio stations. The ‘‘Athens 9,84 FM’’ in Athens, ‘‘Kanali 1’’ in Pireus and ‘‘FM-100’’ in Thessaloniki. The three municipal radio stations had, almost immediately, huge ratings proving that the public radio stations were both outmoded as far as the programmes were concerned and restrictive in the dissemination of ideas and opinions, even under the government of the socialist party. As Papathanasopoulos mentions, ‘there had been great expectations concerning the democratization of broadcasting after the rise of PASOK in power. But it was not surprising that PASOK too, as a government adopted an almost identical policy with that of its precedent’ (Papathanasopoulos: 1994: 249).

The move of the mayors had political motives since their operation secured increased popularity, both for them and for their party. This political juxtaposition with the ruling party concerning that matter was an advance for New Democracy, since public opinion was positive about the emergence of new private radio stations. The matter of pluralism, of polyphony and of free dissemination of ideas had always long been demanded by Greek society. New Democracy invested in this sensitiveness of the Greeks, since, at least apparently, the free establishment of radio and television channels secured pluralism and polyphony, therefore democracy too. The contradiction was that the invocation of pluralism and of free dissemination of ideas through the establishment of municipal and generally private radio-television media came from a party that in the past had restricted both democracy and the freedom of the press.

The success of the municipal radio stations, combined with the general turn of Europe towards the de-regulation of the broadcasting sector, finally led the government to pass another law, the 1730 of 1987, that allowed the operation of

municipal radio stations but also of private ones, provided, of course, that their stockholders were Greek citizens. This law introduced de-regulation in Greece.

The deregulation of the European communication system was an development in an attempt to deal generally with the economic crisis. The changes, which have overtaken broadcasting systems in Europe, have generally been described as the deregulation of the European audio-visual landscape. Deregulation of broadcasting suggests the relaxation of the rules that govern the state-controlled broadcasting monopoly (Thompson, 1995; Noam: 1991; Dyson & Humphreys, 1986; McQuail and Siune, 1986; De Bens and Knoche, 1987; Negrine and Papathanassopoulos, 1990). But deregulation is more than the simple removal or relaxation of certain rules and regulations. According to Dyson and Humphreys, deregulation is central to the broader neo-liberal strategy for modernization of the economy by privatization and the engendering of an 'enterprise culture'. It is also seen as a device for reducing alleged bureaucratic inefficiency and financial profligacy in public enterprises (such as public broadcasting organizations). Deregulation, they note, is a response to the imperatives of increasing international competition and the internationalization of television markets as well as a political prescription motivated by partisan interests. Technological developments such as cable and satellites created further pressure for the deregulation of European broadcasting and, more generally, communications systems as a whole (Dyson and Humphreys, 1990: 231-3). 'With the abolition of the state monopoly deregulation broadened the telecommunication market with the entry of private capital which invested massively in new technologies improved the profit of the telecommunication market sector and therefore increased the rate of the development of the capitalist economy' (Demertzis-Skamnakis:1998:18).

In Greece with the above noted law, the government tried to upgrade public television as well. For this reason a unified broadcasting organisation was created, ERT Limited Company, with two television channels ET1 and ET2. In that organization the Greek Radio Broadcasting (ERA) belonged as well. ERA operated with five radio programmes. At the same time Institute of Audiovisual Media was established, as a carrier for research in the sector of media (Venizelos: 1989:199).

The Presidential Decree 25/ 1988 reaffirmed the legal right of private citizens and of companies as well, to operate radio stations. But it was not allowed to issue more than one operation licenses for the same person or company, nor the creation of networks. In this way private radio in Greece had and continues to have a local character, while its owner is forbidden to possess more radio stations than one.

In the beginning of 1989, more than 200 temporary licenses were issued, while hundreds of radio stations functioned illegally in the whole country, having simply submitted an application for the issue of a license of operation. The creation of municipal and private radio in Greece was the result of the general tendencies for de-regulation that existed in Europe during the '80s. But this process in a country with intense political polarization and juxtaposition unavoidably acquired political characteristics as well. The huge number of private radio stations, given the country's conditions, that was increased even more during the '90s as we shall see further down, did not reflect only the request for polyphony and for free dissemination of ideas. Of course that was an important factor. Besides, the thousands pirate radio stations that operated occasionally confirm this.

The clientelistic networks of the local parties and patrons played also an important, and maybe leading, role. In every city the parties, through the local MPs and politicians, encouraged the creation of radio stations in order to influence the local society and the voters. At the same time 'many private station owners also intended to use radio as a political voice, which they could leverage to increase their business opportunities involving government contracts' (Zacharopoulos: 2003: 19). In this way an extremely chaotic environment was created, in which anyone who wished could operate a radio station without a license.

In 1989, the mayor of Salonica launched a municipal television station, TV-100, that re-transmitted satellite programs of foreign television stations. It is obvious that the mayors who were close to the party of New Democracy intended to intensify the political juxtaposition with the government, this time concerning the matter of television. This move was apparently connected with the upcoming parliamentary elections.

As a political answer and in order to restrict the activity of the right-wing mayors, the government went ahead and established a third public regional television channel, ET3, in Salonica (Panagiotopoulou: 2004). After the elections of 1989 the government under Prime Minister Tzannis Tzanetakis passed a new law, 1866, that allowed the operation of municipal and private television channels, but only on a local level. The law allowed the issue of license only to Limited Companies and not natural entities, while a stockholder couldn't own more than 25% of the total shares. At the same time, the law barred the possibility of participation of the same person or of the same artificial entity in another television channel.

The publishers were treated favorably by this law. In particular, according to article 4 of the law, the shareholders of a company for which an operation license for a television channel was issued had to have 'a satisfactory experience and tradition in the media'. As Dagtoglou mentions 'it is a favorable criterion for the owners of newspapers and an unfavorable one for the other shareholders and it is opposed to international practice' (Dagtoglou:1990:30).

In this way the government satisfied the publishers- businessmen who, as we have already mentioned, aspired to participate in the shaping of the new communicational map of the country. The political instability of that period created the appropriate conditions for the undertaking of initiatives by the publishers-businessmen and for exercising pressure on a government that had no social support and no political perspective.

As Papathanasopoulos mentions 'the businesspeople- publishers seem to realize the inadequacy of the political power and they go on with their plans for the creation of television stations' (Papathanasopoulos: 1994:251). At the same time, the same law established the National Broadcasting Council (ESR), an independent agency that would control and supervise the private and the public radio-television services. The establishment of ESR was based on the French model of Haute Autorite and it was an attempt of the state to have the upper hand on the licences and to continue its "interplay" with the private interests (Papathanasopoulos: 2004). ESR has administrative independence and its own self-sufficient budget. ESR is managed by a council of eleven members who have been selected by the parliamentary parties, without of course being members of the parties, by the journalists union and the publishers, by the Central Union of Greek Municipalities and Communities (KEDKE) and by the Technical Chamber. ESR can shape propositions, but also exercise veto concerning a series of issues

connected with the operation of the broadcasting media (Zeri: 1996: 241-245). It can also enforce penalties on radio and television stations that do not comply with the codes of ethics it has published. The ESR codes of ethics are laws of the state. At the same time, ESR gives its opinions to the government on the issue and the on renewal of the operation licenses of the radio and the television stations. But the final decision is in the hands of the Minister of the Presidency of the government.

Before the end of 1989, two private television stations made their appearance in Athens, Mega Channel and Antenna TV (ANT1). The publishers of five daily newspapers created the first. It is not by chance that this television station was the first to be issued a temporary license. Mega Channel participated with 20% the publisher of the newspapers *Ta Nea* and *To Vima* Christos Lambrakis, the publisher- businessman of newspaper *Ethnos* George Bobolas, the new publisher- businessman of newspaper *Kathemerini* Alexandros Alafouzos, the publisher-businessman of newspaper *Mesimvrini* George Vardinogiannis and the publisher of newspaper *Eleftherotypia*, Christos Tegopoulos. A businessman who was active in the field of shipping, Minos Kiriakou, created the second television channel.

The new private television channels were of course unable to avoid the political orientation that was extremely intense during this period. MEGA CHANNEL proceeded gradually towards supporting PASOK, whereas ANT1 was right from the beginning on the side of New Democracy. A bit later 3 more television channels began their operation, KANALI 26, NEW CHANNEL and SEVEN X. License was issued for one more channel, NEA TELEORASI that never operated. At the same time, in almost every city of Greece local television stations began to appear. The situation that had originated from the creation of

hundreds of radio stations that were operating without a license was once again repeated in the field of television. In a very short period, tens of television stations began to operate in Athens and in the region. Even after the de-regulation of the broadcasting field, the government and the ruling party continued to exercise direct control over public television. But this tendency appeared also in other countries of South Europe, and particularly in Spain and Portugal. Papathanasopoulos pointed out that 'According to some observers the market became a 'television jungle' since no one knew the exact number of stations which were in operation-most of them on a de facto illegal basis' (Papathanasopoulos:1997b:356).

Thus, from 1987 till the end of 1990 the broadcasting system in Greece was under the effects of an illegal operation of commercial radio and TV. As Tsalikis points out, 'It is difficult to understand the Greek state and commercial broadcasting and in particular the way the latter has evolved since late 1989, unless we contextualise the state operators as a device in the hands of the government and the commercial ones as a means for the exertion of political (and financial) influence'(Tsalikis:1995:38). As Serafetinides pointed out 'deregulation did not limit state interference in the field of media' (Serafetinides: 2000:145) nor the entanglement of the owners-businesspeople of media in the shaping of policy in order to serve their economic interests. In this way interdependence was reinforced and at the same time its form was modified under the influence of what is called media clientelism.

The newspapers

Right after the fall of the dictatorship in July 1974, six Athenian daily newspapers were already in circulation, that is *Vima*, *Nea*, *Apogevmatini*, *Acropolis*,

Eleftheros Kosmos and *Estia*. Soon *Athenaiki*, *Avgi*, *Rizospastis* and *Kathemerini* were added *Vradini*. There were also some new publishing attempts that failed and very quickly they stopped circulating, like *Imera*, *Nea Ellada* and *Elliniko Mellon*. *Eleftheria* of Panos Kokkas and *Mesemvrini* of Helen Vlachos did not circulate.

In July 1975 newspapers *Eleftherotypia* and *Etrhnikos Kyrix* were published. The average daily circulation of morning and evening newspapers for the whole year were 934,768, marking a fall comparing to 1974. The average daily circulation of the morning newspapers fell to 308,017 copies. In November 1976 newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix* stopped being published, while newspaper *Eleftherotypia* had an impressive increase in its sales which reached third place, behind *Nea* and *Apogevmatini*. The average daily circulation both of morning and evening newspapers marked another fall. It reached 829,433 copies in 1976, whereas one year later it fell to 768,250 copies.

In 1978 three new daily newspapers circulated, *Proini*, *Proini Eleftherotypia* and *Nea Efimerida*. The last one circulated for only two weeks, while *Proini Eleftherotypia* stopped its circulation in November of the same year. The average daily circulation marked an increase and it reached 867,036, but in 1979 marked once again a decrease and it reached 745,514. In 1980 a new newspaper circulated with the title *Avriani*, and re-circulated the newspaper *Mesimvrini* with a new owner, as have been already mentioned. In May 1980 newspaper *Proini* closed down. The average daily circulation rose again to 778,851 copies. 1981 was a year of elections, in which the socialistic party came first. As it was expected, the increased interest before and after the elections gave a push to circulation. The average daily circulation increased to 866,633. But, although circulation was generally rising, the morning newspapers experienced a

fall in their circulation in compared to 1980. More analytically, 213,176 copies in 1980 decreased to 185,100 copies in 1981. The evening newspapers were dominating the field. During the same year a new newspaper made its appearance with the title *Eleftheri Ora*, while *Ethnos* re-circulated.

In 1982 *To Vima* stopped its publishing, while there were changes concerning the circulation ranking of the newspapers. *Ethnos* rose to second place and *Avriani* to third. The first four, that is *Ta Nea*, *Ethnos*, *Avriani* and *Eleftherotypia* supported the socialistic government. The average daily circulation rose up to 924,395 copies. In 1983 *Eleftheros Typos*, *Eleftheri Gnomi* and *Courageous Foni* circulated, then stopped its publishing after one month. In the same time *Eleftheros Kosmos* stopped publishing, while newspaper *Ethnos* occupied first place. The morning newspapers experienced another fall in their circulation, while the afternoon ones experienced a rise. An important development was the increase of sales of the Athenian newspapers in the region. The average daily circulation reached 947,141 copies.

In 1984 two new newspapers circulated, *Eidiseis* and *Romiosyni*. The first stopped publishing after two months and the second after one month. During November of the same year, the newspaper *Eleftheri Gnomi* stopped its publication and and at the same time *To Vima* was re-published by the same publisher. For the first time in the history of the Greek press the average daily circulation of the Athenian newspapers surpassed the limit of one million copies. Specifically, circulation reached 1,076,388 while in 1985 it was 1,125,983. In 1986 two newspapers were published, *Proti* and *Eleftheros*, while *To Vima* once more stopped its publication. The total average daily circulation falls in comparison with the two previous years, and it reached 1,031,524 copies and in 1987 it was 955,612.

Very impressive was the decrease in the sales of the morning press that in 1987 had an average daily circulation a little above 100,000 copies, occupying almost 10% of the total sales compared to the 35% it had in 1974. We have already made an analysis concerning the reasons of this fall in a previous chapter. To the above mentioned we could also add the fact of the morning newspapers' orientation towards analyzing and commenting the news, while the evening newspapers were of a varied content with rich photographic material and sports news (Zaousis- Stratos: 1993: 27). In 1987 a new newspaper, *Logos*, was published.

In 1988 two newspapers were published, *Epikerotita* and *24 Ores*. George Koskotas, who had already taken over Helen Vlachos' *Kathimerini*, as we have already mentioned, published the newspaper *24 Ores*. This newspaper closed down in November of the same year, after the revelation of the scandal. The average circulation reached 1,032,929 copies, while *Eleftheros Typos*, that supported New Democracy was first in circulation. The general political climate did not seem to favor the newspapers of the opposition.

1989 was the year of political tension after the revelation of Koskotas' scandal. There were changes in the publishing map of the country. The historical newspaper *Akropolis* closed down in August because of the shrinkage in the circulation of the morning newspapers. The same thing happened with newspaper *Vradini* that closed down in April of the same year. At the same time, new newspapers appeared. The weekly party newspaper of PASOK *Exormisi* was converted into a daily one, since the socialist party had lost the support of a series of newspapers. Newspaper *Niki* and two, short-lived ones, *Alithia* and *Prootheftiki Allagi*, circulating for only a few days, were published. The total circulation of

morning and evening newspapers reached 1,101,158 copies. The fall of the morning newspapers was dramatic, and it reached 62,084 copies.

1990 was the year that marked the beginning of a rapid fall of all daily newspapers. The appearance of private radio and, mainly, of private television had dramatic effects on the circulation of the Athenian newspapers. The average daily circulation fell to 834,415 copies. At the same time newspapers *Exormisi* and *Proti* stopped publishing (appendix 2)

In the field of the regional press after 1974, the regional newspapers that had closed down during dictatorship started to circulate again, whereas new publishing efforts appear. Among them newspapers *Pierikoi Antilaloi* in the city of Katerini and *Topiki Phoni* in the city of Preveza both were published in 1974. In 1976 *Kerkiraiko Vima* was published in Corfu Island. In 1977 *Kavala* in the city of Kavala and *Empros* of Xanthi were also published. In 1978, *Chaniotiki Eleftherotypia* in Chania and *Patrida* in Xanthi. *Voitiki Ora* of Levadia and *Eleftheria* of Ioannena were published one year later. *Evdomi* of Kavala and *Chronos* of Kozani were published in 1980. In 1981 *Allagi* of Heraklion, *Eleftheria* of Kalamata, *Elefthero Vima* of Komotini and *Agonas* of Chania were published. *Demokratiki* of Rhodes Island and *Kini Gnomi* of the Syros Island were published in 1982. In 1983 *Machitis* in Arta, *Proini* of Korinthos and *Agonas* of Xanthi started to circulate. *Gnomi* of Alexandroupolis, *Imerisia* of Veria, *Proini* of Pyrgos and *Tolmi* of Heraklion were published in 1984. In 1986 *Imerisia* and *Nea* of Viotia and in 1987 *Enimerosi* of Grevena were also published. In 1989 *Orizontes* of Kastoria, *Akritiki Phoni* of Serres and *Proina Nea* of Lamia were published. Finally, *Phoni* of Agrinio, *Proini* of Grevena, *Proinos Logos* of Kozani, *Aiolika Nea* in the island of Lesvos and *Paratiritis* of Komotini were published.

During the 1980s conditions in the provinces began to change, mainly on an economic level. The socialist government followed a policy of relative decentralization, which aimed at the reinforcement of the growth of the region. Despite the fact that the results were not what the government had anticipated, there were some positive points.

The government of PASOK was able to negotiate with the European Economic Community the so-called Mediterranean Integrated Programs, which supported a series of investment projects with stress on tourism. Towards the end of the '80s the implementation of the first European Community Financial Framework began, which, in turn, contributed towards the growth of the region. 'Under these circumstances the local press began to grow, since the local markets too knew a slow but steady growth' (Skamnakis: 2005: 258).

Despite the appearance of new factors, regional press continued to be of limited circulation and readability, with the exemption of the regions of Thessaly, West Peloponnese and Crete. Its income came mainly from the public publications and from the direct and indirect forms of subsidies. But this period was the period of preparation for the important changes that materialized in the next few years both in investments and in readability.

Journalism Profession

The fall of the dictatorship found the journalism profession in intense mobility. In 28 of April 1975, journalists began a strike with economic demands. The strike lasted for two weeks and, as a result, the journalists won raises from 18% to 30% (Leandros: 1992: 272). Newspapers were not published, with the exemption of the newspapers of the two communist parties, *Rizospastis* and *Avgi* that had satisfied the journalists' demands. At the same time the publishers' association circulated a

small informative leaflet, with daily news of their choice (Kominis: 1985:210), while the journalists went ahead and published newspaper *Adesmefti Gnomi*, in order to cover the gap that was left in updating. This newspaper was printed on the printing press of the newspaper *Eleftheria* that had not circulated again after the fall of dictatorship, as we have already mentioned.

An important development was the passing of Law 780 of 1978 that abolished Law 1004 of 1971 for the journalism profession that the dictatorship had enforced. The new law reinstated Law 1093 of 1938 and the result was another legal labyrinth (Dagtoglou: 1989: 137).

The abolition of Law 1004 of 1971 did not create the conditions for the release of journalists from the parallel work in various public organisations and in the broader public sector. That problem continued to exist and to create relations of dependence on the state. The associations continued to operate as closed unions, with very strict criteria concerning the entrance of new members.

Journalism education

As we have already mentioned, the existence of laws that were issued during dictatorship secured the resources for the establishment of a journalism school. This duty had been entrusted to the Athens Daily Publishers' Association.

It is obvious, however, that the Athens Daily Publishers' Association did not actually want such a school. The junta's Presidential Decree of 1970 allowed six years for the establishment of this school. The dictatorship regime collapsed in 1974. A democratic government was immediately elected. The publishers had to use the mentioned law when the democratic parliament was formed. The Publishers' Association in cooperation with journalists' unions, other press organisations and the newly elected Greek government could have suggested the

democratic reform of the existing legal framework to make it applicable to the needs of the profession within a democratic society. But according to Zacharopoulos, 'press owners feared escalating salaries of trained journalists' (Zacharopoulos: 1996)

In 1977, Act 514 put an end to the discussion for the establishment of a School of Journalism. Ironically, in the same year, from March 17th till April 7th, the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers organised a conference to discuss 'The Problems of Press and Journalism' with the political leaders. Everybody agreed on the necessity of the existence of a university department of journalism or a professional school of journalism (ESIEA: 1977). But, the chance for the establishment of the school had already been lost a few months before. The fact, that none of the political leaders, the participant journalists but also the Minister for the press did not know of the existence of this law is odd enough and it proves that they were not truly interested.

At the same period a hybrid system of journalism training was born on the basis of a 1930s law that allowed private establishments to offer technical training. These private establishments, called 'Free Studies Laboratories' (*Kentra Elefteron Spoudon*), were allowed to offer some journalism training without issuing a recognised certificate. Many well-known journalists taught in these schools but their programme's quality was not guaranteed. 'There are a number of private schools of varying quality at which instruction in practical journalism is given, mainly by senior members of the profession on a part-time basis. Such schools typically run one or two year courses with instruction for two to three hours per day' (Stephenson-Morry: 1990: 211).

In 1978, the School of Law of the University of Athens introduced a Political Communication course within the Department of Political Sciences and

Public Administration. In 1983, the department established a *Direction of Communication*. 'That political communication course was the first cell from which the communication studies came into existence in Greece' (Navridis : 1998: 561). On 9 January 1986, a meeting of the General Secretary of the Ministry of Education, the General Secretary of the Press and Information, the President of Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers and the representative of the Athens Daily Publishers' Association took place in the Ministry of Education in Athens. Its aim was to agree upon the creation of a Journalism school. All sides expressed their view but no agreement was achieved. In February the 12th of the same year, under a proposal that the University of Athens submitted at the Ministry of Education and Religion, a department of communication and mass media was being considered to be established.

The responsibility was taken by the academics who left the press associations back to their dreams. As Anderadis, the former President of the Department of Communication and Mass Media of the Panteion University, pointed out 'The first motive, beyond a general and dull spirit of 'reform', for the establishment of the university departments of Communication was the ambition of some academics and politicians in a country like Greece in which the media dictate political and economic decisions' (Andreadis: 1997: 523).

In almost the same line Zacharopoulos pointed out that, 'Furthermore the left-wing PASOK government was more likely to meet the demands of left-wing university professors who wanted such departments than the worries of the right-wing dominated journalists' guild' (Zacharopoulos: 1996: 55). In 1987, the Journalists' Union of Athens Daily Newspapers started an annual series of nine-month seminars for working and unemployed journalists (Meimaris: 1998: 320). The programme lasted from October to June. Many well-known journalists and

professors from Greece and abroad were invited to teach. The programme was very popular and the Certificate issued by the Journalists Union was accepted from the Newspaper industry. Unfortunately, this annual nine-month seminar stopped in 1994.

In 1987, a plan of a Presidential Decree for the establishment of the Department of Communication and Media Studies at the University of Athens was formed. In 1989, with the Presidential Decree 377 of June the 14th, the Department of Communication and Media Studies was established at the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences in Athens. Among the department's aims was 'the training of journalists and the staff of the daily and periodical press as well as of electronic media'. In the same year with the Presidential Decree 527 of 6 October, the Department of Communication and Media Studies was founded at the University of Athens. Both departments started offering courses in 1990.

Press subsidies

The governmental support towards the press continued after the fall of the dictatorship. The scale of subsidies for the newsprint on the basis of the newspapers' circulation, that dictatorship had imposed, was abolished. The system of subsidies for the newsprint returned to the same situation before the dictatorship. Of course the entry of Greece in the European Economic Community in 1979 changed the facts.

The import of newsprint, if it was done from the countries of the European Economic Community, was no longer subject to import taxes, whereas if it was done from third countries, the common tariff policy of the community applied (Dagtolou: 1989: 74). After the introduction of VAT in 1986, the government of

the socialist party classified with the law 1676 of the same year the newsprint to 6% and not to 18% that applied to other products.

In 1977 with the law 583 the telephone subsidies of the Athenian newspapers were regulated, on the basis of a scale proportional to their average daily circulation. For the regional newspapers applied another scale based on their average daily circulation. This law was again modified in 1989, adding to the telephone subsidies the periodical magazines.

In 1978 the government with the law 780 abolished the law 1004 of 1971 about the journalism profession that the dictatorship had imposed. But it preserved with the article 2 all the press subsidies.

Finally, with the law 1446 the government modified the law 1263 of 1972 concerning the categories of public announcements that were done obligatory in the regional press. With this law not only the dailies but also the weeklies were able to publish public announcements. These were done on the basis of a special price-list that the ministries of Economy and Press decided jointly.

Summary

The fall of dictatorship changed the country's political scene and gradually led to the political system's democratization. Parties were massive and citizens began to play an active role in country's political life. During the first years, the publishers continued to be directly involved in the shaping of politics and political powers to take measures for supporting the press. Under that meaning interdependence continued to exist. But gradually the parties' massiveness and democratization shifted the center of decisions making from political elites and publishers to the parties and the parliament. Under these conditions interdependence between political powers and the press seemed to lessen.

During the 1980s, the rise in the circulation of newspapers but also the changes in the wider field of media created a media market and turned press towards commercialization. This fact was accompanied by the entry of businessmen in the field of the press, who dislodged the traditional publishers.

The entry of businesspeople in the media field brought back interdependence with a new form. Interdependence of this new period is mainly related with the contest for big contracts for public works and public supplies. Businesspeople–publishers provided political and electoral support to the two bigger parties and the parties gave to the publishers-businessmen huge public works and supplies that had no relation with media but concerned other sectors of economy. The interdependence of this period is rather of economic and less of political colour.

CHAPTER 5: POLITICS AND MEDIA (1990-2005)

Political context 1990-2005

The political developments after 1990 are important because of two factors that affected the relations with the media. The first relates to the weakening and the minimization of the political divisions in the Greek political system.

This in turn had an influence on the weakening of the rigid traditional orientation of the newspapers towards the political parties. This tendency, as we have already said, had appeared in the middle of the '80s with the entry of businesspeople in the field of press and with the commercialization that began to develop in the media, especially after de-regulation. As Papathanasopoulos mentions, 'the press's traditional close association with particular parties or individuals has been superseded by a tendency to identify more with a political camp, right, left or centre' (Papathanasopoulos:1999: 383).

The second factor relates to the gradual formation of a politically inadvertent public (Demertzis-Kafetzis: 1996:184) and to the lessening of the high degree of political participation (Swanson: 2000: 427), which in turn comprise of factors that affected the developments concerning the circulation especially of the national newspapers.

On the contrary, the above mentioned factors did not affect the broadcasting media, since they were able to address multiple social group categories, including the politically indifferent groups. The Greek press remain, as we have already seen, close to politics despite the strong tendencies of commercialisation. As Kapekakis mentions, 'we must point out the high participation in the television news programme even of those groups that show little or no interest in politics' (Kapekakis: 2002:152). But of most importance are

the two aforementioned factors, (that is the minimization of the political and ideological divisions but mainly the lessening of the political participation), the media were upgraded and converted into basic vehicles of influence on the exercise of politics. In particular, as it has correctly been observed, there emerged 'the enforcement of the power and of the political strength of television as a medium and as an institution of the country's political system' (Demertzis: 2002:15).

New Democracy's return to power in June 1990 was accompanied by the adoption of a neo-liberal economic policy (Voulgaris:2003: 40, Iordanoglou:2003: 88). This resulted in great strikes, especially this of the public transportation which lasted for almost nine months, created political tension and social polarization. The political divisions continued to exist in that phase, despite the fact that the two ruling parties had shifted from their traditional political views and policies during the middle of the '80s. PASOK had shifted towards the adoption of more social-democratic policy, a fact that was also expressed with its entry into the Socialist International in 1988. New Democracy had abandoned the practices of the post-war right-wing parties and it did not hesitate, as we have already seen, to form a government with the participation of the communist left. Thus, despite the changes concerning the physiognomy of the two bigger parties, the political divisions continued to exist and to play an important role in the country's political life. This was also affected by the historical juxtaposition between the two political leaders, Konstantinos Mitsotakis and Andreas Papandreou (Diamantopoulos: 1997: 297).

Despite all the aforementioned factors, the foundations for the de-escalation of the political divisions had already been laid, since the ideological and the political distances between the two bigger parties had begun to grow

smaller. As Papas mentions, 'the lessening of the ideological distance between the two bigger parties as well as New Democracy's occasional approach towards the Communist Party gradually weakened polarization, a fact that constitutes the most important development in the modern political system' (Pappas: 2001: 11). In March 1991 the trials for the Koskotas scandal began, where the accused were five ex-ministers of PASOK, including Andreas Papandreou. Finally, after a stormy judicial process, Papandreou was pronounced not guilty, and two ex-ministers were found guilty. A third one, Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas, died of a heart attack inside the courthouse. The fact that Andreas Papandreou was pronounced not guilty and the ending of the trial contributed to the decrease of political tension.

In June 1991, KKE seceded from the electoral coalition it had formed with the Greek Left (EAR) for the elections of 1989. The Coalition kept its title and it converted from a left-wing electoral alliance to a new party that had, as its main component, the Greek Left. A large group of low- and high-ranking members of KKE remained in the Coalition of the Left. Two women became leaders of KKE and EAR. Mrs Aleka Papariga was elected secretary general of KKE and Mrs Maria Damanaki president of the Coalition of the Left (EAR). For the first time in the history of the country two women were at the head of Greek political parties. In June 1992, Greece adopted the Treaty of Maastricht with the support of ND and PASOK. The Greek Communist Party and the Coalition of the Left voted against it. The common stand of the two bigger parties concerning the treaty of Maastricht, independently of their differentiation on other minor matters, showed their political consensus concerning important issues and it reaffirmed the tendency for ideological convergence of the two basic poles of the Greek party system.

During the same period problems began to appear in the relations between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, concerning the issue of the name. In 1944, Tito, wanting to preserve the balance between the various national groups that participated in the Yugoslavian Federation, gave to the northern part of his country the name Macedonia. Actually the wider geographic area of Macedonia was divided between three neighboring countries, Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In 1991 this former state of the united Yugoslavia won its independence maintaining the same name but with political demands to the 'heritage of ancient Macedonia and to the creation of a Great Macedonia' (Clogg: 2003: 241).

As it was expected, the Greeks reacted strongly because they believed that they retained historical and cultural relations with ancient Macedonia. The Greeks also had geographical relations with the area, since the northern part of Greece was and still is named Macedonia and its Greek inhabitants call themselves Macedonians. The situation began to get complicated and to feed the nationalism of both parts. In the reproduction of the nationalistic stereotypes the media played an important role. On the Greek side, as Armenakis *et al* mention, 'almost the whole of the press coped with the Macedonian issue and the Yugoslavian crisis in an intensely nationalistic way. The repetition of ethnocentric views and arguments contributed to the cultivation of a stereotype approach to the national issues. The result was to constrict the margins of the political and the diplomatic manoeuvres of the government in order to shape an effective policy concerning foreign affairs' (Armenakis *et al*: 1996: 217).

In 1992 Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis asked for the resignation of the Greek minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonis Samaras, because of the uncompromising nationalistic stand he had adopted concerning the Macedonian

issue. During the following year, 1993, the ex-minister, after he left New Democracy, created a new party with the name Political Spring (Politiki Anoixi). Three more MPs from New Democracy, and, as a result, New Democracy lost its parliamentary majority. So, new elections were proclaimed for October of the same year.

At the same time, the government of Mitsotakis faced a vigorous attack by large groups of companies because of the 49% sale of the share of stocks of the Hellenic Telecommunication Organization (OTE). This organization had a public-oriented character and it possessed a dynamic monopolistic position in the Greek market. It represented a strategic target for the large groups of companies that wished to penetrate the telecommunication market. In this attack against the government the businesspeople used media that either belonged to them or in which they participated as shareholders. Konstantinos Mitsotakis publicly denounced this attack by the businessmen and parts of the media, introducing into the Greek political terminology the word “Diaploki”. This term can be translated as “Interplay” in English, although its exact meaning cannot be easily conveyed. The use of this word now became dominant in Greek political life, since it described the relations between the big groups of companies and the media and the pressures they put on the government to secure public contracts. This was the first time that businesspeople, using the media as their tool, displayed organized and open pressure, in their effort to damage an elected government that did not satisfy their demands.

This fact shows the continuously growing role of the media owners-businesspeople compared to political power, and especially the strengthening of the first compared to the second. The elections of 1993 brought PASOK back to power with a percentage of 46.9%. They were preceded by another change of the

electoral law, by which the simple proportional system had again been modified and the threshold for entering parliament was set at 3% of the total of those who had voted.

New Democracy received 39.3% and the Communist party 4.5% and nine seats. A surprise was the fact that Political Spring, the ex-minister of Foreign Affairs Antonis Samaras attained third place, with a percentage of 4.9% and 10 seats. The Coalition of the Left received 2.94% and it elected no MPs, since the threshold for entering the parliament was 3%. New Democracy's defeat had to do with a number of factors:

The first was the rigid neo-liberal policy it had followed and especially the policy of privatization. The reaction of the unions was intense, and as a result workers once again rallied around PASOK. As Voulgaris mentions, 'economic neo-liberalism as a policy has a limited social base and unstable social alliances in Greece. So it needs a strong and stable political context in order to become accepted' (Voulgaris: 2003: 40).

Secondly, the acquittal of Andreas Papandreou was considered a defeat for New Democracy (Loulis:1995:338-341), to the extent that it had invested politically in the scandal and the involvement in it of the leader of the socialist party. The moral restoration of Andreas Papandreou gave new encouragement to both the supporters of PASOK and its voters, who, during the end of the '80s, had turned to other parties.

Thirdly, the resignation of the minister of Foreign Affairs Antonis Samaras and the creation of a new right-wing party also contributed to the decline of New Democracy. Political Spring drew most of its voters from New Democracy, since it was essentially one of its component parts.

Konstantinos Mitsotakis resigned right after the election, and in his place Miltiades Evert was elected to the leadership of New Democracy. He was ex-mayor of Athens, who had had a leading role in the creation of the first municipal radio-station. As we have already said, the ex-mayor of Athens had a great reputation because of his initiatives for the creation of the municipal radio station and, later, a television service. At the same time he was at the head of the internal opposition in New Democracy. Later, Andreas Papandreou and the socialist party took over power they followed a tough line on the issue of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That became especially obvious after the contracting of diplomatic relations between the new state with a series of European countries and with the USA, as well. The Greek government went ahead and closed the borders and it also imposed an embargo. Andreas Papandreou tried to preserve and to express Greek nationalism in order to gain political benefits.

At the same time massive rallies were organized demanding the change of the name of the new state. In one of these which was organized in Salonica, Greek Macedonia, more than 1,200,000 people took part. That number was greater even than that of the massive political demonstrations of the big parties that were organized during the '80s. PASOK followed a policy of economic cut-backs in order to deal with the huge public deficits. The main target for both parties was the entry of Greece into the EU Economic and Monetary Union.

In this way the political consensus between the two bigger parties concerning Economic and Monetary Union was reinforced, a fact that demanded common views and, mainly, common strategy. Under these circumstances the political differences tended to minimize, while the political divisions became more limited. The schism right-left or right and anti-right had already begun to weaken towards the end of the '80s 'with the weakening of the relations between

the parties and their voters and with the lessening of the interest towards politics' (Kiprianos: 1997:136). During the middle of the '90s, political divisions had almost ceased to comprise the dominant element of the Greek political system. However, a new model of differentiation of the parties began to emerge. This new political discourse began to take shape on the basis of a relative and peculiar division between centre-right and centre-left. The two bigger parties began to address the centre that, oddly enough, did not constitute a composed and organized political group. In Greece the parties of the centre had stopped to exist at the end of the '70s.

The matter of the right-wing parties shift to the centre and the socialist parties towards the centre has been analyzed extensively by many political authors. Nevertheless, the invocation of the centre should be considered as typological and formalistic and not as a reference to a political party composed on the basis of true ideological and political powers, at least in Greece. The appeal to the centre by the two bigger parties relates more to the appearance and the growth of politically indifferent and alienated social groups, which are nevertheless real and comprise an element of political reference. Political inadvertent public and political alienated social groups prefer better to be placed in the centre than the right or left-wing parties (Loulis:1995, Kafetzis:2000). As Kafetzis mentions, 'the political alienation in Greece in 1985 was on an obviously lower level than that of Spain, Italy and Portugal, while in 1990 it reached the same levels' (Kafetzis: 2000: 227).

During the middle of the '90s 'the percentage of those who showed a limited interest or no interest in politics surpassed half of the electorate and it reached 58.9%' (Pappas: 2001: 92). This political indifference created a heterogeneous electoral grouping. Those who were politically indifferent

comprised an electoral grouping by virtue, which could not be demarcated ideologically and politically on the basis of the dominant political and theoretical schemes like for example Marxism. They were simply indifferent.

In the context of a dipolar political system, the indifferent electoral grouping, in a rather arbitrary way, is moved and/or self-defined in the centre (Loulis:1995:560). Exactly that electoral grouping is claimed by the two bigger parties, moving towards the centre or making references to it.

But the populists and the leftists that remained in the party opposed the turn of PASOK towards the market economy, the controlled privatizations, and the reduction of public spending.

In 1995 the ex-minister of PASOK, Dimitris Tsouvolas, whose prestige was very high because of his leftist- populist views, left the socialist party and established a new party with the title Democratic Social Movement (DHKKI). As it has been stated, an important part of the left tendency of the socialist party had gradually either resigned or had been expelled. Furthermore, a big part of the left high-ranking members of the party had staffed the government mechanism and the state bureaucracy, and resulted in their supporting more vigorously the choices of their leadership than the left and socialist ideological character of the party (Katsoridas: 2006). So the leadership of PASOK without resistance from inside the party managed to enforce its policy and to shift closer towards liberal policies. However, the political programme of PASOK was not exactly the same as the one of New Democracy during the period 1990-1993.

The class synthesis of the socialist party continued to be different than that of New Democracy, despite the appearance of new class transpositions that were happening in the electoral base of the two parties. These transpositions blunted but did not reverse the historical result of the intense class differentiation of the

two parties (Mavris: 1997: 193). This fact, that is the class origin of the socialist party, obstructed the adoption of a neo-liberal policy by PASOK. (Katsoridas:2006). In spring of 1995 the term of the President of the Hellenic Republic, Konstantinos Karamanlis, came to its end. After a proposal by the Political Spring, the two bigger parties, that is PASOK and New Democracy, agreed Kostis Stefanopoulos to be elected as the new President of the Hellenic Republic. The new president was an old high-ranking member of New Democracy, who during the '80s had left that party and had established a small party, DHANA. On November 1995 Andreas Papandreou was once again admitted to hospital. For almost two months the country was without a Prime Minister. Finally, on January 1996 Papandreou resigned and six months later he died.

The death of Andreas Papandreou and the death of Konstantinos Karamanlis later, in 1998, signed the end of the charismatic leaders and of the leader-oriented parties in Greece. From that period onward the parties will have a more collective and modernist leadership. The successor of Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister was Professor Kostas Simitis of Panteion University of Athens, who had participated actively in the anti-dictatorship organization, Democratic Defense, as well as in PASOK since its establishment. He had been a minister with the governments of PASOK and he was intensely anti-populist. He had created during the last few years a powerful opposition internally in PASOK that criticized the populists. His election as Prime Minister, after the resignation of Papandreou, was done by the parliamentary group of the governing party, according to the relative provisions of the constitution (Mendrinou: 2000: 127).

Right after his election, Prime Minister Kostas Simitis faced a serious crisis with Turkey, which almost led the two countries into a state of war. This fact was of a special importance, because the media played a leading role in

worsening the tension between both countries (Tilic: 2000: 60). In December 1995, a small Turkish boat grounded on a small rocky island, Imia, which was between the Greek Island Kalimnos and the Turkish coastline. The Greek rescuers went to help rescue the crew, but the Turkish refused, claiming that they were on Turkish soil. In the next days the mayor of Kalimnos and a group of the people of the island sailed to the rocky island and raised the Greek flag. A few days later a Turkish newspaper, *The Hurriyet*, sent a group of journalists. They lowered the Greek flag and raised the Turkish one. The press in both countries set fire to public opinion, and this event evolved from a hilarious subject into a particularly serious confrontation (Clogg: 2003:252). In the next few days a small group of Greek Special Army Forces landed on the small rocky island and after it lowered the Turkish flag raised, once again, the Greek flag. The Turkish military forces landed and occupied the nearby rocky island raising their own flag. At the same time the armament of the fleet of both countries had sailed around the two rocky islands, ready for battle that was avoided at the last minute after intervention by the USA President Bill Clinton. The crisis at Imia represents an example of how the media can play a leading role in the development of a crisis. In both cases the problem with the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in the case of the Greek-Turkish relations of the Imia crisis, the Greek media played an important role in the reproduction of nationalistic stereotypes, influencing at the same time the configuration of foreign affairs (Panagiotopoulou: 1996, Armenakis *et al*: 1996). After the crisis of Imia, prime-minister Kostas Simitis, in order to secure his power, announced his candidacy for the presidency of the party. His election took place in a climate of intense conflict between the two leading groups of the party, the populists and the social-democrats. Within almost six months he had attained total control of the party and of the government. Not only to increase

his social acceptance, but also due to the fact that the parliamentary group had elected him. Simitis announced elections for September 1996.

The elections of 1996 conducted under the same electoral system of reinforced proportional, and the threshold for entry in the parliament was 3%. PASOK was once again the first party with 41.5% whereas New Democracy was second with 38,1%. KKE increased its percentage to 5.6% and the Coalition of the Left entered for the first time in the parliament with 5.1% and 10 seats. As it was expected, DHKKI entered the parliament as well, with 4.5% and 9 seats. Political Spring got 2.9% and did not manage to have a representative in parliament. This was expected since the party was mainly formed due to the problem with the name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In the elections of 1996 compared to the elections of 1993 it became obvious that the electorate had to shifted towards smaller parties, 'but this fact did not represent a fundamental change in the Greek party system' (Zafiroopoulos- Chatzipantelis: 1999: 26). At the same time, the percentage of the invalid and the blank ballots was the highest ever in parliamentary elections since the collapse of the dictatorship (Mavris: 1997: 185).

Obviously the shift towards the smaller parties but also the increased percentage of the blank and invalid ballots were related to the general political disappointment, that was in that given moment expressed in that way. But the shift of voters towards the smaller parties was later discontinued because of a number of factors.

Firstly, there was the dominance of the clientelistic relationships that were exercised in a massive way by the two bigger parties-patrons as well as the dipolar historical character of the Greek political system.

Secondly, there was the inborn political weakness of the smaller left-wing parties. The developments in the countries of Eastern Europe continued to influence the parties of the left, both on an ideological and on an organizational level. The other parties, for example Political Spring or even DHKKI, were created on the basis of a political juxtaposition that appeared in the political life of the country at a given period. They were more parties of protest than parties with a complete political programme.

Thirdly, their creation occurred at a period of time in Greece, as in other countries as well, when 'the traditional organizational relationship of the political parties to the reference groups they represented had declined and the adherence of the voters to the political parties changed from one electoral confrontation to the other' (Swanson: 2000: 242).

The period that followed the elections of 1996 heralded the abandonment of the policy that PASOK followed till then (Katsoridas:2006). Kostas Simitis introduced the terms of renewal and of a "New PASOK". His policy was based on the so-called "Third Way" of social democracy, as Giddens (1998) and other theoreticians expressed it.

'In effect the third road accepts the values of neo-liberalism in the political, economical and social sphere and it seems as if it has virtually no relation with traditional socialist values and policies' (Makrydemetres: 2002: 235).

According to Mouzelis 'the meaning of the third way does not comprise an intermediate solution between socialism and liberalism. Actually it is an intermediate solution between conventional social democracy (as it was applied during the first three decades after the end of the war in Western Europe) and neo-liberalism of the type Thatcher/ Reagan' (Mouzelis: 2002: 15).

PASOK's new policy differed greatly from its older policy. Where the third road of Andreas Papandreou was the adoption of an intermediate position between the traditional social democracy and Marxism, the "Third Way" of Simitis was an intermediate position between social democracy and neo-liberalism. So towards the end of the '90s a complete ideological and political turn had taken place in PASOK. In the offices of the local branches of the party there were no longer photos of Marx and Engels. As we have already mentioned, the political indifference and alienation began to be the dominant tendency from the beginning of the '90s. This fact created centrifugal tendencies inside the parties as well. The parties remained massive but the number of their active members had decreased noticeably compared to the '70s and '80s. That tendency was, and continues to be, a characteristic of this period and represents a norm in the broader European area (Swanson: 2000:422). As Blumer mentions, 'the internal organization of the political parties is being deactivated as less and less members participate in their activities' (Blumer: 2000: 368).

Actually the example of the students who had always been a dynamic and extremely politicized part of the county's population is very characteristic. The students were the main reservoir for drawing new low- and high- ranking members for almost all the Greek political parties during the '70s and the '80s. In research that was undertaken by Demertzis and Armenakis (2000) it was reaffirmed that, compared to the general population, the students continued to exhibit much more interest in politics. But, despite this interest in politics, it was observed that the students 'were possessed by repulsion towards the students' organizations, and that in an overwhelming majority (88.5%) they stated that they were not members of a party or of a party's youth organization' (Demertzis-Armenakis: 2000:42).

The new government of PASOK began to take measures that aimed at getting Greece accepted as a member in the European Economic and Monetary Union. This aim was of first priority and of the highest importance for the government of Kostas Simitis. On the financial level, his government raised taxes, reduced public expenditure and extended privatizations of public organizations. These measures brought about a storm of reactions with strikes in almost all sectors of the economy. Despite this, the new government managed to control the situation and to continue its policy of Greece's entry into the EMU.

In March 1998 the government depreciated the national currency, the drachma, and locked it into the Mechanism of Exchange Parity of the future Euro-zone. After the defeat of New Democracy, the leader of the party Miltiades Evert resigned. In his position Kostas Karamanlis was elected, the nephew of Konstantinos Karamanlis who had established the party. The new leader of New Democracy was only 41 years old, with a very good education in the USA, but with very little experience in politics. He was, however, more open to new ideas and views, and he intended to distance himself from the neo-liberal ideas that were dominant in New Democracy during the period of Konstantinos Mitsotakis. His policy led to an equal opening towards the so-called centre and towards a right of a new kind, the 'popular right' or 'center-right', as the members of the party called it.

The Euro-elections of 1999 gave New Democracy a majority, and this fact encouraged it to ask for premature elections, having as its cause the ending of the term of the President of the Republic. Indeed the national elections took place two months later, on April of 2000. PASOK was again the winner, with a percentage of 43.2% marking a small increase compared to the elections of 1996. But given the negative climate due to the harsh economic measures, this victory was

considered an important accomplishment for Kostas Simitis. New Democracy occupied second place, raising its percentage by 4.6%. This increase was partly due to Political Spring's decision to withdraw from the elections and to render passive support. But the main losers were the smaller parties. KKE maintained its percentage receiving 5.4%. The Coalition of the Left received 3.2% compared to 5.1% it had in 1996. DHKKI failed to elect an MP because it received 2.7%. The elections of 2000 confirmed that the two bigger parties were the 'key-players' of the party system in Greece. The percentage of both of them reached 86.5% of the total electoral body. The relative reinforcement of the smaller parties during the elections of 1996 was obviously a blip. But it did express the political dissatisfaction of this period.

PASOK's victory was mainly due to the economic development that, during that period, was at relatively high levels. It is characteristic of this development that in 2000, a year of elections, the Gross National Product increased by 4.4%, which was the largest increase since 1978. The continuous inflow of resources from the five European Union Financial funds played an important role, as did the implementation of the third European Union Financial Framework towards Greece.

In 1989 the inflows from the EC constituted 3.8% of the Gross National Product, compared to the 3% during the period 1981-1988 (Iordanoglou: 2003: 66). An important factor that contributed to the development of the economy was the inexpensive labor force, especially the immigrants from Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Pakistan etc whose number, according to the general census of 2001, was around 800,000. At the same time Greece undertook the organization of the Olympic Games in 2004, and that led to an unprecedented explosion in the field of constructions, that had as a pivot the public sector. The subway (metro) of

Athens, the new airport, Egnatia highway that connected horizontally the Ionian Sea with the eastern borders of the country, the Attiki Highway, the Rio-Antirio bridge that connected Peloponnese with North-Eastern Greece vertically, the building of regional hospitals, airports and new sport centres, began to transform the country.

Nevertheless, the opposition publicly accused the government many times of preferential treatment of a certain construction company, whose owner was at the same time the owner of one of the largest media groups in Greece. From public accusations by opposition parties it became obvious that George Bobolas' Company had been involved in almost all the important public projects, thus gaining huge sums of money. He was one of the owner of *Ethnos* and *Imerisia dailies* and a shareholder of Mega Channel. Similarly, the owner of the biggest Greek private telecommunication company and of the first mobile company in the country was involved in public contracts. Socrates Kokalis was simultaneously one of the biggest suppliers to the Hellenic Telecommunication Organization, in which the state continued to own the majority of the shares and to appoint the management. This particular businessman was also the owner of one of the first radio-stations in Athens. This radio-station was networking with several local radio stations. This was possible because of a law which allowed the networking of local radio stations with others for up to 40% of the total radio-programs.

This activity he tried to extend in television as well by buying first a local television channel in Piraeus, Magic TV. Then he started to negotiate the purchase of a large number of local and regional channels, intending to network them and to convert them into a national television network.

The opposition, but also high-ranking members of PASOK, identified him as a new Koskotas, who aimed to submit the political system to his business

objectives, and they accused Simitis of “Interplay”. Following all these pressures, Simitis dismissed one of his closest collaborators who were responsible for encouraging this businessman to enter dynamically in the field of the media. All these factors, combined with other accusations continuously made by the opposition concerning preferential treatment of certain businessmen by the government of Simitis, created an intense contest between the two parties and damaged the Prime Minister’s public image. An important role during both the elections of 1996 and of 2000 was played by the media and particularly television. The parties had already begun to use television in order to address their followers and voters from the beginning of the ‘90s. The singularly high percentages of television ratings rendered it especially effective. A new industry made its appearance gradually from the beginning of the ‘90s. ‘This industry is made up of pollsters, media specialists, TV producers, communication professionals or image-makers’ (Yannas:2002:77). The new fields of political communication, political marketing and political advertisement started to play an important role.

The political parties shifted their interest from traditional ways of communication that emphasized the existence of the powerful regional organizations of the parties, to the modern forms of political communication. So the parties themselves began to abandon their organizational efforts that aimed at their development and growth in membership. This fact in its turn influenced the extent of active political participation of the citizens in them, but also in politics, generally. This occurred because the existence of objective factors is not sufficient to maintain the growth or decline of the party membership. The leadership, which can function in a catalytic way in this context, plays an important role.

Although a decrease in the political participation of citizens in Greece had already become obvious before the emergence of private television, the appearance and development of television reproduced or reinforced this tendency (Demertzis-Kafetzis: 1996:205). At the same time, the political discourse of the parties became more and more slogan-oriented, less explanatory and focused around certain subjects, like for example fashion news, most of which were selected by the media (Papathanasopoulos:1997). Under these circumstances the political discourse of the parties results in the breakdown of idealized perceptions and is converted into a “televsual discourse” that is extremely consensual.

As Papathanasopoulos mentions ‘using television more and more for the needs of their political communication, the television-born politicians tend to express more and more center-oriented views, exactly like the television programs, in order to attract larger parts of the population’ (Papathanasopoulos: 2002: 52). What is also important is the formation of television elite that started to appear gradually and to play a role in the shaping of the televsual discourse. A few lawyers, a few politicians, some athletes and actors of soap operas and, oddly enough, some fashion models, constituted a television elite who supposedly possessed social knowledge. It is not by chance that in the last two elections, besides the well known television presenters who decided to give up television and to occupy themselves with politics, all the aforementioned television groups were represented in the Greek parliament, including a representative for the fashion models. But the most important problem that worried Greek society was the high rate of unemployment, which for 2000 was at about 11%. Unemployment had mostly hit the youth and women.

Economic development was not reflected in the creation of new jobs. The two most dynamic sectors of the economy (construction and tourism) had some

special characteristics. The Greeks rejected the jobs offered in the construction sector because of the strenuous and hard working conditions. The immigrants took those jobs. According to the census of the National Statistic Service, 24.5% of immigrants (about 200,000) workers were working in construction sector. The other dynamic sector of the economy, tourism, had a clearly seasonal character.

As we have already mentioned, the economic development, despite the serious problem of unemployment, had created generally a very positive climate. As a result, the Stock Market of Athens had impressive growth during the period 1998-2000. The prices of all shares, without exemption, were increasing with geometrical progress and that entitled an alarming majority of Greeks into buying and selling shares. This phenomenon was of such proportions that even housewives, students and pensioners had entered into the stock market, investing most of the time in shares that did not correspond to their true value. Actually some of them were acquiring loans from banks in order to invest the sums into the stock market. That climate was cultivated by most of the media, but also by high-ranking officials of the government.

After 2000 there was a precipitous decline in the price of the shares and as a result hundreds of thousands of Greeks lost their money. This fact had catalytic effects and a large part of the voters turned towards New Democracy that had the compensation of shareholders as a first priority in its political agenda. In 2002 Greece entered the economic zone of the Euro and its national currency, Drachma, was replaced by it. The introduction of the Euro pushed the prices of goods upwards, and as a result the cost of living became extremely high even in comparison with other European Union countries (Eurostat:2006). Greece was converted from an inexpensive country, as far as the cost of living was concerned, to a rather expensive one, compared to other European countries. At the same

time wages and salaries were the lowest in Europe, approaching the wages of Portugal. Under these circumstances the government of PASOK began to lose social support and voters. Moreover, through various polls, the strengthening of New Democracy became obvious.

Just before the elections of March 2004, Kostas Simitis resigned from the presidency of PASOK. George Papandreou was elected in his place. He was till then the Minister of Foreign Affairs and son of Andreas Papandreou. Georgios Papandreou led PASOK to the elections of 2004. The fact that both politicians who were candidates for Prime Minister, were closely related with two ex-leaders and establishers of the two largest parties, may indicative of certain traditions of Greek politics, which, should they continue to exist, could be a subject of further research. In the elections of March 2004, New Democracy received 45.4% of votes and was elected into office. PASOK received 40.6% and KKE 5.9%, marking an increase compared to 2000 by 0.4%, and finally, the Coalition of the Left attained 3.3% remaining at almost the same levels that it had during the last elections. In general, the period 1990-2004 was of special importance for the country, because a new environment was created for almost all fields of economic, social and political life.

MEDIA DEVELOPMENTS 1991-2005: COMMERCIALISATION AND POLITICISATION

The developments in the wider media landscape since the 1990s have been defined by liberalisation, intense commercialization and the growth of the private market that transformed the country's mass communication system in general.

What one witnesses is a change in media ownership, the dominance of television in the field of public and political communication, a continuous 'power-game' between the government of the day and the licenses of the TV and radio stations and a delayed restructure of the public service broadcaster. I will try to point out these trends. As regards the picture of the media landscape in the same period see appendix 4:

Changes in media ownership

Until 1991, one sees the transformation of the ownership structure of the Greek media. In effect, one witnesses the passing of almost all national newspapers from the hands of the traditional publishers to the hands of business people, who had (still have) vested interests in other sectors of the economy. The only exemption was Mr. Christos Lambrakis, publisher of newspapers *Ta Nea* and *To Vima*. This, however, has not diminished the politicization of the Greek media. As Street mentions refereeing in the case of Great Britain: 'The fact that we have seen the decline of the press baron, whose interests were traditionally linked to politics and to exercising influence, does not mean that press ownership as a source of power died with Lords Northcliffe and Rothermere' (Street: 2001:130). In the case of Greece, the commercialisation of the media has not led automatically to their neutralization. On the contrary as Acchimastos and Komninou have noted:

Political conflicts (may) no longer characterize the identity of a newspaper... (but) we do not believe that there is complete substitution of the party press by commerce. Greek readers continue to prefer a context of politicized press' (Achimastos- Komninou: 1998: 409).

The fast entry of businesspeople in the media field is mainly related to the 'perceived power' of the media in the Greek public. The businesspeople have entered the field because they believed that they will better serve their vested interests in the other sectors of the economy, in they could 'massage' the media content. For example, even during the 1990s, when commercialization was so powerful, the press in Greece had a decisive influence on politics, and especially on voting behaviour. For that reason, businesspeople gradually infiltrated into the field of the press and dominated it, despite the fact that newspapers, as a whole, were in a bad economic situation. In brief, businesspeople infiltrated the press and late the electronic media not because they were expecting to have immediate profits by that activity, but mainly in order to serve indirectly their main economic activities outside the media, obtaining the control of one of country's basic political institutions.

As Leandros mentions, 'the publicity, the prestige and the political power that accompany the buying or the publishing of a newspaper should be considered as the most important reasons for the interest on behalf of the businessmen for entering the sector of printed media. The economic advantages that the businesspeople may have are long-term (for example, favourable legal regulations, increased negotiating power) and are, probably, much more important than the cost of buying or publishing a newspaper' (Leandros: 2000: 201). What is interesting from the history of media deregulation in Greece is the entry of entrepreneurs into the media scene and since, as Papathanassopoulos notes (1997:

360-361) 'Greek newspapers are widely recognized as being political rather than business ventures, which raises questions about their [owners'] motives'.

One can divide the entry of businesspeople into two major phases. During the first phase, businesspeople began to buy either titles of newspapers that had closed down (or were about to) because of their bad economic situation or newspapers' businesses that were in circulation but were, nevertheless, suffering big losses. As an example of the first case we can mention newspaper *Ethnos*, and of the second, newspaper *Kathimerini*.

Although this is not unique in Europe, for example in Great Britain or in Germany newspapers also changed hands many times⁷ (Seymour-Ure: 1996; Kleinsteuber-Tomas: 2000), in Greece the newcomers instead of limiting their activities to the field of the media or even to the entertainment industry, they increased their business activity outside the field of the media. To a certain extent the Greek media entrepreneur corresponds to what Graham Murdock has called 'general conglomerate' (2000: 78), i.e., a media owner who has no necessary a direct relationship with media interest (Street: 2001:126). In Greece, the ongoing increase of power of the 'media- general conglomerates' started worrying the political authorities (Leandros, 2000: 210). In 1996 the government of the socialist party proposed to parliament a law, the law 2398, concerning the legal status of radio-television and the media market. This law theoretically limited the

⁷ According to Seymour-Ure in Great Britain 'there were some 17 major changes of ownership of national dailies and Sundays between 1945 and 1995. More than half took place after 1980' (Seymour-Ure: 1996: 38). Some of these businesses were active in the broadcasting and the publishing field, having a multi-media character, as for example Rupert Murdoch's News International. Something similar happened in Germany as well, where certain businesspeople were active in the field of radio-television and in the press also, for example Bertelsmann (Kleinsteuber-Tomas: 2000: 6).

concentration of ownership.⁸ In reality that law was never enforced since many of the publishers-businesspeople participated in two television stations or owned even three different categories of media. Needless to say, almost all of them had some kind of economic transactions with the public. In his research, Demitrios Psychoyios, the ex-member of the National Broadcasting Council and professor in the Department of Communication, Culture and Media Studies of Panteion University, discovered a number of infringements into almost all the shareholders lists of the television stations of national range (Psychogios: 2001). While various governments passed laws in order to limit the unlawful activities of the media-businesspeople, at the same time they were having transactions with them and they consigned them public supplies and contracts of enormous value, leading to the so called 'licensing game'.

Broadcasting licenses and politics

The deregulation of the broadcasting system and the entry of private radio and TV stations were rather haphazard and did not follow either rules or criteria. In fact, as it is well known, in Greece the new structure of the field was based on a pre-existing interdependence between the media owners and the political power (Papathanassopoulos: 1993 & 1997, Karamanis: 2003, Panagiotopoulou: 2004-see appendix 5). Indeed, the publishers and businesspeople put pressure on the government of the day during the period 1989-1990, and as a result the first

⁸ . For example, no physical or legal person could own more than 25% of the shares in only one company that owned a television station. The same went for the relatives of that person, up to the fourth degree of kinship. Also, the same physical or legal person could not participate in more than two different categories of media that is a television channel and a newspaper or a radio station. The same law introduced the so-called incompatible

temporary license for a private television (Mega Channel) was given to them. An earlier temporary license was given to Nea Teleorasi, whose shareholders were also publishers. But that channel never operated.⁹ As Daremas and Terzis note: 'The granting of television licences was not the outcome of an open, publicly accountable, competitive process of bidding among various candidates, but the result of behind-doors negotiations and political blackmail due to the political clout held by the press barons of the period' (Daremas and Terzis: 2000:119).

The general instability of the period 1989-1993 and the impotence of the parties in shaping effective policies contributed to the favourable treatment of the publishers-businessmen by the political power, concerning the issuance of temporary television licenses. As Komninou mentions 'the group of businesspeople-publishers took advantage of the political crisis in order to handle the privatization of television in such a way as to obtain the most important share. In their efforts the publishers-businessmen had the unlimited support of New Democracy, which, in its turn, expected to gain political benefits' (Komninou: 181: 2002). Probably history is repeating itself, but on another level. In the past,

and the obligatory nominalization of the shares up to 15% of those that were active in the field of public supplies and, at the same time, in media.

⁹. Until 1993, besides Mega Channel, Antenna and Nea Teleorasi, which never operated, five more channels had appeared and demanded operation licenses of national range: New Channel whose shareholders were a group of businessmen who were friendly towards New Democracy. Kanali 29, with the main shareholder, the publisher of pro-PASOK populist newspaper Avriani, George Kouris. This television channel was replaced in 1994 by Star Channel that belonged to the Vardinogiannis family, which was also shareholder in Mega Channel and owner of the newspaper *Mesimvrini*. Sky TV that belonged to a shareholder of Mega Channel, Alaphouzos family, who was the publisher of the newspaper *Kathimerini*. Finally, Seven X and 902 TV. The latter belonged to the Communist party. Most of the television channels belonged to publishers-businessmen.

as we have already mentioned, when there was political instability and political crisis, the publishers intervened in a more dynamic way in the shaping of politics and played a decisive role in the political developments. During the period 1989-1993, the businesspeople-owners of television channels interfered decisively, aiming not so much at shaping politics, but at securing their future economic interests. Politicians gave in to that effort, expecting, in turn, political benefits. It is exactly this point, the mutual transaction between the political power and the media, which confirms their interdependence during the period of de-regulation as well. Since then, as Papathanassopoulos (1997: 356) has put, there has been 'a continuous licensing game' between the political power and the media owners. In effect, there have been various attempts by successive governments (1990, 1993, 1994, 2000, and 2006) to manage to sort out the broadcasting situation. Unfortunately, this was never realized, since either the Conservative or the Socialists governments remained indecisive in their years in office. Thus, up to the moment of writing this thesis the major political parties when they come to power they announce their intention to grant the broadcasting licences; but, the licences have never been granted. It is obvious that the awarding of licences is a part of the domestic 'political game'. This is obvious in the pre-election period since in most of the cases (1993, 1996, 1999, 2003/4) the governments try to use the licences as a way of delaying and at the same time gaining a tactical advantage in the face of the coming general elections.¹⁰ According to Sims, one of the

¹⁰. In June 1996, with a ministerial decision that was published in the Government's Newspaper on 24th of June, with circulation number 484, the map of frequencies for Athens and for the prefecture of Attica was defined. According to that ministerial decision the radio-stations that were operating in that area should apply for a definitive license of operation. The map of frequencies included 33 frequencies, from which 13 belonged to the public radio and the rest (20) would be given to private radio-stations.

The Ministry of the Press and Media had recorded according to Demertzis and Skamnakis, in the prefecture of Attica, 472 radio-stations, most of which were not operating with a regular program (Demertzis-Skamnakis: 1998: 211). The application for an operation license would end on 17th of January 1997. 86 radio-stations applied for a license. The fact that from the 472 radio-stations that had been recorded only 86 applied for a license is indicative of the fact that their majority did not have the necessary presuppositions. Two years later, the National Broadcasting Council presented the radio-stations that had been selected. During many discussions and deliberations that lasted for another two years, until 2001, with the owners of the radio-stations, the government revised its initial decision twice. It added to the 20 radio-stations that it had already chosen 8 stations with its first revision and 7 more with the second, which would operate in the future. Until March 2002 the 34 of the 35 licenses had been finalized. An operation license was not given to the Church of Piraeus, because of the fact that an operation license had already been given to the Church of Greece, which had its headquarters in Athens. Finally, in March 2001, the government decided to close down almost 70 radio-stations, which continued to operate illegally in Athens and the outskirts. On the issue of the final operation licenses that were given to the radio-stations of the prefecture of Attica, the only area for which definitive operation licenses for radio-stations have been given until today, the interdependence between political power and owners was more than obvious. Most of the publishers and the owners of television stations received operation licenses for radio-stations as well. For example, the Alafouzos family, owner of the daily *Kathimerini* received an operational license for the radio station Melodia, the owner of the television station Ant1, Minos Kyriakou, for the radio station Ant1 radio, the owner of Alpha Channel for the radio station Alpha News. Also, the owner of the weekly newspaper *Ependitis* for the radio station Planet and Sokrates Kokalis for the radio station Flash. Kokalis also owned the local television channel Magic TV, which he planned to transform into a channel of national range, as we have already mentioned. In 2003, the government tried to pass a law that enabled the radio stations to transmit to national range, if they employed at least 35 reporters and had a news program of 12 hours daily. Almost all the regional stations reacted to it, claiming that the problem of the operation licenses in all the prefectures should be solved first, and then a discussion concerning other issues should start. According to Grigoropoulos 'this regulation intended to serve the interests of 5-7 radio stations in Athens, which belonged to big businesses. None of the regional radio stations could afford to employ 35 reporters. Only the radio stations in Athens, which belonged to the businessmen, had such ability. With this regulation political power intended to reinforce even further the owners of the newspapers and television stations of national range' (Grigoropoulos: 2006). Finally, after the intense

factors that created these delays and the revisions with the addition of new licenses was the interplay between political power and the businessmen-owners of media: 'it is clear that the radio enthusiasts who advocated free radio during the movement to privatize have not been served. Instead, a homogenization of the media has developed in which a small number of wealthy and powerful businessmen own and control media properties (Sims: 2003). In 2004, in the aftermath of the general elections, the New Democracy government, and in particular the minister of Press and Mass Media declared in a conference of the Coalition of Radical Left said that: '[our] intention of the legislative work of the new government is to cut the umbilical cord between the businesses of the media and the companies that undertake public contracts. It does not suit the political culture we aspire the media to become vehicles for the exercise of business' or other pressures' (Rousopoulos: 2004).

However, up to the time of writing, only non-official licences have been granted to the stations. The reason for the 'non-action' policy by the governments during these years seems to be simple. According to Papathanassopoulos (1997: 357-360) since the government and politicians have lost control of television — which is now the dominant medium of information and television channels frequently follow a critical stance to government policies and to politicians — they continue to play this 'hot and cold' game with the broadcasting stations' owners. As Papathanassopoulos mentions what politicians are saying is 'you be nice to me and you might get an official licence' (Papathanasopoulos:1997: 361). As Demertzis and Kafetzis note: 'The unlimited and unconditional deregulation of the broadcasting field was, in a last analysis, a demonstration of the patronage

reaction on behalf of the professional associations and the parties of the left, this law was withdrawn.

state, in the environment of a floating and atypical market' (Demerzis and Kafetzis: 1996: 208).

A long due restructuring of public broadcaster

Few other public service broadcasters in Europe have suffered as badly from the introduction of private television (Papathanassopoulos: 1999: 67). The Greek public broadcaster, Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation - ERT has sharply declined in ratings and ad spend- as concerns television, ERT's channels' ratings has declined to 8,3% (ET1 4.8% and ET2 3.5%) in 1996¹¹, which resulted in large advertising losses (ERT's advertising market share in 1996 was 7% of total TV advertising). In effect, all ERT's three channels have witnessed a steady erosion of market share since the private TV launched in late 1989 (Leandros: 2000: 263). ERT has also accumulated a debt of 38 billion drachmas. Moreover, it was argued that ERT is too bureaucratic and overstaffed -the permanent staff is 3,600 plus 1,500 occasional or external employees/collaborators-, and for years politicians had been unable to approve any of numerous plans for its salvation (Papathanassopoulos: 1999).

ERT's problems stem from the state broadcaster's one-time role as a mouthpiece of government propaganda. This led to the erosion of its credibility to the Greek public and in effect, was the entry-ticket for private television and the total deregulation of the TV sector. In effect, ERT had to pay for the democratisation and pluralism on the television frequencies, since it was unprepared to meet competition from the private broadcasters. The private TV channels almost immediately dominated the audiovisual landscape. For example,

¹¹In 1991 the private stations occupied 74% of the TV market share, while the public channels had just 21%.

this wide acceptance of private television by the public is due to various reasons. Firstly, the privatization and the emergence of many television channels were considered synonymous to pluralism and the dissemination of new ideas even though this proved to be something of a myth as we will see below. Secondly, the public broadcasting media, as we have already mentioned, were under the close control of the governments and the ruling parties, and as a result there was intense questioning of their operations. Thirdly, private television offered a great variety of entertainment and 'fast paced' programs, and as a result it attracted various categories of social groups. The state broadcaster (after the 1987 law) is consisted by:

a) Two national coverage channels (Elliniki Teleorasi 1 and 2 -ET1, ET2) which are based in Athens.

b) a third channel ET 3 which is based in Thessaloniki and has a stronger coverage in Northern Greece but is also can seen in other parts of Greece. In effect, it is the regional channel of ERT and in its profile emphasis is given to Northern Greece, arts and culture.

c) The Hellenic Radio (ERA) which broadcasts four national radio programmes (ERA 1 through 4) originates from Athens through 19 relay stations. There is also the fifth programme (ERA 5), the "Voice of Greece" which is aimed for the Greeks abroad and regional programmes. ERA 1 is mainly the information radio station of the state broadcaster, ERA 2 mostly entertainment, ERA 3 is quality and classical music station and ERA 4/Sports is sports and music radio station.

d) It also publishes its weekly TV/radio listings magazine *Radioteleorasis*

However, ERT's management has attempted to turn a new page in the public broadcaster's troubled history. In 20th of October 1997, ERT changed the face of

the state broadcaster in order to re-approach the Greek public. In effect, the first channel ET1 has become a general channel with more emphasis to entertainment. The second channel with the previous name ET2 does not exist any longer. In fact, it has been re-launched its programming and under a new name NET (Nea Elliniki Teleorasi- New Hellenic Television) is mainly a 24 hour information channel with news bulletins, information programs, talk shows and documentaries. NET's program is consisted of four main program time slots: the morning slot with a magazine as well documentaries from the BBC, ARTE in areas of history, archaeology and science. The afternoon slot is consisted of semi-hour news bulletins and documentaries. The evening slot is more of entertainment orientation with magazine on culture, animals, environment and the youth. There are also programs on sports and the arts. The prime time slot is consisted of news and talk shows. The night TV news bulletin gives special emphasis on international news. Every hour it broadcasts a 3 minute news summary.

ET 1 has become a general quality entertainment channel and has already commissioned and produced six new TV Greek series with well known Greek actors and directors. The "new face" of public television seems to have been welcomed by the Greek viewers (ET1 and NET increased their total market share by 1.5%). On the other hand, ERT has to reduce labour costs by applying a system of voluntary retirement of some of its personnel. In effect, ERT's management aims through a redundancy plan to "attract" 600 to 800 of its personnel to retire early in order to reduce labour costs up to 2.000. It also has decided to reduce the number of external collaborators and increasing the productivity of the existing personnel. Nevertheless, public television sought recourse to a model of pluralistic information with a delay, offering an alternative

to private television, but that model has not yet gain the public's acceptance (see also Achimastos- Komninou: 1998: 411).

The dominance of television in political communication

The upgrading of television, as a medium of political communication, as we have already explained above, led politicians and the political parties to a systematic usage of television. This fact was especially evident during the pre-electoral periods, which occur quite often in Greece. The national elections, the European elections and the municipal/ local elections usually take place in different years. The political parties in Greece are financed by the public budget for their various political activities. In these activities the acts for their promotion through the media (mainly political advertisements) are included, with a percentage of 40% of the total financing allowed for them. So political advertisements became an important part of the communication policy of the parties, especially in television.¹² Moreover, in 1996, for the first time, a television debate on the occasion of national elections took place between the political leaders of the two major parties. That debate was broadcast live by the three public and the four private channels of national range. At the same time, some politicians preferred to participate in a television debate than in a discussion inside parliament. As

¹². As Daremas and Terzis mention, 'Political advertising is very important in Greece if one considers that the two big parties were the first and the fourth advertising products in terms of expenditure during 1996. 80 percent of the advertising budget of the Greek parties was spent on advertising on television stations' (Daremas-Terzis: 2000: 121). The total advertising expenditure of the Greek parliamentary parties during the pre-election period of 1996 was 7,114,800 million drachma. During the same pre-electoral period 3,492 spots of political advertising of total duration of 34.4 hours were used. 84.4% of the total number of spots and 90.9% of the time referred to the two bigger parties, PASOK and New Democracy (Chairetakis: 2002:121).

Mouzelis and Pagoulatos mention, 'the coming of the television programmes in the centre of public attention shifted the centre of political importance from the parliament to the studios of the informative debate shows, corrupting in this way even more the institutional role of the legal body' (Mouzelis- Pagoulatos: 2003: 23). Political advertisements, discussions and debates between the leaders, the political juxtaposition in general, began to take place mainly in the television studios and not in the squares and the neighbourhoods, as they used to. A television elite of politicians and professional journalists, who were appointed by the media, replaced the political activists, whom one could meet in every massive demonstration of the political parties. That created a competition among the politicians concerning who would appear more times on television, and as a result, as Tzanetakos mentions, 'the need for political publicity impelled public political persons to pursue the establishment of privileged relationships with the media, expropriating part of their independence' (Tzanetakos: 1998: 363).

This fact created a bigger dependence of the politicians and the parties on television, which, in turn, made politics more susceptible to the pressures of the businessmen-owners of media, who were always aiming at signing public contracts. It seems that the increased role of the private radio-television media, and especially television, in Greece did not decrease the relationship of interdependence between political power and media; on the contrary it expanded it. But the main difference, in relation to the past, was that interdependence was not only related to the politics, but also serving the huge economic interests of the owners of the media.

CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis, I have tried to describe the development of the media in Greece from the end of the eighteenth century, and of journalism profession and education to a lesser extent. I have also tried to set these developments within the context of Greek political, social and economic history and argue that there has been a clear interdependence between the Greek state and media throughout the period, since my concern was to show how a media system is shaped, as well as its policies made, by whom and to whose interests. Unlike the dominant Anglo-Saxon model based on the independence of media, Greece has historically developed a very close relation between political authorities and the media (Papathanassopoulos, 2004). In Greece the print media has functioned particularly more as a political complementary institution than as an independent force, expressing sometimes the political consensus and sometimes the political divisions of the political forces. However, this model is also common to the rest of the countries of Southern Europe (Mancini: 2000, Smith: 1976, Hallin-Papathanassopoulos: 2002). This close relation between politics and media in Greece is due to two basic factors.

- The first is the long delay of capitalism development and the agricultural character of the country. This fact created an atrophied civil society, with weak institutions of democratic representation and a limited function of the democratic parliamentary system (Mouzelis: 1987; Charalambis: 1989). Under these circumstances the undertaking of political initiatives by other institutions, including the press, was rarely experienced. Still the undertaking of

political initiatives by the press did not constitute some particular autonomy by the political forces. On the contrary, its involvement was ideologically complementary and supplementary to the dominant political forces of the Greek political system.

- Secondly, the delay in industrial development and especially in the development of the publishing industry, created in Greece a very limited market, which in its turn did not allow the emergence of the conditions for commercialization of the press (Leandros: 1992).

Greek press did not manage to develop as a commercial product, and, as a result, remained till the end of the twentieth century oriented towards the parties, a fact that limited the reading audience and therefore circulation. On the contrary, in the USA, for example, 'the modern newspaper as it evolved during the 19th century was a consumer product designed for broad circulation. In their efforts to do business commercially with the whole public or large segments of it, newspapers sought broad consensus' (Nord: 1984: 272).

Because of the above, journalism in Greece differed also from the Anglo-Saxon, where the characteristics of 'objectivity' and 'independence' were valued, at least theoretically. Greek journalism emphasized mainly commentaries and analysis. Political arguments and debates were common in Greek journalism and the journalist did not report events but tried to explain them. We meet this tradition in other countries, as well. According to Gaunt 'French journalism has always been more a journalism of expression than a journalism of observation, with marked preference for commentary rather than reporting. It has been concerned with subjective analysis and a critique of intentions rather than a strict recounting of facts which makes it very different from Anglo-Saxon reporting with its preference for the 'objective' (Gaunt: 1990: 28). Germany was, also

wedded 'to the ideology that objective or even neutral accounts of reality are not possible' (Donsbach and Klett: 1993: 37). At the same time the conditions were created for a delay in the process of professionalisation of journalism and the formation of a professional culture. This fact was decisive for the development of a parallel model of literary journalism (Skamnakis: 1998). Briefly, while the Greek newspapers were basically partisan journals of opinion that existed for political rather than commercial reasons, they also developed a literary style in journalism.

This model was developed and preserved for many years in other countries, mainly in Southern Europe (Bierhoff: 1999). Among them is France (Hoyer: 1993: 283) and Italy (Mancini: 2000). In Greece, as to a certain extent in France and in Italy, besides the commentaries, the chronicles, a journalistic form of writing, constituted an important part of the contents of a newspaper. This kind of literary journalistic tradition gradually weakened, to disappear eventually in our days. Today in Greece a number of theoretical approaches and interpretations concerning the close relations between politics and media have been advanced that are worth mentioning (Komninou: 2002; Papathanassopoulos: 2004). Some of them emphasize the interfering character of the state and political power in the functioning of the Press and later of broadcasting. Others stress the historical involvement of the publishers in the shaping of the country's politics but also, more recently, the pressures on behalf of the media owners to obtain public contracts.

To all the aforementioned approaches, which this study does not refute but attempts to complement, the dialectical view of interdependence is being proposed. Interdependence has been, and continues to be, a historical parameter and basic component in the relations between the two fields. We can define

interdependence as a mutual relationship between political power and the media, where one part attempts to secure benefits by the function of the other and, for this reason, a mutual dependency is created. Nevertheless, one must note that from time to time the role of one field could vary in relation to that exercised by the other, but that does not dispute the existence of interdependence. In some extreme versions interdependence can take a) the form of censorship where the political power interferes in the media and b) the form of exceptional pressure on the political powers by the media in order to obtain special economic benefits and privileges, beyond the ones that the legislative context defines, that is beyond even the standing of indirect and direct press subsidies. These kind of extreme manifestations have appeared in Greece, as we have already mentioned.

In the first instance we can include the policies of censorship that the dictatorial and autarchic governments have enforced, and in the second we can include the over expensive “promotion packets” that the owners of certain regional television channels use in order to promote some politician while excluding some other (Panagiotopoulou: 2004: 163).

In general, the evolution of the media and its relationship with politics can be divided into three big historical phases. Each one of them is divided into sub-periods, as we have already analyzed in the previous chapters. But what finally characterizes all of the three phases is the interdependence between the two fields, although it can take different forms in the light of different historical factors

Interdependence during the oligarchic democracy

During its first phase of evolution, from 1784 to 1909, the Greek press before and during the revolution, along with the other political forces, had as a unique objective the dissemination of national ideas and the constitution of a modern, bourgeois- democratic and constitutional state. As the Greek state was established and developed gradually, the press constituted a political instrument of the dominant political powers. The political powers, despite their differentiation into parties, shaped during this phase a context of political consensus on the issue of the establishment of a constitutional state and a bourgeois democracy. In that political consensus the press played a leading role. Under these circumstances relations of political interdependence between parties political and the press elite was created. The more the political elite of that era needed the press in order to achieve its goals, the more the press became an integral part of politics and it played a dominant role in the political developments.

This historical political identification and interdependence between the press and the political forces of that era is confirmed by a series of events.

- The intense criticism by the press against the centralized policy of Kapodistrias and especially against the attempts to suspend the constitution of Trizena.
- The leading role that the press had before and during the progressive *coup d'etat* of 3 of September 1843 against King Otto.
- The important role of the press during the preparations for the uprising of 1862 that led to the definitive expulsion of the Bavarians from the country.

- The contribution of the press to the campaign against the parliamentary *coup d' état* by Demitris Voulgaris in 1875 and the attempts for constitutional change by the 82 'stylites' MPs of his party.
- The leading role that the press had during the 'Movement of Goudi', in 1909 and the support most newspapers gave to the demands for bourgeois-democratic integration and limitation of the power of monarchy.

Therefore, during this historical period of oligarchic democracy, the press is directly attached to the dominant bourgeois forces and it acts to shape common policies and relations of political interdependence with them.

Interdependence during the liberal-bourgeois democracy

During the second phase, that lasts from the establishment of a bourgeois democracy in 1909, until a little after the end of the dictatorship of the colonels in 1974, the Press followed the political divisions and the splitting of the bourgeois class in Greece into liberal and conservative groupings. That division was of course connected with the deepening of liberalism on a social, political and economic level, which Eleftherios Venizelos sought and to which the landowners reacted. A key- point here is the 'Movement of Ethniki Amyna' (National Defence) and the events of November of 1916.

In the context of these events, the press itself divided, supported and expressed the political formations of that era, and especially the political division between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, a division that lasted until the beginning of the Second World War.

The passage from oligarchic to liberal-bourgeois democracy was not accompanied by a decrease or shrinkage of this interdependence. On the contrary,

the interdependence expanded considerably. On the other hand, it is placed in a new context, the context of the political divisions and the clientelistic relationships, since these, as we have already mentioned, present probably the most important role within Greek society and politics. The interdependence of that era is not based on a political consensus, with the exception of the civil war period, but it rather contains all the contradictions and the instability that characterize that period.

Because of the polarization and political divisions, the governments of that period passed a series of laws, which limited the freedom of the press but on a practical basis. With these laws, successive governments usually tried to limit the oppositional or adversary press, including the press of the Left.

Legal restrictions on the left press became extremely drastic during the dictatorships of '36 and '67. Paradoxically, the same period saw the passing of laws that reinforced the conservative press through the press subsidies. But even this implementation of state support towards the press was sometimes converted either to a mechanism of censorship or to the preferential treatment of certain publishers at the expense of some others.

Interdependence during this period is especially evident through the secret loans that are given by almost all Greek governments to most of the publishers (Kominis: 1985, Dimitras: 1997: 102, Leandros: 1990: 158). The governments were trying through the loans, (that most of the times were never paid back), to support the Press that was friendly towards them. This support was also expanded towards journalists, who were allowed by various laws, which we have already mentioned, to work in parallel in various jobs of the public sector, which provided them with additional income. At the same time, special benefits were granted to the journalists' associations, as well as indirect financial support, that were

distributed among their members afterwards. According to Dimitras, 'governments attempted to influence the majority of journalists and newspapers with some 40 million Euro per annum of subsidies and 'secret funds', or by keeping some 70% of the main journalists on the state payroll, sometimes with 'phony jobs' (i.e., *fake*)' (Dimitras: 1997: 103).

Of course, as we have already noted, press subsidies are much more substantial even than this large figure (see also appendix 4). At the same time the publishers exercised intense political activity and participated behind the scenes in the election of the leaders of the political parties but also in the formation of the governments. Many high-ranking journalists became presidents of big public corporations and public banks, MPs and even ministers. One of them, Alexandros Diomedes, became Prime Minister after the Second World War. We have already mentioned many examples. One more example may strengthen this position. According to Helen Vlachos, her father and publisher of the newspapers *Kathemerini* and *Mesemvrini* 'insisted that Papagos should participate in the elections of 1951. One of the reasons that Papagos finally took part in the elections was the persistence of George Vlachos' (cited in Psarakis: 1993: 148). Papagos, who established ERE party and participated in the elections, finally became Prime Minister with the support of the same publisher.

Media clientelism: a new form of interdependence in the new era

The third phase lasts from the middle of the '70s until today. The gradual minimization of the political divisions, political alienation, the entry of businessmen in to the media and, the intense tendencies to commercialization characterize this period, especially after the deregulation of the broadcasting field.

At this stage, one must note that the conditions of the first years after the fall of the junta created a temporary decrease of the interdependence because of the huge growth of the political parties, the democratization of the political institutions and, in general, the appearance of a radical political movement. Those factors led to a decrease of the dependence of the one field on the other.

- Firstly, the political power began to depend on the real social powers, since they had entered centre stage dynamically.
- Secondly, for the same reason, the publishers lost, to an extent, their power of direct involvement in the shaping of politics.

The massive participation of citizens in politics left no room for such initiatives. Briefly, the centre of political initiatives and decisions had shifted from the traditional political patrons and the publishers to the social powers, and maybe that was the most important development in the history of the Hellenic Republic. Anyway, even during that period interdependence continued to exist because it constituted a functional and historical component, despite its relative weakening and restriction. During a second part of that period, by the middle of the '80s, the media began to have an increased role in relation to politics, and interdependence took a new form.

This is mainly related to the entry of businesspeople into the field of media, and especially in broadcasting. With that entry the businesspeople strengthen their influence decisively. This was also facilitated by the gradual decrease of citizens' participation in politics, a fact that allowed the parties' leaderships and the media owners to interact at an elite level and to make decisions without inference to the electorate. According to Papathanassopoulos 'it seems that we have entered a new era of interplay between media owners and politicians. In this, new game each party tries to get tactical advantages because each needs the other'

(Papathanassopoulos: 1999: 399). This new form of interdependence between politics and media in Greece, which is called 'media clientelism', is defined by

- a) the clientelistic relations and their practice on a massive base by the party-patron and the state bureaucracy from the mid 80s,
- b) the increased influence of businessmen, who through the ownership and the control of the media gained even greater power and tried to influence the political power in order to serve their economic interests,
- c) the dependence of the politicians on the media, in the sense that they depend more and more on the media in order to address the electorate and society
- d) the bureaucratization of the parties and of citizens' organizations as a result of the decrease of the political interest of the major social groups, and
- e) the almost worldwide dominance of the neo-liberal views that encouraged the powers of the market to expand uncontrollably and to dominate in all sectors of the public sphere.

As Mouzelis and Pagoulatos mention 'the unprecedented power that the magnates of the media enjoyed relates to a web of interdependence not only with the parties or the government, but with political persons as well. The intrusion of the owners of the media in a wide spectrum of activities perpetuates the umbilical cord between politics and business as a mutual accommodating relationship of questionable legitimacy' (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos: 2003: 23).

Despite the fact that in all the countries of Europe businesspeople from various sectors of the economy have penetrated the media landscape, the extent of their opaque transactions with the governments and the dominant parties do not seem to be of the same degree as in Greece. This may be due to the fact that the traditional clientelism in Greece, as it evolved during the 1980s, and was practiced

on a massive base by the party-patron, played an important role, if not the leading one, in the formation of this new form of interdependence. According to Papathanassopoulos, 'in Northern Europe and North America, clientelistic relationships have been displaced to a large extent by national-legal forms of authority and especially in the smaller continental European countries by democratic corporatist politics both of which decrease the need for the economic elite to exert particular pressures and form alliances in order to succeed in the pursuance of their interests' (Papathanassopoulos: 2004: 148). It is obvious that media clientelism as a new form of interdependence cannot exist without the pre-existing forms of traditional political clientelism, but this does not mean that the rest of the factors that we mentioned above do not also play an important role. Further, comparative research should be done on this issue in countries with a tradition of clientelism.

In any case, despite the process of entry of businesspeople, particularly in the broadcasting field after 1989, this new form of interdependence can be confirmed by a series of events.

- a) The first temporary license for the operation of a television channel was given, as we have already mentioned, to the five publishers of the five largest Greek newspapers
- b) For more than 15 years the legal status of the television licenses has not yet been solved, because political authorities prefer to leave it unsolved (Papathanasopoulos:1997a), in order to put, in their turn, pressures on the media owners.
- c) After 1990 the various forms of press subsidies were reinforced, instead of being reduced. A very characteristic example is the regulation, with the law 2328 of 1995, about obligatory

advertisement of the wider public sector on media. It is characteristic that in 2005 it reached 80 million euros (Papapolizos: 2005).

- d) The Government has not demanded fees from the owners of television channels and radio stations in exchange of the usage of the frequencies involved.
- e) By the favourable and privileged treatment, by the TV channels, of the two largest parties that interchange in the governing of the country. It is notable that in the period 2004-2005 the National Broadcasting Council has issued 34 decisions in total, concerning the violation of the objective of political diversity, and the non-promotion of the smaller parties.

Nowadays, in almost all the countries of Europe, at least as far as democracy and the function of the political institutions are concerned, and despite the fact that recent powerful pressures are being exercised because of the problem of terrorism, there have been significant steps. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Europe has solved serious problems, like the problem of unemployment or of the development of social welfare, or, more importantly, that the problem of a democratic information society has been solved. As Golding mentions, 'information society is a myth. We live in a media society' (Golding: 1994). The dominant problem has mainly to do with the increasing power of the media and its consequences for pluralism and democracy.

In Greece, as Mouzelis and Pagoulatos mention, 'the owners of the media represent a center of power that no politician dares to question, unless he aims to commit political suicide. Their power is being reinforced by their dominant

position in numerous business fields (telecommunications, information technologies, constructions, etc.) (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos: 2003: 22).

Today, the freedom of the press in Greece is not being threatened by certain undemocratic regimes, but by powerful tendencies of concentration and monopolization of information that is being observed in the field of media in the whole of Europe. For example, according to a research by the Greek Institute of Economic and Industrial Research, five publishing groups control 65% of the sales and 78% of the advertising (IOBE: 1998). The same may, to a lesser or a larger extent, apply to other countries of the European Union. The question that is justly being asked is what will happen should these tendencies grow even more and dominate the political and social life of our societies.

Certainly, the principle of the freedom of the press, as I have mentioned, may be eroded and the democratic role of the press might lose its historical mission, i.e., its function to serve society and democracy. If indeed the tendencies of concentration of capital in media represent a deterministic development in the context of the function of the market economy, then we should, at least, search for ways to secure the democratic function of the market itself. The laws certainly do not suffice to limit the unrestrained tendencies of concentration, if we do not anticipate parallel forms for reinforcement of the institutions of economic decentralization, which will be viable and secure the democratic function of the market, pluralism in society and social control of the cultural product. The European Commission and the national governments should bear in mind that developments relating to the continuously growing control of information by media owners, and reinforce those media that could function in a decentralized way, or that are already functioning in such a way. Those media exist and they could become the forces of a different policy of non-centralization in the field of


media. Reinforced alternative and local media means expression of the local communities, greater pluralism and democracy, and reinforcement of the local cultural identities. Reinforced minority media means respect for the difference, for culture and for peace. In general, it means releasing policy from the economic interests and from these forces that are against pluralism.

In conclusion, interdependence between politics and media in Greece constituted a basic characteristic and it continues to exist even today with the form of media clientelism. But the further reinforcement of the tendencies of concentration on the field of the media in Greece, but also internationally, may, in the long run, reverse this relationship and reinforce even more the position of media against politics. But this hypothesis must be further studied and researched.


APPENDIXES

1. Daily average circulation of Athens daily newspapers [1953-1973]
2. Daily average circulation of Athens daily newspapers [1974-2005]
3. Daily regional newspapers' readership [2004]
4. The media landscape [1991-2005]
5. Ownership of TV stations

APPENDIX 1



APPENDIX 2



APPENDIX 3

DAILY REGIONAL NEWSPAPERS

READERSHIP SOURCE : METRON ANALYSIS 2004

A/A	NEWSPAPER	CITY	REGION	YEAR	READERSHIP
1	GNOMI	ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE	1984	5,3
2	ELEFTHERI THRAKI	ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE	1945	3,9
3	EPARCHIAKOS TIPOS	ALEXANDROUPOLI	THRACE	1963	1,8
4	ELEFTHERO VIMA	KOMOTINI	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1981	1,2
5	PARATIRITIS TIS THRAKIS	KOMOTINI	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1990	3,5
6	PATRIDA	KOMOTINI	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1978	1,8
7	XRONOS	KOMOTINI	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1964	7,5
8	AGONAS	XANTHI	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1983	2,2
9	EMPROS	XANTHI	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1977	3,2
10	THRAKI	XANTHI	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1994	2
11	MAXITIS	XANTHI	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1998	3,3
12	FONI TIS XANTHIS	XANTHI	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1970	2,2
13	EVDOMI	KAVALA	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1980	4,5

14	ENIMEROS	KAVALA	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1998	2,5
15	KAVALA	KAVALA	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1977	1,6
16	NEA EGNATIA	KAVALA	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1998	2,6
17	I PROINI	KAVALA	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1951	4
18	TACHIDROMOS	KAVALA	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1931	2,7
19	CHRONOMETRO	KAVALA	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1999	2,3
20	IMERISIA CHRONIKA	DRAMA	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1995	3,5
21	PROINOS TIPOS	DRAMA	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1951	2,3
22	ICHO	DRAMA	EASTERN MACEDONIA & THRACE	1991	2,9
23	ELEFTHERO VIMA	SERES	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1995	1,8
24	PARATIRITIS	SERES	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1983	1,7
25	NEA EPOCHI	SERES	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1988	0,8
26	PROODOS	SERES	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1929	1,6
27	AKRITIKI FONI	SERES	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1989	0,9
28	SERAIKO THAROS	SERES	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1974	1,4
29	ANEXARTITOS	SERES	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1997	1
30	SIMERINI	SERES	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	2000	0,6
31	TIPOS	SERES	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1999	0,8
32	IMERISIA	KILKIS	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1986	2,3
33	PROINI	KILKIS	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1999	2

34	EPIKINONIA	XALKIDIKI	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1998	1,1
35	TIPOS TIS XALKIDIKIS	XALKIDIKI	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1996	1,9
36	GIANITSA	GIANITSA	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1994	1,1
37	PROINI	EDESA	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1981	1,2
38	IMERISIA	VERIA	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1984	3,3
39	LAOS	VERIA	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1965	8,8
40	MACEDONIKI	VERIA	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1996	3,2
41	IMERISIA	KATERINI	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1996	1,7
42	OLIMPIO VIMA	KATERINI	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1973	6,3
43	PIERIKOI ANTILALOI	KATERINI	CENTRAL MACEDONIA	1974	2,5
44	ELEFTHERO VIMA	FLORINA	WEST GREECE	1997	2,4
45	POLITIS	FLORINA	WEST GREECE	1992	2,3
46	KATHIMERINI FONI	KASTORIA	WEST GREECE	1992	1,3
47	ORIZONTES	KASTORIA	WEST GREECE	1989	1,7
48	GRAMI	KOZANI	WEST GREECE	1999	1,7
49	FAROS	KOZANI	WEST GREECE	1960	2,1
50	PROINI	KOZANI	WEST GREECE	1995	0,8
51	PROINOS LOGOS	KOZANI	WEST GREECE	1990	1
52	CHRONOS	KOZANI	WEST GREECE	1980	1,5
53	ENIMEROSI	GREBENA	WEST GREECE	1987	3,4

54	IMERISIOS LOGOS	GREBENA	WEST GREECE	1992	2
55	PROINI	GREBENA	WEST GREECE	1990	4,3
56	ANEXARTITOS TIPOS	IOANINA	IPIROS	2001	0,8
57	ELEFThERIA	IOANINA	IPIROS	1979	1,1
58	ENIMEROSI	IOANINA	IPIROS	1988	0,9
59	IPIROS	IOANINA	IPIROS	1993	1,6
60	IPIROTIKOS AGON	IOANINA	IPIROS	1926	4,4
61	NEOI AGONES	IOANINA	IPIROS	1993	0,7
62	PROINA NEA	IOANINA	IPIROS	1966	2
63	PROINOS LOGOS	IOANINA	IPIROS	1957	4,9
64	ELEFThERO VIMA	IGOUMENITSA	IPIROS	1966	2,7
65	THESPROTIKI	IGOUMENITSA	IPIROS	1969	3,9
66	VIMA TIS PREVEZAS	PREVEZA	IPIROS	1994	3,7
67	NIKOPOLI	PREVEZA	IPIROS	1999	2,4
68	TOPIKI FONI	PREVEZA	IPIROS	1974	3,4
69	ICHO TIS ARTAS	ARTA	IPIROS	1957	2,2
70	MACHITIS	ARTA	IPIROS	1983	1,7
71	ELEFThERIA	CORFU	IONIAN ISLANDS	1943	1,4
72	ENIMEROSI	CORFU	IONIAN ISLANDS	1999	1,7
73	KERKIRA SIMERA	CORFU	IONIAN ISLANDS	1993	1,5

74	KERKIRAIKO VIMA	CORFU	IONIAN ISLANDS	1976	2,6
75	ANEXARTITOS	ARGOSTOLI	IONIAN ISLANDS	1995	2,2
76	IMERISIOS	ARGOSTOLI	IONIAN ISLANDS	1991	4,4
77	KATHIMERINI FONI	ARGOSTOLI	IONIAN ISLANDS	2001	1,6
78	ELEFThERIA	ZAKINTHOS	IONIAN ISLANDS	1996	2,7
79	ERMIS	ZAKINTHOS	IONIAN ISLANDS	1996	8,2
80	IMERA TSI ZAKINTHOS	ZAKINTHOS	IONIAN ISLANDS	1995	6,9
81	I THESALIA	VOLOS	THESALIA	1892	20,6
82	NEOS TIPOS	VOLOS	THESALIA	1997	2,5
83	PROTI	VOLOS	THESALIA	1996	5
84	ELEFThERIA	LARISA	THESALIA	1922	30,5
85	IMERISIOS KIRIKAS	LARISA	THESALIA	1929	3,7
86	I ENIMEROSI	TRIKALA	THESALIA	1992	6,2
87	I EREVNA	TRIKALA	THESALIA	1958	9,6
88	PROINOS LOGOS	TRIKALA	THESALIA	1970	10,3
89	TRIKALINA NEA	TRIKALA	THESALIA	1963	4,3
90	I GNOMI	KARDITSA	THESALIA	2000	1,7
91	THESALIKI ICHO	KARDITSA	THESALIA	1953	4,1
92	NEOI KAIRI	KARDITSA	THESALIA	1965	3,7
93	NEOS AGON	KARDITSA	THESALIA	1935	28,8

94	PATRIDA	KARDITSA	THESALIA	1997	6,3
95	PROINOS TIPOS	KARDITSA	THESALIA	1995	10,5
96	AICHMI	MESOLOGI	WEST GREECE	1995	1,8
97	ETHNIKI IXO	MESOLOGI	WEST GREECE	1969	1,1
98	NEA TIS AITOLOAKARNANIAS	MESOLOGI	WEST GREECE	1998	0,4
99	SIMPOLITIA	MESOLOGI	WEST GREECE	1996	0,8
100	PANAITOLIKI	AGRINIO	WEST GREECE	1967	0,8
101	SINIDISI	AGRINIO	WEST GREECE	2001	0,3
102	FONI TIS AITOLOAKARNANIAS	AGRINIO	WEST GREECE	2000	0,3
103	KATHIMERINI FTHIOTIDA	LAMIA	STEREA ELLADA	1994	1,1
104	LAMIAKOS TIPOS	LAMIA	STEREA ELLADA	1935	4,3
105	PROINA NEA	LAMIA	STEREA ELLADA	1989	0,5
106	FOS	LAMIA	STEREA ELLADA	1963	0,9
107	EVOIKOS TIPOS	XALKIDA	STEREA ELLADA	1992	1,9
108	KATHIMERINI EVIA	XALKIDA	STEREA ELLADA	1963	0,6
109	VIOTIKA NEA	LIVADIA	STEREA ELLADA	1995	2,1
110	VIOTIKI ORA	LIVADIA	STEREA ELLADA	1979	2,4
111	NEA TIS VIOTIAS	LIVADIA	STEREA ELLADA	1986	1,9
112	SKITALI	THIVA	STEREA ELLADA	1997	1,3
113	AIOLIKA NEA	MITILINI	NOTH	1990	7,2

114	DIMOKRATIS	MITILINI	NOTH	1928	4,6
115	EMPROS	MITILINI	NOTH	1974	3,6
116	ALITHIA	XIOS	NOTH	1987	10,3
117	DIMOKRATIKI	XIOS	NOTH	1988	5,5
118	POLITIS	XIOS	NOTH	2001	4,8
119	PROODOS	XIOS	NOTH	1927	2,9
120	KINI GNOMI	SIROS	SOUTH	1982	4,2
121	KIKLADIKI	NAXOS	SOUTH	2001	0,9
122	DIMOKRATIKI TIS RODOU	RODOS	SOUTH	1982	3
123	PROODOS	RODOS	SOUTH	1949	4,8
124	RODIAKI	RODOS	SOUTH	1915	7
125	HMERISIA	KORINTHOS	PELOPONISOS	1983	1
126	KORINTHIAKI IMERA	KORINTHOS	PELOPONISOS	1983	0,7
127	PROINI	KORINTHOS	PELOPONISOS	1997	2,8
128	ALAGI	PATRA	WEST GREECE	1981	1,3
129	GEGONOTA	PATRA	WEST GREECE	1994	1,2
130	IMERA TON PATRON	PATRA	WEST GREECE	1945	1,7
131	IMERISIOS AIGIOXOS	AIGIO	WEST GREECE	1994	0,7
132	IMERISIOS KIRIX	PATRA	WEST GREECE	1969	0,5
133	PELOPONISOS	PATRA	WEST GREECE	1886	12,3

134	PROINI GNOMI	PATRA	WEST GREECE	2002	0,7
135	PROTI TIS AIGIALEIAS	AIGIO	WEST GREECE	1994	1
136	PATRIS	PIRGOS	WEST GREECE	1902	19,7
137	PROINI	PIRGOS	WEST GREECE	1984	6,7
138	PROTI	PIRGOS	WEST GREECE	2002	8,7
139	ARGOLIDA	NAFPLIO	WEST GREECE	1993	3,2
140	DIMOSIOGRAFOS	NAFPLIO	WEST GREECE	1995	1,5
141	NEA TIS ARGOLIDAS	NAFPLIO	WEST GREECE	1996	3,8
142	ARKADIKES IDISIS	TRIPOLI	WEST GREECE	2000	1,4
143	KATHIMERINA NEA	TRIPOLI	WEST GREECE	1985	2,9
144	ELEFThERIA	KALAMATA	WEST GREECE	1981	13,7
145	THAROS	KALAMATA	WEST GREECE	1899	4,1
146	SIMAIA	KALAMATA	WEST GREECE	1914	6,5
147	FONI	KALAMATA	WEST GREECE	2000	3,4
148	LAKONIKOS TIPOS	SPARTI	WEST GREECE	1996	3,2
149	PARATIRITIS TIS LAKONIAS	SPARTI	WEST GREECE	1996	2,7
150	AGONAS TIS KRITIS	CHANIA	CRETE	1981	1,7
151	O DHMOKRATIS TON CHANION	CHANIA	CRETE	1988	0,4
152	KIRIX	CHANIA	CRETE	1977	4,8
153	CHANIOTIKA NEA	CHANIA	CRETE	1968	24,2

154	CHANIOTIKI ELEFTHEROTIPIA	CHANIA	CRETE	1978	1,4
155	HRAKLIOTIKA NEA	IRAKLIO	CRETE	1989	0,6
156	MESOGIOS	HRAKLIO	CRETE	1953	1,3
157	NEA CRETE	HRAKLIO	CRETE	2000	9,7
158	PATRIS	HRAKLIO	CRETE	1950	12,8
159	TOLMI	HRAKLIO	CRETE	1984	3
160	KRITIKI EPITHEORISI	HRAKLIO	CRETE	1911	10,9
161	RETHEMNIOTIKA NEA	RETHIMNO	CRETE	1965	15,9
162	ANATOLI	AGIOS NICOLAOS	CRETE	1932	9,3

APPENDIX 4: THE MEDIA LANDSCAPE 1991- 2005

Newspapers

In 1991 the average daily circulation of the daily Athenian newspapers fell to 725,317 copies. The morning showed a very small increase by 14,000 copies after the disastrous continuous fall of the years before. The total average daily circulation of the morning papers was 65,429. Significant is the increase of the Sunday editions, whose average weekly circulation was in 1991 910,723 copies, with 17 titles. In 1991, a morning newspaper, *Anagnostis*, was published, but it stopped circulating in June of the same year. Also, in October of the same year the evening newspaper *Epikerotita* ceased publication. In 1992 the average daily circulation of morning and evening fell again to 622,605 copies. The mornings lost almost half of their copies, reaching 34,745 copies. In 1993 the average daily circulation marked a small increase to 643,599 copies, whereas in 1994 they increased to 710,402 copies. In 1993 circulated a new newspaper with the title *STAR*. In 1994 circulated two more new newspapers, *2000* and *Nea Mesimvriini*. The first one closed down after one week and the second one after a month. In 1995 the average daily circulation fell again to 603,648 copies, while in 1996 there was an increase to 667,459 copies. In 1995 the newspaper *Onoma* circulated and in 1996 the newspaper *Exousia*. In 1997 the average daily circulation fell to 565,528 copies. The newspaper *STAR* closed down, while a new morning with the title *Kalimera* was published, but it, too, closed down after two weeks. Newspaper *Athenaiki*, which had closed in 1976, made its reappearance with a new owner, journalist Spiros Karatzaferis and the newspaper *Vradini* with another journalist owner, George Tragas. In 1998 the average daily circulation fell a little under 500,000, more specifically to 499,771 copies. The historical newspaper *Akropolis*

was republished, while after a disagreement between the two publishers of the daily evening *Adesmeftos Typos* started to circulate two different editions but with the same title. Another evening newspaper made its appearance, for only a few days, the newspaper *Gnosi*. In 1999 the average daily circulation fell to 480,812 copies. Nevertheless, the morning had a small increase in circulation. More specifically, from 65,319 copies in 1998 they reached 97,666 in 1999. Apparently the reason for this relates firstly to the emergence of the daily morning *To Vima* and secondly with the rise of the stock market. The morning dailies emphasized economic issues, and maybe this contributed to the increase of their circulation. Besides *Vima*, another journalist, Nikos Kakaounakis, published a new newspaper with the title *Karfi*.

In 2000, the average daily circulation rose to 518,522. The mornings after many years exceeded the barrier of 100,000 and they reached 102,032 copies. Two new newspapers made their appearance, *Espresso* and *Nea Ellada*. The second closed after two months. The newspaper *Espresso* was essentially the first yellow newspaper, and it gained in no time 8% of the total sales of the evening newspapers. This tendency was expected, since private television had already introduced this kind of journalism and it had prepared the ground for a newspaper readership.

In 2001, the average daily circulation fell to 407,126 copies. The morning increased their circulation from 102,032 to 129,675 copies. To this contributed and the publication of a morning yellow newspaper, *Traffic Newspaper*, which gained 10% of the sales of morning newspapers with 13,398 copies. Another evening newspaper, *Ektropi*, circulated for only one month, whereas *Athenaiki* closed.

In 2002, the average daily circulation reached 462,187 copies, whereas in 2003 it was 452,409. In 2002, a new morning newspaper, *Anexartitos* was published, that closed down after one month, and in 2003 an evening, *Post* circulated, which also closed down after almost one month. Anyway, both *Espresso* and *Traffic Newspaper* fell to 21,895 and 4,097 copies, respectively.

In 2004, the average daily circulation of evening and morning was 471,954 and in 2005 it reached 430,128 copies. The morning newspaper stabilized in sales with more than 100,000 copies. The most important development concerned the Sunday editions, which in 2005 exceeded 1,000,000 copies in average weekly circulation, reaching more specifically 1,134,040 copies.

The main reason for this, were and still continue to be, the huge offers in gifts which the newspapers made. Also the impressive appearance of a new newspaper, *Proto Thema*, which was published by two journalists whose television shows were one of the first in the television ratings. This particular newspaper immediately won 18,50%, and had the largest circulation of any title in its category.

Generally the period 1991- 2005 was a period of serious crisis for the circulation of the daily Athenian newspapers. The decrease in their circulation was almost 55%. Certainly this fall of circulation could have been larger, if there had not been the big offers of special inserts and gifts. Of course this fact was accompanied by a significant rise in their price. Today the price of the daily Athenian newspapers is 1 Euro, whereas the price of the weekly and the Sunday is, on average, 3 Euros.

Nowadays Greece is a country rich in newspaper titles. The most influential newspapers are still published in Athens, enjoying a nationwide circulation. In 2006 political dailies published in Athens were: 14 afternoon, 9 morning, 4

financial morning and 10 sports. Additionally, there are 14 Sunday editions and 10 weeklies. The average daily circulation of the national newspapers was about 406,000 copies in the first three months of the 2006. With only one exception, *Kathimerini*, the Athens dailies are tabloid in format.

The last one has nothing to do with so-called “yellow journalism”, which in some countries is being identified with the tabloid format. According to Papathanasopoulos ‘In some countries the tabloid press is the yellow or sensational press whereas the broadsheet press is seen as the respectable press. Yet in others the tabloid press is associated with the physical size of a newspaper rather the content, and some of these newspapers offer readers very serious journalism (Spain, Italy, Greece). Few would identify *Ta Nea* (Greece), *El Pais* (Spain) and *La Repubblica* (Italy) as sensational newspapers because of their tabloid format’ (Papathanasopoulos: 2001:113). Today, major newspaper publishers are:

- The Lambrakis Publishing Group with an afternoon daily (*Ta Nea*), a morning daily (*To Vima*), a daily English-language (*Athens News*), a Sunday edition *To Vima tis Kiriakis*, and many weekly and montly magazines including the Greek version of *National Geographic*.
- The Tegopoulos Publishing Group with an afternoon daily (*Eleftherotipia*), a bi-weekly advertising newspaper (*Chrisi Efkairia*) and a Sunday edition (*Kiriakatiki Eleftherotipia*).
- The Pigasos Publishing Group owned by Bobolas with an afternoon daily (*Ethnos*), a financial daily (*Imerisia*), a Sunday edition (*Ethnos tis Kiriakis*) and many weekly and montly magazines.

- The Press Foundation with an afternoon daily (Eleftheros Tipos) and a Sunday edition (Tipos tis Kiriakis). In the beginning of June of 2006 it was announced that both newspapers were sold to a group of businessmen from the shipping sector.
- The Kathimerini Publishing Group owned by Alafouzos family with a morning daily (Kathimerini) and a Sunday edition (Kathimerini tis Kiriakis).

National Television

The appearance of private television had a catalytic effect, and changed the Greek broadcasting field and the field of the Greek Media in its whole. Since then the private stations have multiplied rapidly. Today they are approximately 160.

In order to follow the complicated television mosaic, as it emerged in Greece, it is helpful to use the rating of the television stations with the classic criteria of range (national, regional, local), broadcasting (hertzian, satellite, cable), the way of reception (free, pay) and technology (analogue, digital).

The larger television stations of national range, through ERT SATELLITE, MEGA COSMOS, ANTENNA SATELLITE & PACIFIC and ALPHA SAT, broadcast to the Greeks that live abroad, the five continents. The cable broadcasting, which was tested in the middle of the '80s in some isolated occasions, is today operating in some districts of Athens and its penetration is about zero (Iosifidis-Kiki: 2000:16).

Pay television made its appearance in Greece in 1994 with the creation of the first pay channel, FilmNet (Dimitras:1997:106), which is now broadcasting as Supersport/ Fox Jettix (Sports and kids, respectively). Its owner is the company Netmed Hellas. The Greek market for satellite television, which until 1999 had

not been explored, attracted initially, as an open market, three players. One of these is the pioneer, Nova that today is broadcasting 31 channels with a coded signal: its subscriber is able to receive all the channels that are broadcasting worldwide by the same satellite. With Nova's equipment one can watch more than 100 free satellite television programs and listen to more than 50 radio programs, worldwide. Also, it offers the viewer interactive services. The penetration of satellite television in Greece is up to 1,4%.

Today, the larger Greek television stations have incorporated digital technology for the broadcasting of their signal through satellite (by Nova's platform), and they still use the analogic technology for the hertzian broadcasting.

Television penetrated, at first discreetly, in Greek society and the family. In 1970, only 2% of the Greek population owned a television set. With the restoration of democracy, in 1974, television became gradually dominant in everyday life.

In 1987, the eve of de-regulation, 72% of the households owned a television set. It is remarkable that while television appears in Greece with a delay of three decades compared to Great Britain, the households' satiety of the television sets happened, with the almost absolute percentage of 99%, only four years after the same occurred for the British households. Given that television has now passed in the phase of industrial maturity, the index 'television set per household' is rather outmoded.

In 2001 more than the 2/3 of the households owned a video set. The public enthusiastically accepted the coming of private television in 1989, as the much-desired answer to the demand for polyphony and pluralism as we have already mentioned.

The channels organised their relation with the public using television ratings as an exclusive guide. It was the case of a rapid de-regulation, parallel to that of Spain, Italy and Portugal, that resulted in an extreme commercialization of television time and space. The two largest stations, in conditions of increased competition, turned finally to the adoption of widely accepted 'formulas of success', for example the music shows, the morning magazines, which create the new stars of Greek entertainment, the Greek comic and dramatic series, and cinema movies.

Special cases were the soap operas, the dramatic daily series of Greek and foreign production, which flooded the programs of the private stations with great commercial success. The public television's program's structure was oriented towards quality, especially through the continuing tradition of producing documentaries of high standards and, in parallel, taking care of the needs of smaller groups of viewers.

Today, three stations, ET-1, NET and ET-3, constitute the public television service, that covers the different needs and the preferences of the Greek public. ET-1 addresses all the categories of viewers, offering choices mainly of entertaining, educational and cultural contents. NET is the informative and news channel of public television, par excellence, with an important presence to the cultural field, as well. Finally, ET-3 has taken the role of a national range, regional television, which emphasizes themes that interest the population of Macedonia and Thrace and of the wider Northern Greece.

The recording and the impression of the preferences of television viewers is of special importance for those who are involved in the television process (owners of the channels and the employees, advertisers and advertised, creators of television

programs). That is because they constitute the basic elements that define the costing of television time.

The fact that watching television is a favorite habit of the Greek population is confirmed by the quantitative recording of television viewing.

According to the data by the European Audiovisual Observatory, in 2001 Greece had the highest average time of television viewing (243 minutes) among all the countries of the European Union. According to the measurements, the total television viewing of the private channels during the period September 2002-April 2003 was up to the crashing percentage of 90% of the total time. The two bigger stations Antenna and Mega Channel claim first place.

These two stations assemble the substantial part of Greek viewers in 2005 according to AGB Nielsen Media Research. More specifically, Antenna during 2005 had the highest share of television viewing, 19.4%, maintaining first place. Second was Mega Channel with 18,5% and third ALPHA with 14.2%.

Regional and Local Media

The subsystem of regional and local Media in Greece has developed on a basis of centralization that has always defined the media system in this country. To understand the development and profile of regional and local media it is important to relate them to the general model of communication nationally. The centralization of the media system was expressed for years through state monopoly in radio and television and the domination of Athens dailies in the Greek regions against provincial dailies as we have already seen.

Even after 1990, the media in Athens still dominated the market and the share of marketing resources. This happened despite the fact that a large number of local, private radio and television were established. At the same time the fact that news was produced only in the capital of Greece had an influence on local societies which were swamped for a whole period with non-local News. As mentioned above, post-war international economic development led to a considerable development of the Greek economy and has brought important changes in the relation between the centre and the provinces. In the 90s, in particular, strong tendencies of decentralization and regional development, which worked very powerfully on the part of the regional press, were observed (Skamnakis: 2005: 258). Under these circumstances, the non-local character of news in regional media and in the daily local press has begun changing gradually. Today there is regional media, daily newspapers in particular, promoting the local character of news, which is related mainly to economic development in specific areas of the country. Many regional and local media especially in the last ten years started to invest not only in the printing and news technologies sector but also to the new working positions including journalism jobs.

In many cases, though that is not always the rule, local events of a political or cultural nature start assuming significant importance for the regional media. At the same time, specific local dailies acquire more and more of a commercial character, marketing and sales being a main aspect of them; this brings a significant improvement in their financial (Demertzis-Skamnakis: 1998: 202)

Regional Newspapers

Today there are daily regional newspapers with extended local news reporting that have an enormous readership and a degree of influence in the local society that in some cases is between 65-80%; they are competitive even with the Athenian dailies. The same tendency is observed with certain local radio and regional television taking into account, of course, the historical differences and the special conditions of their creation.

An important historical feature of the development of daily regional press in Greece which differentiates it from the evolution of regional newspapers in other European countries is the limited character of its circulation, usually within a prefecture or town. This element helps considerably not only the shaping of its identity but also its evolution, due to the limited character of the market within which it is forced to circulate. As has already been mentioned, the almost complete absence of truly regional newspapers and a domination of prefectural ones through the years is due to historical reasons. The majority of daily local papers work as individual or family enterprises, although the last 10 years some of them employ 35-75 persons, which is reasonably substantial. It should also be emphasised that the number of titles is quite big compared to the size of the country. In the beginning of 2005 the number of daily local newspapers was 160 throughout the country.

Two other main features of daily regional press in Greece are the small size and the simplicity of the papers (an average Greek local newspaper has about 16-24 pages) as well as the low circulation. Very few of the daily regional newspapers sell more than 5,000 copies daily. It is estimated that the newspapers with the highest circulation are *Eleftheria* in Larissa, 21,000 copies, *Patris* in Hiraklio,

Crete 11,500 copies. *Chanian News* also in Crete 10,000 copies, *Peloponnisos* and *Thessalia* published in Patras and Volos correspondingly, 8,000 copies. *Neos Agon* of Karditsa and *Patris* of Pyrgos have also about 8,000 copies. According to publishers themselves, since there is no official register of their circulation, such as those from Athens, the average daily total circulation must be between 300,000-350,000 copies (Demertzis-Skamnakis: 2000: 201). However, if we take into account that the average daily circulation of daily Athenian newspapers, morning and evening ones, throughout Greece, for the first three months of 2006 was about 406,000 copies then the circulation of daily local must be considered to be satisfactory. A recent readership research by Metron Analysis shows the following relationship between regional dailies and that of Athens. There are four main factors that explain the profile of daily local press in Greece:

- Low and unequal development of the Greek regions. The lack of centralization of the Greek region and its dependence on Athens on many aspects does not create broadened needs capable of overcoming the problem of the reading audience the number of which is very limited in some cases.
- The involvement of local newspapers in local clientelistic networks, which forms a basic means of competition and showing-off in local societies. At this point the answer of 30% of publishers in a related question is quite interesting. They replied that it is necessary for the press to play a role in the conflicts in politics (Demertzis: 1996: 49).
- The entrance of the press of the centre on the reading audience of the region. Today almost half of the circulation of Athenian newspapers is being absorbed in the region. As part of this strategy in most provincial

towns Athenian newspapers continue to circulate early in the morning at 10.00 o'clock, unlike in Athens where they circulate at 12.00.

- Localism in Greek provinces which through the splintering of priorities that involves works as a barrier towards the development of broader groups of the reading audience for the creation of big regional newspapers.

It should be noted that the existing framework of the function of local daily newspapers, both that of law and institutional, prevents phenomena of concentration tendencies in the domain of regional media. For example Law 2328 of 1995 do not allow the ownership of more than two regional dailies.

The selection of topics in provincial newspapers depends a lot on the profile of their publication: daily local newspapers publish news concerning main interests of the local society and then general issues such as tradition, environment and regional development. The geographical distribution has some peculiarities that are due to the combination of political, cultural, journalistic and economic factors at certain places (Demertzis: 1996: 132). The cultural importance of newspapers is not negligible. Due to the small climax of local societies regional newspapers can show the local cultural identity and function as a supplement to other media without yielding to localism. Furthermore, apart from the fact that new journalists can begin their career working in regional newspapers, they also take the responsibility of shaping a new attitude towards newspapers and life, in general, on the part of the readers and help to a large extent the strategic planning of cultural policy in the Greek region. A prospect like this is difficult to be shaped since the development of electronic media in the centre and locally due to the appearance of private radio and television has changed the already problematic

situation. Only a few big newspapers tend to survive provided that they help their tendencies of regionalisation that have existed for a short time.

Local Radio

Since 1990 and till today private radio developed considerably as far as a number of broadcasting stations is concerned. According to figures provided by the Ministry of Media and Press by the beginning of 1998 many other stations have been recorded all over Greece. Crete: 111 stations, Peloponissos: 225, Ipiros: 59, Thrace: 54 (six of them are said to be owned by the Muslim minority living in the region), Thessalia: 134, islands of Ionian Sea, islands of Aegean Sea: 167, Macedonia: 203 (Thessaloniki excluded), Sterea Ellada and Evia: 157. The radio stations of Athens (472) and Thessaloniki (124) should be added to these numbers, too. That means that the total number of the stations in Greece was 1744 (Demertzis-Skamnakis: 1998: 211). There were also 19 regional stations of the public Helleniki Radiophonia (ERA) and a public-station, the Hellenic Radio of Macedonia, as a part of the public regional television ET 3. Today the total official number is significantly reduced to 777 (Vasilaki et al: 2005:39).

Local and Regional Television

In a previous chapter we explained that the de-regulation of the telecommunications and the broadcasting field in Europe was a determining development in the context of capitalism. This particular market, where the state had the monopoly, was to be altered and extended with the introduction of private capital. During a decade the map of the broadcasting media in the whole of Europe had changed. It is characteristic that during the beginning of the '80s, in 17 European countries there were only 5 private television channels, 4 of them in Luxembourg and one in Great Britain, compared to 36 public ones. 'Towards the

end of the '80s the landscape had changed dramatically. The number of private ones reached 38 and the number of public 41' (Demertzis- Skamnakis: 1998: 18). In 2004 in Greece alone there were 8 national and 135 regional channels, of which 116 functioned on a regular basis' (Panagiotopoulou: 2004: 137).

The first private regional and local channels started operating in various towns in Greece. Regional and local television in Greece appeared and developed at the same time with deregulation. In fact, the development of regional television is defined to a large extent by the appearance of private television in Athens.

In 1989 Act 1866, as we already said, changed the conditions in the sector of television and offered companies and Local Authorities the opportunity to operate local television channels. The operation of dozens of local television stations started right away, without any kind of operation licenses. In 1993 there was an important progression as far as licenses for television channels are concerned. After a proposal by the National Broadcasting Council and a ministerial decision on July 23rd 1993 a license was given to six channels of national range, mentioned before, and five local ones (three in Athens and two in Thessaloniki). Those regional and local television channels that had not been given a license continued to operate illegally.

In 1994, under Act 2181, provisional licenses were given by the local authorities. These licenses, however, were asked back by the Ministry in charge with the Law 2328/95, article 5, Section 3 because of problems appearing on the state telecommunications system. With Section 1, Article 1 an extension was given to the licenses of television channels that operated on article 4, Act 1866/89. The extension was for one year only. After the end of the year with Act 2438/96 the licenses of the channels were extended for 9 more months. Since May 29th 1997

all television channels, regional ones or not, operated without a license. Between 1990 and 1995 167 applications for licenses had been made: 38 of them were in Attica, 15 were in Thessaloniki and 99 in other areas. In the meantime, some of the applicants resigned their demands, while other channels stopped broadcasting (Demertzis-Skamnakis: 2000: 214). It is estimated that in March 19th 1998, the day before making the applications for licenses about 149 regional and local channels had been applied for all over Greece (Panagiotopoulou:2004:124). Some of them worked for a short period, other channels were existing as companies without having any kind of programme. Moreover, there were additionally some TV channels that had either not applied for a license, since they did not meet the law requirements, or had merged with other channels. The Law 2328 influences the development of regional and local channels being innovative in the following way: unlike the provincial daily press which had been confined to a purely local-prefectural level, at least so far, provincial television had to operate on two different levels, regional and local-prefectural. After 5 years, in 2003, the total number of the regional and local television channels was reduced to 135 (Panagiotopoulou: 2004:192).

Minority Media in Greece

The singularity of Greece as a country that has been constituted on the basis of a national controversy in the wider Balkans on the one hand, and of an unstable democracy and a semi-parliamentary system on the other, defined to a great extent the policy towards minorities.

The Balkan countries are characterized by the existence of different state-nations and ethnic communities. The latter, in many cases, were closer affiliated with the neighbouring countries than with the nation-state in which they lived. In cases

where various ethnic groups were not assimilated but continued to have certain language or religious elements and a different identity, the policy of the official Greek State had been to acknowledge them as religious minorities. In that it also contributed of course to the international treaties that, for the benefit of diplomacy and of balance in the Balkans, acknowledged the minorities not on the basis of national criteria but of religious ones. The Muslim minority that includes the Pomaks of Thrace is in that category. This Muslim minority, through individuals, has a number of 11 newspapers, 7 local radios and a monthly magazine that are based in the prefectures of Rodope and Xanthi (Skamnakis et al: 2004: 175).

In the field of the printed media two weekly newspapers stand out, the *Triakyanin Sesi* and *Gundem*, whereas occasionally the newspapers *Diyalog*, *Ozgur Balkan* and *Ileri* are published also. All the above-mentioned newspapers are based in Komotini. There is also a monthly magazine the *Azin-licka*

In the field of radio there are at least 7 local radio stations. The *Isik FM*, *City FM* and *Joy FM* in Komotini, and in Xanthi *Kral FM*, *King FM* and *Tele Radio*.

Important is the presence of a daily regional newspaper, *Paratiritis of Thrace* (Observer of Thrace), published in Komotini, whose publishers although do not belong to the minority have chosen to include in their newspaper daily news in the Turkish language. Besides the Muslim minority of Thrace other minorities, for example the Jews, whose number has been limited after the World War II to around 5.000, don't seem to have any serious activity in the field of the media. The same thing goes for the bilingual Slavic-Greek speaking population in Northern Greece and for the Armenians (Georgiou: 2001).

In the field of the immigrants there is significant activity. The Albanian community, beside the Albanian newspapers that are imported from the

neighboring country on a daily basis, is able to be informed by *Gazeta e Athines*, a weekly Albanian newspaper that is published in Athens.

The Russian-speaking immigrants and many of the same descent from the ex-USSR are able to be informed by the weekly newspapers Athenian Courier, Athenian Sun, Omonoia and *Athens-Plus*, whereas the immigrants from Bulgaria from the weekly newspapers Bulgaria Today, *Bulgarian Voice*, *Becth* and *Kohtakth*. Of course Russian and Bulgarian newspapers are being imported on a daily basis from these countries.

The weekly Athens Weekly Report and the semimonthly *Panorama* inform the Arab-speaking immigrants, whereas the weekly *Aawaz Athens* informs the immigrants from Pakistan. There is also a monthly bulletin *Hearts* for immigrants from the Philippines. Finally, the presence of the weekly newspaper *Kurier Atenski*, which is one of the first newspapers for immigrants, that informs the Polish living in Greece (Skamnakis et al: 2004:177).

In the broadcasting sector, the national radio broadcasts special programs for the immigrants in 12 languages, but there is always the problem of low radio ratings, whereas in television there hasn't been yet any systematic News programme for the minorities or the immigrants. However, in 2005, the municipality radio of Athens, 9.84 FM, introduced a radio news programme in several languages including Albanian, Russian, Polish, and Bulgarian etc.

Press Agencies

The Athens News Agency was established, as we have already seen, in 1895 as a private News Agency. In 1905 it was bought by the Greek Government. In 1994, ANA became a Societe Anonyme with a seven-member Board of Directors three

of whom are appointed by the government, one each by the journalist unions of Athens and Thessaloniki, the publishers' association and the ANA employees. ANA collaborates with the international news agencies Reuters, AFP, DPA, ITAR-TASS and a number of national news agencies. All the ANA service are on-line with an estimate 250 news items in Greek and 10-15 items in English updated daily. It also publishes a bi-lingual English and French news bulletin containing all the Greek and major international news. 'The ANA employs 250 persons of which 160 are journalists and it has offices in Brussels, Istanbul, Nicosia and Bonn. There are correspondents in New York, Washington, Montreal, Melbourne, London, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Moscow, Scopje and Belgrade' (Voulelis: 2005: 2).

The *Macedonian Press Agency* started operating in 1991. Its establishment was the result of a will expressed by all local and regional media organisations. Today, the MPA has an office with 5 correspondents in Athens while it also has correspondents in Washington, New York, Melbourne, Toronto, Brussels, Sofia, Skopje, Tirana, Bucharest and Moscow. MPA offers on a 24-hour basis political, cultural and economic news and information on events taking place in Greece and internationally with a special emphasis on issues concerning the Balkans.

In 2006, with the Law 3444, the two press agencies were unified, and the name of the new press agency is now *Athens and Macedonian Press Agency*. This unification is still under way, mainly as far as the organizational issues are concerned.

The Journalism Profession

According to recent research about the journalism profession in Greece 45 percent of working journalists in Greece have a university degree and 10 percent postgraduate studies (V-PRC:2005). However most of them have a diploma in Law, Philosophy and Social and Political Sciences while only a 22% percent have studied in one of the three departments of Communication at the Greek universities. Additionally 10 percent have a Degree in communication or media from a foreign university. The low percentage of journalists with a degree in Communication and Mass Media studies or Journalism is related to the recent establishment of these departments.

63 percent of journalists in Greece have specialised studies in Journalism but the majority of them in the various private colleges. Finally 82 percent have never followed further training programmes on journalism. Today, there are five major Journalists' Union in Greece, members of the Panhellenic Federation of Journalists' Unions (*POESY*) established in 1995. In 2000 the total number of journalists, in all five unions, was 3,666 (Skamnakis: 2000: 114), while in 2005 it was 6,316 (Tsalapatis: 2005).

JOURNALISTS' UNION MEMBERSHIP

YEAR	2000	2005
J. U. of Athens Daily Newspapers	2500	4365
J. U. of Macedonia and Thrace	333	695
J. U. of Ipirus, Peloponnisus and Islands	119	158
J. U. of Thessaly, Sterea Ellada and Evia	107	164
J. U. of Periodical Press	607	934

This increase in the members' number, especially of the associations of Athens and those of Macedonia and Thrace, is important. Within five years the union of Athens increased its members by 75%, while the union of Macedonia-Thrace by more than 100%. The increase of the journalists of periodical press, which during the same period is about 50%, is also important. Probably during the last years these three unions decided to become more open to new members.

This is confirmed by research conducted by V-PRC, in which 70% of those who were asked answered that they were members of a journalistic union. So, based on all the above-mentioned, the total number of journalists in Greece should be about 9,500-10,000.

However it is almost impossible to estimate the exact number of working journalists including free-lancers. The journalism profession in Greece is open to everybody according to the Greek Constitution. Anybody who wants to can call themselves a journalist without having to produce any particular qualification to any authority. Indeed, there are 'journalists' who have never seen a newsroom work from the inside. 48,1% of journalists entered the field between 1990-1996 during the spectacular changes in the Greek media landscape. The 41% of the journalists agree that there is a serious problem of corruption and 50% that simply there is a problem. 20% also agree that there is a problem concerning the journalist's dependence whereas the 59% are only a little satisfied by the quality of information.

In the field of the professional unions, after 1990 a series of unions were established. Those were mainly unions of owners of regional Media. In 1995, the Union of Regional Television (EPEK) was established, which had as its main

subject the issuance of licenses and the distribution of the public advertisements to the regional media, according to the relative law (Demertzis- Skamnakis: 2000:118). Television channels of regional and local range co-existed in this union. A new union of television stations was established in 1996. The 12 bigger television channels left from EPEK and established the Union of Owners of Regional Television of Greece (EIPETIME).

In 1998 some efforts for the re-union of the two unions were made, but without any results. Instead, a new union, Greek Regional Television (TEP) was established, in which almost all the members of EIPETIME joined, and as a result EIPETIME was dissolved (Panagiotopoulou: 2004: 185). Today in the field of regional and local television there are two unions, EPEK and TEP.

In 1997 another union, the Daily Regional Newspaper Association, was established, as a result of a split in the Union of Owners of the Daily Provincial Newspapers. Both unions are members of the World Newspaper Association. So, today in the field of the daily regional newspapers there are also two professional unions. The first has the 53 larger newspapers (Alexiou: 2005) while the second has 107 newspapers (Aslanoglou: 2005).

In 2001, a union of local radios of the region was established, the Panhellenic Union of Owners of Greek Radios (PEIRAS).

At the same time in Athens two unions of owners were established. The first is the Association of Private Television Stations' Owners of National Coverage (EITISEE). It had been established in 2003 and brought together all 6 owners of private TV stations of national coverage. The second is the Athens Independent Radio Station Association (EIIRA). It was established in 1993 and it brings all 35

radio stations; owners operating in Athens. Finally, a union of local radio-stations was created in Salonica.

Journalism and Communication education

Since 1992 one more department involved in the communication studies was founded, the Department of Communication and Cultural Technology of the University of the Aegean located on the island of Lesbos and other universities introduced courses in Communication like the Department of Political Sciences of the University of Crete. Additionally, there are three new departments at the Higher Technological Educational Institutes (HTEI). The Department of Public Relations and Communication of the Higher Technological Educational Institute of Western Macedonia founded in 1999 the Department of Information and Mass Media of the Higher Technological Educational Institute of Patras founded in 2003 and the Department of Public Relations and Communication of the Higher Technological Educational Institute of Ionian Islands founded in 2005 in Kefalonia. Besides that, it should be noted, that the non-establishment of a higher school of journalism in Greece was partly due to the literary tradition of Greek journalism, a tradition that required from the journalist to possess talent rather than some sort of basic education.

In France and Italy, however -countries with equally strong literary traditions in journalism- schools of journalism were already established since the beginning of the century (Skamnakis:2000). Apparently, there was a combination of factors that contributed, in a negative way, to any attempts of founding a journalism school in Greece as it was explained above.

The spectacular expansion of audiovisual media at the beginning of the 90's caused an equally spectacular expansion of the journalism education via the so-called Centres of Laboratory Studies (KEΣ), many of which were, later on, with the introduction of post-secondary education, transformed into Institution of Professional Training (IEK).

At the same time the European Commission Financial Framework towards Greece and other European programs allowed for the so-called Centres of Professional Training (KEK) to offer tuition in journalism to young people, especially unemployed ones. The training of this kind was, of course, insufficient, due to the general problem that characterised the nature of the programs, as well as, the manner of formation of the centres themselves.

Generally, we can identify four kinds of journalist education and training in Greece nowadays:

- The official education on the field of Communication, Culture and Media is offered by University Departments. In these Departments, journalism is being taught, as part of an overall program of studies that does not lead to a degree in journalism but in Communication. However the Department of Journalism and Communication of Aristoteleion University in Thessaloniki offers a complete course of studies on journalism.
- The Institutes of Professional Training (IEK), public or private, offer two-year-long courses, under the supervision of the Ministry of Education via the responsible body, the Organisation of Professional Education and Training (OEEK). During 1998-99, there were 11 public and 16 private IEK that offered training courses on journalism (Skamnakis:2000: 136).

- Centres of Laboratories Studies (Kentra Eleftheron Spoudon- KEΣ) usually offer two-year-long- courses. It is estimated that, by the end of the 90's there were approximately 25 KEΣ, which offered studies in journalism, non-accredited by the state. Some of these KEΣ, nowadays, collaborate with British or American Colleges to offer four-year-long courses in journalism, which are still not recognized by the Greek government and finally the, usually three-month-long, learning seminar-courses for the unemployed, which are materialised through KEK. However, serious problems, concerning their quality and control, come up during their application.

In conclusion, since 1990, basic journalism education and training in Greece- official or not- is going through a thriving phase, of a quantitative manner though. This boom caused contradictions that applied a lot of pressure on the profession, especially due to an oversupply of the workforce. However, the basic problem, of continuing education and retraining of journalists and other professionals of the field, remains. That is, while issues concerning the existence of various forms of basic education have been resolved, especially after 1990, the problem of an institutional form of further education for the professionals of the field still remains. Such forms of education exist in Western Europe for many years now while they recently started developing, for different reasons though, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. All these educational institutions of further education for journalists and other media professionals were established after common attempts/initiatives of the professional unions of the field. In Greece, this gap still remains with the only exception of the research conducted by the Prefecture of Chania in 1998 about the formation of a Mediterranean Centre of Journalism, which would have an international character and basic directions on

further education, retraining and on applied research. The initiative is undertaken now by the Daily Regional Newspaper Association and the Institute is expected to start its activities within 2006.

Press subsidies

Since 1990 state support for the press was strengthened even more. It should be said, however, that the state support was organized with a more objective base. The “secret funds” were cut and loans were a subject of free negotiation between publishers and the banks without the direct intervention of the government. The most important development in the area of press subsidies was the regulation of state advertisement. With Law 2328 of 1995 the appropriation of funds of the state advertisement was divided, with certain criteria of readership and circulation, between national and regional media. 70 percent of the total budget was given to the national media and 30 percent to the regional. However the implementation of this Law never took place in the case of regional media and for this reason the regional unions had expressed their disaffection to the government many times. Governmental officials and state administrators favour the national media because of the clientelistic relations. For this reason the government with Law 3166 of 2003 set up a special committee within the General Secretariat of Communication in order to observe the right implementation of the Law.

In the press subsidies such as free plane tickets were given to accredited journalists that participated in the official visits abroad of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. In the press subsidies we should add a huge amount of money that comes from the obligatory publications and announcements of the Local Authorities, public organizations, ministries, universities and other

public institutions. The same exists for the reduction of charges in the electricity bill and state insurances for the staff of the newspapers which are lower than other companies. Nobody can estimate the total amount of press subsidies which belong to these categories. The system of the press subsidies is not new. It was developed mainly in continental Europe especially during the '60s and the '70s. In some countries, like Greece, this system was used to increase the tight interdependence between the political world and the media.

APPENDIX 5: OWNESHIP OF TV STATIONS

SHARES OF TV STATIONS 2005

ANTENNA TV

<i>Holnest Investments Ltd</i> (Kiriakou Minoas 100%)	25%
<i>Globecast Holdings Ltd</i> (Kiriakou Theodoros 100%)	24,50%
<i>Altavista Global Holdings Ltd</i> (Kiriakou Xenofon 100%)	24,50%
<i>Praxis Global Holdings Ltd</i> (Kiriakou Athina 100%)	24,50%
Gourdomichalis Efstathios	0,85%
<i>The Bank of New York</i>	0,65%

ALPHA

Kodominas Dimitrios	24,08%
Psaras Giorgos	25%
<i>Mantelord Investments Limited</i> (Kodomina Maria 100%)	22,22%
<i>Interfinance - systems of financial services SA</i>	25%

ALPHA Entertainment SA (Kodomina Maria 75%, Kodominas Dimitris 25%)	3,71%
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100,01%

ALTER (FREE TV SA)

Modern Times SA (Gianikou Ekaterini 97,86%, Gianikos Konstadinos 2,14%)	25,00%
PRESS Hellas Greek Publishing and Printing Company (Kouris Giorgos 98,6%, Kouris Andreas 1,3%)	11,42%
Kouris Giorgos	13,58%
Kouris Andreas	15,45%
Love Radio Broadcasting SA. (Kouris Andreas 90%, Vandorou Maria 10%)	9,39%
Marfin Classic AEEEX (Laxey Greek Investments, Marfin AEPPEY, Koubas SA Sharings, Union Bancaire Prive, Altec ABEE)	4,67%

MACEDONIA TV

Viewership One-Person Company of Restricted Responsibility (Mitrou Georgios 100% [trasfer under approval])	25%
Kabilafkas Ioannis	24%
Chalkidi Vera	1,98%
Ραδιοτηλεοπτικές Συμμετοχές Μονοπρόσωπη ΕΠΕ (Xanthopoulos Georgios 100%)	25%
Television Activities Μονοπρόσωπη LTD (Papadopoulos Stefanos 100%)	24,02%

MEGA (TILETIPOS SA)

Journalism Organisation of Labrakis (Labrakis Christos 50,003%, Savidi Lena 6,442%, Labraki Anna 8,842%)	10,76%
PEGASUS PUBLISHING (Bobola Maria 34,401%,Bobolas Photios 27,619%,Bobolas Georgios 11,230%)	22,46%
X.K. TEGOPOULOS PUBLISHING (Tegopoulos Christos 34,32%, Tegopoulou Marianthi 18,64%, Tegopoulou Eleni 18,64%)	12,28%
Greek Company of portfolio investments S.A	2,87%
FIDELITY Investment Found Europe	2,95%
EFG Eurofinanciere D' Investissements S.A.M.	2,75%

STAR CHANNEL

Dasen Holdings Limited (Vardinogiani Vardiana 100%)	22,41%
Fedilia S.A. (Tsatsakis Miron 99,5%, Duphil Eric 0,5%)	12,38%
Mooreefields S.A. (Vardinogiani Anastasia 99,995%, Canepa Michele 0,005%)	24,84%
Blue Sky Holdings S.A. (Chatzis Ioannis 99,7%, Plaka Vasiliki 0,3%)	1,66%
Blue Dime Holdings S.A. (Vardinogianis Dimosthenis 99,89%, Kelaidi Aglaia 0,11%)	4,90%
Hogrid Holdings Limited (Vasiliadis Georgios 100%)	2,56%
Amnatos S.A. (Papadogianakis Emanouil 99,9%, Paulus Camille 0,01%)	25%

<i>Press Foundation S.A</i> (foundation of Lilian Voudouri 100%)	5%
<i>Foundation of Lilian Voudouri</i>	1,25%

TELECITY

Karatzafelis Ioannis	25%
Skandalakis Konstadinos	25%
Koukakis Dimitrios	25%
Sfikas Fotis	24,50%
Papathanasopoulos Spilios	0,50%

MAD TV

Kouris Andreas	25%
Kouris Gerasimos	25%
Paliouras Theodoros	2,22%
Andreopoulos Konstadinos	19,23%
Vasiliou Ioannis	1,39%
Kouri Aggeliki	25%

Kosmatos Nikolaos	1,46%
Aggelopoulos Anastasios	0,56%
Tsapaliaris Dimosthenis	0,14%

CHANNEL 10

Tragas Georgios	25%
Markoulidaki Vasiliki	25%
Dales Georgios	25%
Karagianis Panagiotis	2,50%
Photopoulos Panagiotis	2,50%
Kounoupiotis Nikolaos	2,50%
Vosos Ioannis	2,50%
Trakada Ourania Maria	2,50%
Sachini Anna	2,50%
Protopapas Panagiotis	2,50%
Protopapas Dimitrios	2,50%
Protopapas Aris	2,50%

Zwi Efstathia	2,50%
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902 LEFT

<i>Communist Party Of Greece</i>	25%
Triadafilis Georgios	25%
Kourkounis Nikolaos	25%
Mixou Aggeliki	25%

100%

COSMOPOLIS

<i>POLIS NET CONSULTANTS AE</i> (Tsotsoros Efstathios 100%)	24,99%
<i>WORLD HELLENIC INFORMATION CONDUCT OF ELECTRONIC DATA S.A</i> (Kopanelis Ioannis 99%, Charisi Irene 1%)	25,00%
<i>AEP</i>	25%
<i>Athletic Radiostation</i>	9,97%
<i>New Time</i>	14,99%
<i>METEP</i>	0,07%

From the analysis of the above data elements arise that are directly in contrast with Law 2328/95 about the participation of a physical or legal person up to the 25% of the total of the shares, and also of their relatives up to forth degree of

kinship. The cases of Ant1 and Star Channel are characteristic. In Ant1 four members of the same family own 88.5% through other companies that they own by 100%.

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Grigoropoulos Antonios (President, Union of Local Radio Stations)

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